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CHAPTER 1

CLASSIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
Like any science, sociology must somehow effect a marriage between
explanation and evidence.

However, since sociology has not outlined a

single vision of the world, we have no one way to perform the ceremony.
Here I am proposing a standardized typological format for examining the
various relationships we now permit between our theoretical ideas about
some social event and our strategies for supporting these ideas.

The for-

mat includes a series of typologies--individual theoretical works classified according to research approaches, subject matter, and other variables
--along with a procedure for evaluating the system.

With the classifica-

tion I have examined several hypotheses about both internal relationships
between components of a theory-research combination and the effects of
outside, non-theoretical forces.

Finally, I have indicated some implica-

tions for theoretical reformulations, resolution of controversies, and
other possibilities suggested by the classification system.
Clearly no one variable dimension would be sufficient for inspecting
theory-research relationships and assessing their importance in theory
building.

For example, we could rate sociological theories according to the

degree of concern they display for interpreting subjective elements--ranging
from theories that do not even allude to the existence of norms, values, and
other social-mental constructs to theories that explicitly consider these constructs as cause and effect in social life but still remain "positive" only
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because they preceed interpretive analysis with some description of
objective behavior.

We could develop a

sc~le

of subjectivity by simply

counting the number of subjective components in each theory.

A typology

with such a scale based on increasing concern with subjective elements
could prove very discriminating, assuming that each new concern adds to
the sum of all the others; to illustrate, that a theory incorporating
values also considers norms, that a theory including socialization also
includes norms and values, that each incorporation includes all previous ones.

Often, however, reality does not arrange itself so neatly.

A theory might include a number of subjective elements without respect
to order.

Counting the number of variables in this manner might pro-

duce a scale of increasing subjectivity which groups Parsons and Marx
in one category simply because both observed a relationship between

values and structures.
classification.

Most sociologists would not accept such a

Furthermore, given an interest in theory-research

connections, we might want to ask questions outside the scope of such
one-dimensional typologies: Do interpretive sociologists examine cultural values as part of a sequence in social change or a construction

in stable reality?

Do they prefer to arrange their evidence to build

an inductive theory or to substantiate deductive models?
~roubling

Or--a more

question--Does the whole interpretive-positivistic framework

relate to other facets of their work at all?

Thus, the simple inter-

pretive-positivistic classification may prove so broad, so inclusive,
so heterogeneous that it does not really tell us anything.
On the other hand, detailed classifications often lead directly

to conceptual overload thus undermining any rationale for a typology.

As Bailey (1972; 1973a; 1973b) noted about the mini-max dilemma in
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typology construction: in order to be truly useful, a concept should
have a minimum number of types and each type should have a maximum
amount of homogeneity.

Perhaps 192 types of theory exist in "reality"

or could be coaxed from a computer.

But it is easier for us to under-

stand two or three.
As the first step toward choosing a proper course, we must con-

sider how a typology may be used in further analysis (Weber, 1905:16488; 1918:141).

Distinguishing between rational, traditional and

charismatic legitimacy, for example, enables us to explore different
kinds of behavior among those who exercise authority.

Further, these

types help us to investigate the link between patterns of legitimacy
and other social features like religious perspectives or levels of
economic development.

It would be impossible to adequately understand

patterns of authority if we either

exa~ined

authority as a unitary con-

cept or looked at each authority figure individually.

In the first

instance, authority could relate to all other group variables indiscrtminately since some kind of authority exists in all stable groups.
In the second situation, it is likely that authority figures would each
display a unique set of concomitant variables.

Clearly we need typolo-

gies to dispel the conceptual confusion.
Applying Weber's basic principle to theoretical typologies, I
suggest there are two general kinds of analysis that can be performed:
1.

An examination of formal elements within a theory system

2.

--for example, the links between inductive arguments and
systems models;
An exploration of outside forces affecting theory construction--an ideology, the introduction of a new tool,
other possible influences.

In sum, I am presenting a system that can contribute to teaching,
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theoretical reformulation, and exploration in the sociology of knowledge.
The typology should identify clusters of similar works thus providing a
map of the theoretical terrain simple enough for beginners, detailed
enough to interest those of us more familiar with the territory.
Analysis of the internal properties of each type should suggest missing
ideas, new conceptual combinations, extended arguments.

Inquiry about

the social background of various thinkers should tell us whether similar
backgrounds inspire similar ideas.

Such analysis, however, requires

many variables, far too many for a single-dimension typology.

It also

requires a fairly mechanical, standardized technique for assigning
theorists to categories based on these variables and for reducing the
categories to a mini-max classification.

Toward this end, I have

developed a classification system--not a simple typology--designed to
deal successively with limited sets

o~

variables and limited number of

theorists selected according to whatever questions one may choose to
address about the various relationships between explanation and evidence.
I will begin my classification system in this chapter by enumerating other approaches to theory-typology construction.

Chapters II and

III outline the mechanisms of my approach, first the rationale for
chosing specific trait variables, next some specific hypotheses argued
from the sociology of sociology, finally some technical problems of
systematics based on numerical taxonomy.

The next two chapters detail

types of sociological theory described by numerical taxonomy.

In

Chapter IV I use the system to look for Kuhn paradigms in sociology
and, in Chapter V, I explore theory reformulation possibilities for

s
stratification, religious asceticism, and other topics that happened
to appear in the works used here.

Chapter VI examines the ties between

theory types and social influences both in specific tests for hypothetical influences and in reformulations of works by members of
"opposed" social groups.

In the final chapter, I speculate briefly

about the future utility of numerical taxonomy in theory construction.
Trends in Theory Classification
To date, typologists have devised classifications rather than
classification systems and used artistic judgment rather than a more
mechanical apptoach both for the creation of the taxonomy itself and
for the assignment of theorists to various categories.

Their work

naturally reflects the changing orientation of the field: when Sorokin
wrote Contemporary Sociological Theories in 1928, he classified Emile
Durkheim as a sociologistic theorist; recently Turner (1974) discussed
Durkheim as a forerunner of modern functionalism.

But, historical

differences aside, typologists also illustrate long-term theoretical
interests by using similar kinds of categories for their classifications.
Without trying to outline a typology of typologies, I would
suggest that a classifier's personal definition of theory, however
·vague, shapes his categories.

Many define theory as some sort of

formal construct, perhaps a set of propositions logically derived from
some basic axioms.

Of course, sociologists have not agreed on what

these formal properties might be (Ward, 1973), but many look for some
underlying logic, some model of science, some perspective or view of
the world, distinguishing the types of theory.

Others define theory as
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a way to describe the "guts of the phenomenon" (Stinchcombe, 1968:15)
and may prefer to classify theory according to its content rather than
its formal properties.

These typologists would be more apt to group

theories about community or power phenomena than theories
positivistic approach.

who use a

But, with either conceptualization, classifiers

often look outside of sociology itself for explanations of why theorists
chose a particular model of science or subject matter at a particular
time.
Sorokin (1928), an example from the first group, identified key
variables for various "schools:" mechanistic sociology used the concepts of physics, chemistry, and mechanics; biological-social demography
described social life as the effect of population increase or decline.
Martindale (1960) traced the philosophical roots of positive organicism,
formal (Kantian) sociology, and other branches with a distinctive set of
intellectual origins.

Timasheff

(1967) used similar basic reasoning

but changed his classification variables from political ideology (social
Darwinism) to national background (Russian subjectivism) to scientific
strategy (analysis) to independent variable (psychological sociology).
More recently Turner (1974) named four key perspectives or "paradigms"
(without ever defining his use of the term) along with one alternative
perspective.

In a systematic rigorous fashion, he then examined the

common assumptions and strategies of functionalism, conflict theory,
interactionism, exchange theory, and ethnomethodology.
illustrates the "guts" orientation.

Nisbet (1966)

In The Sociological Tradition, he

identified five key nineteenth-century concerns (community, authority
status, sacredness, alienation) and discussed how interest in these
topics has informed sociology to this day.

Using logic and research
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practice rather than tradition to define the crucial subject matter,
Boskoff (1969; 1972) listed generic concerns explored by sociology,
problems like group formation, deviation, control, and change.
Traditional classifiers have also looked beyond the subject
matter and formal properties of sociology to the historical forces
shaping the intellectual life of an era.

In other words, the

sociology of sociology is not a creation of the 1970s (Curtis, 1972).
Barnes (1948), for example, named both the industrial revolution and
scientific reformation as instrumental causes of early sociology.

In

his own work (1948) and in the three volumes he co-authored with Becker
(1938; 1961), he identified political ideologies, economic reverses,
national traditions, and other variables that could encourage different
formations of sociological theory.
Hinkle and Hinkle (1954)

Reviewing the American scene,

described three eras.

Before World War I,

sociologists shared a societal belief in progress, melioristic intervention, and the powers of positive science.

After the war, a less

optimistic America produced sociologistswho examined irrational forces
behind human behavior, oppressive structures in urban society, and the
disruptive forces of technological change.

After the Second World War,

sociologists, like other Americans, stressed utilitarian values: they
· wanted their science to be "useful."
Two movements within sociology seem particularly important for

theory classification during the 1970s.
in philosophy of science.

First, the growing interest

Comte and Spencer built their theoretical

eastles on the foundation of an organic analogy.
an organism, then ••••
could expect

. . ..

If society was like

If social groups developed as species do, we

During the 1960s Kaplan (1964), Brown (1964), and
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others articulated a much more technical model for social science based
on philosophical views of natural science along with examples already
set in social studies.

They outlined the logical structure of science,

the links between concepts and measures, the assumptions behind mathematical tools, the need for different analytic strategies.

In accord

with these interests, sociologists like Blalock (1961; 1969}, Gibbs
(1972}, Reynolds (1971}, Stinchcombe (1968}, Zetterberg (1954; 1965),
and others have written books specifically instructing students in the
art of theory construction with logic, with calculus, with linear
graphs, with other technical tools.

The way we explain a phenomenon is

becoming as important as what we explain.
Second, sociologists have become increasingly concerned with
identifying the particular social structures that affect theory development just as they have become ever more interested in the technical
details of the theory itself.
the sociology of knowledge.

This concern grew from early efforts in
Comte's typology of societal consensus,

Durkheim's formulation of how social organization creates collective
consciousness, Marx's hypotheses about the relationships between class
and ideology all foreshadow the modern interest in links between social
structure and scientific thought.

Weber, who spent his lifework detail-

ing the growth, correlates, and implications of rationalization in
Western thought, focused on rational science in "The meaning of 'ethical
neutrality' in sociology and economics" (1917}.
detested, certain aspects of rationalization.

Weber feared, even
On the other hand, he

believed his hope for civilization should not affect his use of data
or his interpretation of empirical reality.

This is the thrust of

Weber's famous plea for value-free sociology; not that values asso-
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ciated with our position in society have nothing to do with our choice of
a problem, but rather that we must separate our dreams from reality, our
preferences from the facts, our political commitments from the identification of truth.

To this day, sociologists continue to debate whether

science should be--or can be--"value free," often, however, without
properly considering what Weber meant by the term in the first place.
Moral issues aside, sociologists have also studied the empirical
problem of identifying where and how the social situation affects the
scientific enterprise.

Merton (1938) pioneered such empirical work

when he documented the ways religious-cultural values encouraged the
growth of science among seventeenth-century English Puritans.

More

recently, especially since the late 1950s, sociologists have examined
their own science, frequently by using the Marxist perspective and showing the ways scientific concepts reflect the interests of dominant
societal groups.

In his survey of the sociology of sociology, Curtis

(1972) reviewed four key trends: first, a long tradition of intellectual
histories such as those of Barnes (1948) detailing the impact of historical events on scientific thought; second, the studies of Becker and
Barnes (1938; 1961) and others who contrast intellectual trends in
different countries; then, a new but growing body of research about the
work styles, political preferences, publishing records, and sundry other
peculiarities of American sociologists; and finally, inquiry into the
specific areas where non-scientific values seem most likely to affect
the research process.
Thomas S. Kuhn has provided a natural framework for a combined
interest in philosophy of science and sociology of sociology.

In The

Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962; 1970) he explored the nature
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of paradigms (which he defined roughly as general frameworks delimiting
a subject matter, explanatory outline, and methodological strategy appropriate for some science).

He then described why a discipline may aban-

don one paradigm for another.

Contrary to our traditional view, this

shift is less gradual evolution than abrupt revolution.

The success of

a challenger depends partly on its ability to attract numerous pretigious adherents.

Thus, Kuhn defined science as a political activity

dependent on the social structure of its practitioners.
How do these developments affect theory typologies?

To begin,

instead of simply categorizing theories according to a basic framework
which they exhibit or from which they developed, typogists now use
the analytic properties of theory (enumerated by the work in technical
theory construction) as variables for developing categories.
Walter Wallace provides two examples of this new trend.

First,

consider the loosely defined typology of "positivistic" and "interpretive" theories already mentioned.

I choose these types because they

highlight problems that have informed sociology from the beginning
~agner,

1963).

However, additional variables could sharpen the typology

considerably by increasing homogeneity within categories at the cost of a
slight increase in the number of types.

Wallace (1969) expanded this

typology by distinguishing motor behavior from dispositional states,
independent variables from dependent variables, social causes from
non-social ones.
behavior.

All sociological theories, he noted, explain

social

But some, the subjective theories, stress dispositional

behavior--motives, aspirations, sentiments, meanings.

Others,

the objective theories, stress motor behavior--writing, speaking,
fighting, eating.

This distinction separates Parsons, who pointed to
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economic values as one of the defining features of a society, from
Marx, who identified class consciousness as an observable effect of
economic behavior and a prelude to further action.

To this division

Wallace added the differences between sociological subject matter (as
defined above) and several categories of variables theorists use to
account for this subject.

The added dimensions distinguish Marx, who

argued that economic situations affect behavior, from Cooley, who
showed how symbolic-meaningful exchange with others shapes a "lookingglass self" which later serves as a social conscience for the individual's economic (and other) action.
sketched a ten-cell table.

With this framework Wallace

His use of the logical structure of the

theory itself transformed a simple exercise in cataloging into an
analytical tool: besides exposing real differences between theories,
Wallace could point to an empty cell (the study of physiological
effects), a logical possibility not yet developed in sociology.
More recently, Wallace (1971) has developed a model depicting
various stages--or in Kuhn's terms, the various components of a
paradigm (1971:24nll)--for theory construction and testing.

He

recommends that we list possible strategies appropriate to each
stage, classify theorists within each according to their methodologies,
and then compare the different groups that form for different stages.
We could compare the data-gathering stage with the research-design
stage to ask if there is a tendency for participant observation
researchers to favor "grounded" or "emergent" theory building (Glaser
and Strauss; Huber).

Or we could look for variables outside the theory-

research sequence, for example, the influence of "schools" on various
approaches.

Wallace advocates typologies explicitly developed to
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examine such hypotheses about sociological theory, although he has not
applied the idea in his own research.
New trends in the sociology of sociology also affect the ways we
think about theory and, therefore, the ways we classify it.

In The

Coming· Crisis of Western Sociology, Gouldner (1970) hypothesizes that
the political nature of knowledge defines basic categories of theory.
Scientific knowledge, he argues, is possessed by the dominant groups in
society and formed in response to their needs.

According to Gouldner,

a functional-systems framework developed within American sociology to
provide the rationale for a stable political regime while 11arxist
analysis developed to support changing regimes of Eastern Europe.

He

predicts a growing crisis for academic functionalism created by the
growing American welfare state.

lve can resolve this crisis by incor-

porating Marxist change ideas into stable-system theories.
the

}~rxist-orientated

Meanwhile

sociology of political change prominent in

Soviet-Bloc countries will experience a similar crisis as non-revolutionary governments require a new ideology of stability.
In A Sociology of Sociology, Friedrichs (1970) revised the paradigm idea to make the social scientist's image of himself the essential paradigm-defining subject matter of sociology.

Social scientists,

he reasoned, chose a "prophetic" mission or a "priestly" one.

This

mission, in turn, forms the framework for their methodology, special
subject concerns, theoretical models, and other features of their
paradigm.

Although we may not believe in the specific doctrines of

this "theology of sociology" (Collins, 1974), we must seriously consider its central tenet positing the existence of non-rational motives
behind the rational enterprise of science.
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Instead of ideology, Mullins (1973) examined the social structure
of sociology for its relationship to theory formations.

In Theories

and Theory Groups in Contemporary Sociology, he divided the field into
symbolic interactionists, ethnomethodologists, and other groups of
theorists who cite common sources, who share a professional social
circle (as colleagues or students), or who are considered similar by
themselves and by others.

Then he traced the structures of friendship,

colleague relationships, and sponsorship to argue that these social
forms affect the eventual success or failure of a theoretical framework.
Without a spreading network of practitioners, a framework dies.
The paradigm conception reappears in a very recent work by George
Ritzer (1975).

After reviewing Kuhn's various formulations, Ritzer

defined paradigm as "a fundamental image of the subject matter" which
forms the "broadest unit of consensus within a science" defining "what
should be studied, what questions should be asked, how they should be
asked, and what rules should be followed in interpreting the answers
obtained" (1975:7). He then identified three basic sociological paradigms, or broad units of consensus, clustered around social facts,
social definitions, and social behavior.

The social factists study

structure and institutions, usually with questionnaire and interview
data.

Social definitionists often use participant observation to

examine the evaluation process conducted by individuals in the social
world.

The social behavioralists favor experiments to probe indi-

vidual behavior forming around a reward-cost motivation structure.
After defining his paradigms, Ritzer criticized each in detail, making
two key points: first, no one of the paradigms adequately explains all
of the phenomena we include within sociology even though some of its
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practitioners may think it does; second, some practitioners within each
paradigm seem peculiarly blind to the merits of contributions from
another camp.

Hence, social factists may denigrate the "soft" method-

ology of participant observation and definitionists retaliate with
remarks about the "incomplete" nature of hard data (Ritzer, 1975:13237).

Fortunately, other thinkers--most notably Marx, Durkheim, Weber

and Parsons--bridge the paradigms.

According to Ritzer, these giants

who straddle different camps may also suggest the ways that sociology
could,possibly, form a single scientific framework.
Both Wallace and Ritzer raise some problems I address with the
classification of theorists in this study.

Both authors highlight

important variables ranging from basic definitions of subject matter
to basic research strategies.

Both group theories by their internal

properties rather than philosophical-intellectual origins.

Ritzer

actually named three groups each of which contained a distinctive
definition of subject matter with a corresponding constellation of
theoretical and methodological ideas.

Wallace, on the other hand,

listed important elements of theory along with questions one might ask
about how these elements vary between different groups of theorists.
Although Wallace considered the qualities comprising a paradigm, he did
not attempt to demonstrate that such frameworks actually exist in
sociology.

Thus, Ritzer identified groups and then isolated the bridge

theorists who might provide clues for a common framework while Wallace
assumed these groups might be constantly changing as sociological
thought formed and reformed around various possible frameworks.
men focused on the relationship between theory and research.

Both

Both also

specified extra-theoretical forces, items unrelated to the truth or
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validity of a theory, that nevertheless shape the explanations we construct and the evidence we choose to support these propositions.
New Possibilities for Theory Classification and Analysis
I have constructed a new typological system along the lines
suggested by Wallace, a system to compare how authors who group
together in reference to one dimension may or may not group together
on another.
To do this I have classified theorists on six separate dimensions
(with four to eight variables each); 1) the abstract subject focus of
sociology; 2) abstract methodological strategies; 3) groups used as
units and objects of analysis; 4) group processes analyzed; 5) principle
data-gathering techniques; and 6) observational categories.

Examining

the typology as a whole and comparing the similarities and differences
between the six dimensions considered separately, I can discuss if there
are indeed fairly cohesive paradigms (as Ritzer claims) or if sociology
is still in a much more fluid state (as Wallace implies).

This pro-

cedure also locates the mavericks--although the typology alone cannot
tell us whether they are paradigm bridgers who transcend traditional
broundaries or simple eclectics who have not developed a coherent
thought system.

To make that distinction, I have examined a few

specific analytical problems as approached by mavericks and by mainliners.
Obviously one's choice of theorists (or more specifically theoretical works) constitutes another important set of variables.

The

classification begins with twenty-five works that appear to represent
a cross-section of sociological thought to date.

Some are classics

commonly accepted within the discipline; some are typical examples of
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trends we often cite as major directions in the field.

With this

initial group I have established a basic set of types locating both
typical and atypical theorists.

Later I can select additional groups

of theorists who--according to the ideas of various other classifiers-should belong to different types, for example, "priests" to compare
with "prophets" (Friedrichs) and "causal analysts" to compare with
"structuralists" (Mullins), and stratification theorists to compare
with community researchers (Nisbet).

But even with my initial group

of twenty-five, I can discuss theoretical contrasts and continuities
among theorists in terms of the trait variables used to identify types
of theory.
In sum, I am using a classification system to determine whether
philosophy-of-science variables can define clusters of theorists,
whether these clusters hold constant or 'Shift with different theoretical
dimensions, and whether extra-theoretical forces {political ideology,
structural group, substantive interest) affect these clusters.

CHAPTER II
VARIABLES FOR A THEORY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
aefore examining the nature and significance of classifications
in sociological theory, we face the critical tasks of choosing variables for the classifications themselves and determining what groups of
theorists we should attempt to classify.

Bailey (1973a; 1975) emphasized

the importance of variable selection--an aspect of typology building
which is still far more art than science.

Nevertheless, in efforts to

routinize the process, typologists have developed two approaches.

Work-

ing from the data, Hadden and Borgatta (1965) could profile different
kinds of American cities with a factor analysis of their structural
properties.

Udy (1958), in contrast, used the ideal traits of Weber's

bureaucracy to discover related characteristics and to distinguish
different kinds of bureaucracy that adhered more closely to one cluster
of traits than to another.

Both approaches have proved fruitful, but

each has its limitations.

The "data up" strategy presupposes a large

supply of likely variables--a collection at least roughly approximating
a "known universe" of variables from which we may select a sample (D.
L. Wallace, 1968).

And the "theory down" approach presupposes a well

articulated theory in the area.
Since we have not developed a listing for theoretical constructs
!tan ideal type of the ideal theory, this typology will use a modified
Version of the "theory down" approach by borrowing ideas about what
various authors think--theoretically speaking--a theoretical construct
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must be.

To begin, if science requires both methods and observation,

rule of procedure and events to observe (Wallace, 1971:13-24), then the
typology should include ideas about the scientific strategy and subject
matter of sociology.

If we assume that extraneous factors--especially

social-structural forces--affect the growth of all social knowledge
including sociology, then the classification should also draw from the
sociology of sociology literature for variables.
In the next few sections, I will review some key issues in the

philosophy of science which a theory typology should include and then
outline some current ideas in the sociology of sociology to suggest how
the typology could--in a limited degree--test these ideas.
Traits of Sociological Theory: Implications from
the Philosophy of Science
During the nineteenth-century,

both philosophers and sociologists

debated the nature of sociology as a subject matter and as a research
strategy, speculating whether such a discipline was intellectually
legitimate, what its boundaries might be, how it could utilize scientific
procedures.

In an effort to avoid resurrecting the dead controversies of

the past or pursuing the academic fads of the present, I chose some perennial issues that have bedeviled sociology from the nineteenth-century
to this day, issues like the nineteenth-century debate about the advantages of "cultural" versus "positivistic" social science that recurs
today in the work of ethnomethodologists and the rigorously "objective"
technicians.

Perhaps such issues live only in recurrent speculations

about theory and in controversies among technical methodologists rather
than in the work of research theorists.
question.

This is an important empirical

As Rex (1961:1-3) noted, the philosophy of science should be
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a descriptive discipline as well as a normative one; if procedures do
not work in research, they should not be part of the philosophically
respectable principles.

For the purpose of establishing classifica-

tions in the first place, however, I assume the philosophy-of-science
categories do describe practices widely used in sociology.

Later, the

presence or absence of empty cells in the data matrix can settle this
empirical question.

To supplement the philosophical categories for

"cultural" science and other abstract ideas, I have also included some
variables describing the actual practices of sociologists in more concrete detail.

So this section will review several sets of variables:

first, abstract ideas about the basic subject matter of sociology and
abstract ideas about basic methodological strategies; then some more
concrete qualities, namely, the principle social groups, key processes within these groups, techniques for observing these processes,
and the principle observational dimensions used in this observation.
Dimension One: The Abstract
Subject Focus of Sociology
From its inception sociology has entertained controversy about
its subject matter.

Although they all agreed that sociology studied

groups in society, nineteenth-century theorists disagreed, often
bitterly, about the exact subject area of the new science, sometimes
quarreling with all the grace of rival gang members eyeing two blocks
of disputed "turf."

These debates were not merely verbal squabbles.

First, these disputes weighed the differences between natural sciences
and cultural (unnatural?) ones.

Second, they delineated sociology in

its relationships with other social or cultural sciences.

In both

instances, they reflected the desire of sociologists to create a "real"
science, a science that somehow adhered to the idea standards used by
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Newton two centuries before.

For my classifications, I have chosen

four perennial issues that describe different directions in sociology:
the "interpretive" versus "positivistic" approach; the use of sociological explanations versus psychological ones; the view of the total
social system versus relationships within the system; and the distinction between equilibrium and time dimensions.

Each of these issues

centers on a chronic tension in the field; in empirical work a researcher
must often favor one position over the other even if he believes both
are theoretically correct.

Further, each of these issues has inspired

controversial haggling like the old arguments about whether the "real"
sociology must be quantitative or qualitative.

But here we will con-

aider them simply as tensions that have informed our discipline from its
beginning.
Interpretive and Positivistic
Conceptions of Social Life
Helmut Wagner (1963) has identified the division between positiviatic sociologists who stress objective, detached observation and interpretive sociologists who emphasize·verstehen or some other "understand1ng" as the principle enduring division within the field.

This dis-

tinction began when nineteenth-century historians questioned whether a
scientific approach could hope to capture the essential geist of a
social milieu.

This doubt really probed the very nature of science.

Is science a set of techniques designed to record, measure, and explain
only those objects that we can reach directly through our senses? Or is
it an approach to knowledge based on the interpretation of the meanings
1n such data?

If science is such a set of techniques, then we are con-

fined to studies that record and measure very concrete objects like the
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composition of water and the frequency of church attendance.

If it is

an approach to knowledge, we are challenged by the difficulty of applying this approach to intangibles like the nature and meaning of religious
beliefs.

There is a third resolution to this controversy.

If science

must be strictly positivistic and if social behavior is incomprehensible
without subjective interpretations, then there can be no science of
society.
Naturally, sociologists fought this third view--either by making
their research as objective and "scientific" as possible or by reconceptualizing scientific techniques to fit the peculiar data of social
science.

However, even while they argued one side of the issue, early

sociologists often practiced more moderately.

Comte proclaimed sociology

to be the queen of the positive sciences but he also used this science
to document (or attempt to document) the growth of a social-mental construct called "consensus." Following Comte's dictums, Durkheim studied
"things" called "social facts" but often explained these facts with
interpretive understanding.

For example, Durkheim used a Verstehen pro-

cess in Suicide to describe the different rates among divorced men and
women in terms of what marriage must mean to members of each sex given
the biases of contemporary society.
·sive marriage, he

exp~ained,

A woman liberated from an oppres-

would be far less inclined to suicide than

a man removed from his source of stability (Abel, 1970:102-06).

Weber,

in contrast, more fully accepted the challenge of cultural science and
developed special research strategies to tease out the unspoken, halfunderstood meanings inherent in human behavior.

Nonetheless, he

typically began his studies not with mental constructs of individual
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people nor with cultural beliefs but with the objective activity defining
the social structure.
Modern versions of this interpretive-positivistic tension persist
throughout sociology.

However, we can understand their implications best

by reviewing the extremes.

The extreme positivists can depict a world

determined by functional or causal forces.

The group creates these

forces and man simply responds, perhaps by committing anomie suicide or
by choosing an ethnocentric circle of friends.

In this perspective, the

identification of subjective states can become an exercise in tautology:
marginal man "feels marginal."

Subjective sociologists can reverse this

conceptualization to highlight personal input, existential drift, the
process of experience.

They often ignore group structure--revealing a

subject's reaction toward a half-seen social world.

They can tell us

that people learn to adjust to total institutions without carefully distinguishing those inmates who enter by choice and those who enter at
gunpoint.

The extreme subjectivists ignore the "outside" world alto-

gether and describe-society as the product of an individual mind.

In

contrast, some objective technical experts avoid focusing on any subject
matter by specializing in methodology.
linear graphs,.and other tools

Their causal models, typologies,

are sometimes constructed and refined

without explicit reference to the data they are designed to describe or
explain.

In effect the tool can become the subject.

Social and Psychological Levels
for Explanatory Variables
Once they legitimized the concept of social science with a
special subject matter to be explained, sociologists had to identify
explanatory categories.

Should they explain one group phenomenon in
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terms of another or should they look for component behavior, for the
actions of individual persons in social situations?

According to Durk-

heim, the appropriate level of analysis must be social: he chose to
study "phenomena which would not exist if this society did not exist
and which are what they are only because this society is constituted the
way it is" (1900:363).

Tarde, in contrast, looked .for repetitious

behavior, specifically, inter-mental communication within groups of
people leading to imitation of accepted practices and eventually creating language, law, family structures, and all the other social forms in
society (1904:137-39).

Neither denied the joint importance of both the

group and the individual.

Rather they argued different positions on

this one basic assumption: Durkhetm examined how individual behavior is
informed by man's associations within groups and Tarde explored how
individual behavior creates the group.
The problem, then, resolves not around whether individual-psychological forces actually motivate real behavior but whether these variables should be used to explain social forms.

When they use psychological

explanations, sociologists generally follow one of two approaches: naming
the kinds of people active in a situation or describing the activity in
terms of individually motivated interaction.
The first approach often leads round a circle.

As Durkheim

(1897:59-62) noted long ago, if we explain suicidal behavior by saying
"these people have a suicidal monomania," we have explained nothing.
This, in essence, was Pareto's fault when he compared the crafty, innovative "foxes," who excelled in revolutionary times, with the brave,
loyal, but plodding "lions," who could consolidate an empire but not
create one.

If the elites did not manage to retain their rule during
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rapidly changing situations, then clearly they were "lions" in a situstion that requ i red "f oxes. II

Similarly, the "foxes" could not hope to

perform the painstaking tasks required for maintaining a stable regime;
in such situations, "lions" would gain control of the administration.

The other reductionist strategy cannot be dismissed so easily.
Romans has combined reductionism with behavioralism for explaining social
groups--and ultimately social institutions--as networks of activity performed by individual humans who seek rewards and pay the costs.

Logic-

ally, we must agree with Romans' main strategy (Webster, 1973).

Just as

thermodynamics can be reduced to statistical mechanics, so we may be
able to reduce group behavior to reward-cost principles.

Empirically,

however, we may question whether this activity is worthwhile.

Clearly,

the "rewards" and "costs" vary with size, history, and other special
group aspects.

Discovering additional propositions to link individual

reward-cost action with group properties may cost so much of our time
that we will not value the reward of additional understanding.

Consider,

for example, how a national leader (a king like Henry II of England)
might effect a major judicial reform.

Romans suggests that Henry II

must have borrowed heavily from his "social capital" when he deployed
his own circuit judges to outlying baronial courts.
nobles allow the king to assume their power?

Why else would the

Henry must have traded his

social capital with individual nobles in exchange for conformity to his
newly established norms (1974:365-66).
This may be true.

But whatever the personal exchange Henry may

have effected between himself and each individual noble, he drew his
basic capital from one source: he had won the war and he obviously had
the ability to impose his peace on the country.

In short, Henry could
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make non-conformity prohibitively expensive.

If we wish to explore why

each noble decided to obey, we could resurrect local chronicles, court
judges, and other records to examine the exchange between Leicester and
Henry.

However, if we wish to explore the

perquisites of power or the

prerequisites of judicial reform, we might find it more efficient to
count bow often and under what circumstances a man like Henry gets his
way.

Holistic-Synthetic
Conceptualizations
and RelationalAnalytic Ones
Like the two issues already reviewed, the choice between describing a social whole and separating it into parts, began in the nineteenth-century efforts to legitimize a science of society and continues,
with a modern emphasis, in today's sociology.
At first many sociologists hoped to use state-of-the-system as an
explanatory variable.

Comte and Spencer borrowed biological concepts to

study a social "organism."

Both hoped to explain social relations in

terms of societal needs during a particular evolutionary stage much as
we can explain heart action in terms of its contribution supporting
higher forms of life.
several related areas.

However, whole-to-part analysis breaks down
To begin, the Weltansicht of a large whole like

society probably does not explain the values that inform daily practice
in some local region, unless we can assume that the same ideals exist
everywhere regardless of the local economy, regardless of the vicissitudes of local history, local political customs, and all those other
forces that may encourage regional differences.

Furthermore, we cannot

avoid circular reasoning if we insist on-understanding the parts solely
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in terms of the whole.

If, for example, we use Cooley's definition of

primary group as a collection of people who engage in intimate face-toface contact and then hypothesize that intimate contact creates the primary group, we are really taking two parts of a definition and analyzing them as if they were separate entities.

If, by definition, we

declare the whole to be a single piece understandable only as a whole,
we have no way of comparing the relative importance of variables or conditions which limit variables within this whole.

We cannot judge, for

instance, whether intimate emotional feelings depend more on how often
people see each other or how many interests they have in common.

Finally,

when we choose large, complex wholes like the ones Comte studied, we must
select from a limited number of cases.

Biologists can look at thousands

of one-celled animals, but Comte could only observe one.Western Europe.
Bow could he judge which societal traits were important, which merely
accidental?
In order to avoid these problems many sociologists analyzed part
of a social situation (much as an astronomer would isolate planetary
motion from all the other facets of the universe).

These analytic

sociologists recognized group coherence, a cohesive force.

So, instead

of examining the entire situation at once, these sociologists looked at
the patterns of cohesion, that is, at social interaction as a cause, a
process, or a result linked to other features in the social setting.
However, this analysis can abstract too much and focus on action far
removed from a specific situation.

When Park studied patterns of neigh-

borhood change, he was actually observing neighborhood change in Chicago
during the 1920s.

Later research on population shifts in other cities

and other eras revealed how time and place affected this pattern
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far more than Park had originally thought.
Modern sociologists have often defined their subject matter both
in terms of the system as a whole and the relationships within it.

They

have learned to escape tautological circles by either tracing the causal
paths of specific relationships or by tying the system activities to
extra-system forces.

Furthermore, they have studied a variety of systems,

not just society but primary groups, communities and formal organizations.
Buckley (1967:38) called the modern system concept "organized complexity
--defined as a collection of entities interconnected by a complex network
of relations."

Rex (1961:50-59) placed individual relations within such

systems; the system provides "sustaining activities" to support interpersonal behavior.

Our daily relationships depend on expectations, norms:

we pay our taxes; we do our jobs; we love our children in large part

because we act within a network of institutional structures for government, economy, family.

In a different system, with different sustaining

activites, we would act differently.
Thus, "system" and "relationship" have become two complementary
ways to conceptualize the subject matter of our research, not two independent objects for study. We can concentrate on the "sustaining"
mechanisms or on the relationships made possible because of this whole.
One final point needs consideration.

The holistic focus implies

--butdoes not necessitate--certain corollaries.

If we view the entire

group, we tend to look for balanced relationships, for equilibrium.
Thus we examine cooperation and define conflict as pathology or system
disturbance.

Similarly we concentrate on stability and define change as

"growth" or rearrangement in the balanced system.
total systems in rapid change powered by conflict.

Marx, however, studied
He identified the
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economic institutions alternately as forces to maintain equilibrium
through exploitation of lower-class groups and as forces for revolution
when these groups inevitably rebel.
The Study of Equilibrium
and Development
At root, change is the subject matter of sociology.

The disci-

pline began when social thinkers tried to formulate an intellectual
response to the problems of the Industrial and French Revolutions (Nisbet,
1966).

None of them could deny the fact of sweeping societal change.

Comte traced the evolving patterns of intellectuality in a society shifting from theological to metaphysical to positivistic modes of consensus.
Spender described increasing complexity in a developing organism--or was
it a changing species?--producing ever more sophisticated forms of coordination.

Marx detailed economic pressures erupting in political upheaval.

In a later generation Park studied changes--and patterns of similarity-brought to a community by immigration.

But somehow, while observing the

small-scale recurrent changes of invasion and succession within each
neighborhood, he lost sight of the changes that transformed the community
as a whole.
Herein lies the problem of research into social change: change must
be studied as the "take off" from some equilibrium (Blalock, 1969:76-77).
Consequently, sociologists often concentrate on the equilibrium itself or
assume equilibrium while looking at one, limited facet of internal change.
For example, Durkheim explored the correlates of mechanical and organic
society in depth: two end points, one might call them ideal types of
stability, flanking industrial modernization.

And Park watched Jews,

Poles, Italians, Irishmen invading Chicago neighborhoods without docu-
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senting the expanding job market, massive population growth, and other
changes that made the situation of the 1920s immigrant from Europe quite
dissimilar to the plight of today's arrival from the south, the reservation, or the islands.
Blalock (1969:106-26) suggests that the difficulties of developmental studies are less conceptual than empirical.

Although we all

recognize the fact of change and the technical sophisticates among us
can even apply calculus, time-series analysis, or other mathematical
tools to models of change, we cannot measure the changing situations
themselves, at least not as accurately as Blalock's techniques would
require.

Discussing the study of development in anthropology, Nadel

(1957:125-52) recommended longitudinal studies lasting over a generation.
Only with long-term views can we separate the "changes" that are mere

recurrent patterns in an equilibrium from the trends than actually
rearrange the social structure.

Hauser et al. (1975) demonstrate the

yield we could expect from a developmentally oriented study of shortterm process in modern society.

They assessed American social mobility

studies in the light of United States history.

Sociologists who simply

concentrate on the patterns of father-son mobility find great change,
a generation of sons climbing the stratification ladder.

However, when

Hauser and associates evaluated the occupations of each generation in
terms of what occupations meant in the social systea of the day, they
found much less "mobility" than appears when we assume an equilibrium of
stratification lasting during the entire father-son process.

Thus, the

problem is not deciding if we want equilibrium or developmental studies
but rather discovering how to combine the two for a proper assessment of
social change.
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The various issues considered here do not revolve around whether
we should choose a subjective over an objective subject matter or prefer
an equilibrium to a developmental viewpoint.
whether we

~

study social life as we wish.

They center, instead, on
Polemics aside--sociologists

seem to be making a series of compromises: some deciding that subjective
states cannot be measured, leaving us to explore objective behavior;
others naming subjective states as the true subject matter of sociology
to be explored no matter how crude our measurements.
Dimension Two: The Abstract Methodological
Strategies of Sociology
No matter how intangible or obvious the subject matter, whatever
the group or its problems, in some way the sociological enterprise must
tell us about the empirical world (Popper, 1958:40-41).

For this

empirical validation sociologists use a combined research strategy of
find the social patterns that do occur and looking for those that do
not.
Verifying the existence of an empirical phenomenon can mean discovering if it occurs anywhere.

For example, Sumner asserted that

almost any behavior, no matter how bizarre, will be sanctioned by some
soeity, somewhere.

Because the discovery of approved wife-swapping in

eastern Utopia proves the existence of this practice as accepted behavior,
Sumner could support his claim about bizarre norms by describing the
sexual customs, dietary habits, kinship patterns, and other types of
behavior routinely practiced in various societies.

Thus, one illustra-

tive example of any approved custom or type of customs sufficed to prove
its existence and support Sumner's hypothesis.

However, we often want

to verify a universal condition instead of a single example.

For these
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statements, when we are not in a position to survey the entire universe
of possibilities, falsification (Popper, 1959:68-70, 112-13) often
proves the better strategy.

To verify the hypothesis "Wife-swapping is

beyond the universal pale," we would need to search all groups for the
absence of such approved behavior; to falsify, we need only find one contrary example.
In actual practice (with problems considerably more complex) the
two

approaches shade into each other; we verify the existence of a

theoretically important relationship; we falsify alternative explanations; we try to falsify a critical point (Kaplan, 1964:35-39; Zerrerberg, 1965:104-11).

Durkheim's Suicide provides the classic example.

First, we traced a relationship between suicide and various "solidarity"
measures.

Then he falsified climate, nationality and other alternatives.

Finally, he chose a special group, the urban, educated Jews, who according to his solidarity hypothesis should have enjoyed low suicide rates
but according to other measures should not.
fying a central tenet in his theory.

In short, he risked falsi-

When his solidarity predictions

proved true, this attempt at falsification provided strong support for
~his

ideas (Madge, 1962).

However, even if his ideas had failed this

test, Durkheim would probably have sought additional ones.

In sociology,

with complex relationships and weak measures (especially of "interpretive"
concepts), we cannot rely on either verification or falsification in a
single test (Rex, 1961:18-22).
Clearly, then, our research strategy requires a subtle combination
of logic and fact-gathering--with no universal consensus on the one right
way.

Nonetheless, methods, or rules of procedure, have become a measure

for judging scientific conclusions (Wallace, 1971:13-16).

In this classi-
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fication, I will consider four recurring polarities that define the
abstract nature of this procedure: analytic-inductive versus formaldeductive approaches; categoric and propositional explanations; sampling
from the average case or the universal example; prediction versus
understanding.
Analytic-Inductive and FormalDeductive Strategies
Should science describe networks of relationships or should it
list key principles along with deduced propositions?

This question -

weighing inductive and deductive reasoning has puzzled sociologists
from the earliest days of our discipline.

Following Bacon's precepts

many nineteenth-century sociologists hoped to build scientific principles on a base of numerous simple empirical generalizations (Rex,
1961:10).

Spencer and Sumner, for example, built huge data collections

(anticipating the Human Relations Area Files) to serve as sources for
sociological theory.

Others preached a doctrine of positivism: obser-

vation without philosophical preconceptions.

Induction, however, is

not an inference from data into the unknown.

The scientist has some

preconceptions about his planned research ranging from a general preference for some subject material to a tight-knit deductive system with
very explicit predictions about what the empirical world will reveal.
And, if the nineteenth-century heritage prescribed scientific induction,
it also provided several overarching frameworks for analysis.

Some

frameworks specified the outline of the empirical world: "Society is
like a large organism • • • "

Coupled with the injunction to work

inductively, this reasoning led to such contradictory conceptualizationa as "positive organicism" {Martindale, 1960:52-53).

Other frame-
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works stressed the form of scientific statement: "Scientific generalizations should follow from basic principles."

As we shall see shortly,

this reasoning also leads to its own variety of distortion.
But for the moment consider induction.

In crude form, induction

piles facts into an unordered collection of two-variable propositions
or factor clusters (Reynolds, 1971:140-44).

Properly executed it con-

structs concatenated theory (Kaplan, 1964:298-99) describing a configuration or pattern of relationships, presenting explanation through our
comprehension of these patterns (Kaplan, 1964:332-35; Hansen, 1958:430).

When Park observed intergroup relations in the city, he argued

from migration patterns and life style to a series of propositions
about invasion, succession and other process stages within "natural"
areas.

He began with a pattern of behavior--actually a pattern sug-

gested by his ideas about biological-social processes; no theory is
totally inductive--then he used the observed pattern to describe natural
areas and their changes within the city.

As Park's work illustrates,

induction always requires a non-logical act, a creative leap from the
familiar data into • • • error?

Glaser and Straus (1967:1-18) advocate

"grounded theory," theory both generated and refined through contact
with data during the course of research.

Huber (1973), in contrast,

·argues that "emergent theory" is peculiarly vulnerable to bias introduced during research by both the worker and the people being observed.
Hence the continual search for a complimentary deductive framework--borrowed from biology, systems theory, classical logic, statistics; with concepts ranging from organic analogies to Boolean sets.
The goal is always explanation.
for our understanding.

Inductive analysis presents a pattern

Deductive reasoning lists key principles,
~
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derives propositions, and demonstrates how these propositions describe
empirical life (including the patterns that originated the theory in the
first place).

In effect, it organizes our thought by specifying the

form of our statements instead of the shape of the empirical world.
When Simmel described the role of the poor, the patterns of conflict,
and the interaction of the stranger, he outlined logical possibilities
and then combined experience with historical examples to illustrate
patterns: "Looking at the poor in a society which believes in equal
justice, we find •

Looking at the poor in a society which believes

in charity to gain spiritual merit for the benefactor, we find •••• "
Simmel deduced propositions from a rigorous listing of possible
events.

Sociologists have long employed more sophisticated tools of

logic, mathematics, and other deductive methods with success.

Durkheim's

use of statistics, for example, enabled him to analyze deductive propositions about mortality in various areas (even though he did not run
tests for significance as we would do with such data).

Our problem is

simply to avoid becoming so beguiled by these tools that we mistake the
structure of thought for the structure of data.

Combining statistics

with classical logic, we might say:
There is a one-hundred per cent probability that all men will die;
Socrates is a man;
Therefore, there is a one-hundred per cent probability that
Socrates will die, making a true, if trivial, statement.
change the second line to "God is a man"?

But what if we

This raises many, many issues

about the existence and nature of something called "God," about the
information value of formal propositions, about the relationship between
formal correctness and substantive validity, even though we could com-
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plete the syllogism with a logically correct conclusion: "There is a onehundred per cent probability that God will die."
In sum, models, formal reasoning, and other deductive tools can
guide the logic of our thought, but cannot replace inductive "social
theories" phrased in "ordinary language" (Movahedi and Ogles, 1973).
Typical Sampling and Sampling
from Universal Conditions
Whether we proceed inductively or deductively, we must sample

data from the universe of possibilities choosing either data "average"
for its universe or data that fits some universal condition.
problem is a choice between generalization and abstraction.

The real
As Willer

(1967:97-115) notes, a survey of cows, even a cross-cultural survey,
will yield a generalization that the "average" cow in this area, at
this time has 3.999 legs.

To explore the nature of cows, or religious

beliefs, or economic structures, we could do better by developing an
idea of group traits under certain universal conditions and then
examining some occasions when the conditions hold true.

In other words,

he argues, we are not looking for a generalized description of life at
a time and in a place but for a set of abstract universal conditions.
We do not want to describe the path of an American billiard ball but to
learn how billiard balls and rockets both behave as objects moved by a
particular types of force (Willer, 1973:23).

To research such universal

problems we should list our abstract conditions and select samples that
fit, first verifying if our idea has any validity, then falsifying the
conditions outside of its scope (1967:97-115).
Despite its limitations, the typical-sampling strategy seems very
attractive.

Working in a science without a single unifying theory --

often without theoretical agreement on a specific limited subject matter--
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we need to build from data, view the possibilities, and later, construct
ideas based on those.

Durkhetm argued for this strategy when he sug-

gested normal cases as a basis for all further comparisons with deviance,
social change and other non-average events (Rex, 1961:8-10).

This

strategy identifies some particular situation as the normal one.
on what criteria?

But

Durkhetm never satisfactorily answered that question.

Instead he developed theories about "normal" types of society, "normal"
levels of deviance, "normal" forms of law, "normal" modes of religious
expression.

Although Durkheim' s theory recognized changes in the normal

mode, his research practice, with some exceptions like his analysis of
suicide, measured the average at some point in time and assessed social
change as an abnormal deviation.
Weber and Simmel, in contrast, began with theoretical outlines of
the special conditions under which an event might occur.

In Stmmel's

ideal-type flirtation, for instance, a couple interacts with ritualized
patterns of mutual flattery, coy shyness, and other amorous tricks best
plaed by those who do not have serious intentions.

Simmel was not pri-

marily interested in flirtation, nineteenth-century manners, or even
social interaction at parties.

He wanted to examine interaction between

two people in situations when the form took precedence over content;
flirtation, aimless party chitchat, courtly rituals, all provided sample
illustrations of interaction under this condition.
The arguments for such abstractions over generalizations grow from
the physics model of science: if we could only list the proper variables
and control them, we could predict behavior (Rex, 1961:15-22).

Sociolo-

gists like Lundberg, who favored the positivistic approach to subject
matter assessed the problem in terms of measurement.

When we learn to
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aeasure economic pressure as well as the physicists measure wind
velocity, we can make predictions about economic man (Lundberg, 1939:
140).

However, sociology is not physics.

It is not just the complexity

of our subject matter and the problems of measuring such complexity that
vitiate a Lundberg-style analysis.
material forces within our subject.

We must also account for the nonThe subjective-interpretive

sociologists like Weber could approach the problem by substituting
ideal types (of subjective-human orientations) for a list of purely
objective universal conditions.
But even with ideal types, sociology has not developed the systematic theory needed to list universal conditions before we completely
adopt Willer's analysis by abstraction to replace the more widely
used analysis by generalization.
Analysis with Type Concepts and
Directly Propositional Analysis
Scientific analysis must account for relationships between
variables.

However, the variables themselves often cluster within

larger theoretical concepts, often concepts so broad we really cannot
assess their relationship to other social features without subdividing
the concept into type-combinations of variables.

Or we may build types

by combining variables; for example, in a two-by-two table "type A"
could possess the first variable but not the second; "type B" could
represent both variables in interaction; and so on (Stinchcombe, 1968:
38-47).

Either way the type provides a parsimonious summary of vari-

ables (Wallace, 1971:101-06).
Such types prove useful in a variety of ways.

First, by pro-

viding a handy label--saying "vertibrate" is easier than saying "a
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member of the group of animals with segmented spinal columns or with a
more primitive form of backbone;" discussing "bureaucracy" is easier
than listing the hierarchy of control, written rules, and other variables associated with this type of authority.
become the variables in hypotheses.

Beyond that, types

For example, we may analyze the

tmportance of bureaucracy in contemporary life without separating each
feature and considering it individually.

Or

we may use categoric

analysis to bring ourselves to the conceptual middle-ground between &11
authority figures and a particular one--like Nixon; knowing he exercised
rational-legal authority (and knowing the characteristics of that type)
helps us explain why

he retained his ability to command long after his

personal credibility had collapsed.
Early use of subdivision classification demonstrates some of the
problems inherent in this methodology.

When Linnaeus outlined the

biological world, he began with a finite universe of identifiable
objects.

True, some species had not been discovered yet and even today

such life forms as the virus puzzle the classification experts.

None-

theless, deciding whether the object in hand could be called a "bird"
is considerably easier than determining if the behavior on the front
lawn is a "social fact" or if a particular collection of people and
.customs constitutes a society (Rex, 1961 :4-15).

Furthermore, biological

categories do not vary as much as social ones in their most interesting
features.

Once we have identified a cat, we can expect it to have the

blood composition and musculature characteristic of cats.

But inter-

personal behavior--the human trait that truly interests sociologists-varies widely.

Knowledge of the type provides an overview, perhaps a

set of probabilities, but not knowledge of individual cases (Blalock,
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1969:143-147).

Comte misconceived this relationship between the indi-

vidual and the type when he tried to explain everyday life in terms of
evolutionary stages.

Proper understanding of the advanced theological

stage, Comte might have told us, will illuminate most of the characteristic behavior in a fourteenth-century French village.

However, as

Blalock would argue, the Weltansicht of an entire continent probably
does not explain the values that inform daily practice in some local
region, unless we can assume that the same ideals exist everywhere
regardless of the local economy, regardless of the vicissitudes of
local history, the local political customs, all those specific group
features that encourage regional differences.

Comte recognized this

but hoped to investigate the whole thoroughly enough to delineate the
parts.

Durkhefm, who understood

the problem more fully than Comte,

eventually defined his types as very mixed bags indeed.

For example,

in the Division of Labor he used repressive and restitutive law for

indices of mechanical and organic solidarity in his types of society.
By the time he wrote Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, he had
identified national loyalties as a necessary source of continued repreaive law and mechanical feelings even in the most organic society.
Thus types provide a measure for a specific case against the
·typical one, or for explaining a particular situation in terms of the
typical pattern, but they do not yield predictions about the detailed
specifics of any individual or subgroup fitting within a type.
The variable-combination types also serve best as guides to
possibilities rather than empirical predictors.

One can always take

two (or more) variables, list their possible combinations, and label
the results a typology.

But, without theory, these typologies tell us
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little.

In fact, some of the most informative ones were not developed

empirically.

Merton's "anomie" scheme, for one, maps out some possible

ways people respond when society provides unequal access to treasured
goals and appropriate means.

On the other hand, he never calculated

how many people will choose innovation over ritualism; he never truly
explained why.

Nonetheless, this typology has inspired research on the

causes of delinquency (the "why" may be function of neighborhood opportunities) and provided one theoretical rationale for the War on Poverty
(which attempted to restructure opportunities).

Parsons also built a

suggestive typology with his pattern variables.

In theoretical com-

bination, the five pairs would produce thirty-two "types."

In empirical

reality a few type cells appear important while the others remain
empty; the affectively

neutra~

person tends to stress universalistic

standards rendering the neutral-particularistic combination unlikely,
and so on.
In conclusion, categoric analysis is just a special case of propositional analysis.

We simply begin by building types for a parsimo-

nious summary of several variables and only then do we state propositions about the relationship of variables within the type or the relationship of the type-as-a-variable to other outside features (see Basu
·and Kenyon, 1972, for a slightly different view of "causality versus
typology" analysis).
Prediction and Explanation
We often think of prediction as a natural goal of science.

With

scientific procedures we should review past and present patterns in
order to predict future ones.

But as Dubin (1969:9-25) explained, pre-

diction often requires empirical variables precisely defined to calcu-
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late specific empirical results; in contrast, explanation uses theoretical constructs to elicit broad understanding about why events occur.

If

a settled, well-kept community wants to plan school buildings, shopping
malls, and similar practical matters for the next twenty years, it can
hire a demographer to estimate population changes likely with such givens
as housing stock, migration patterns and birth rates.

A community with

large old houses peopled by elderly couples can anticipate an influx of
young families whose children will overfill the schools, whose teenagers
will overtax the police department, whose housewives will ignore the
store's fine linen section and ask for toddler's clothes instead.
these variables we can anticipate these results

Given

But, this pre-

dictive knowledge does not explain middle-class attitudes toward education, the causes of juvenile delinquency, or patterns of concumption.
On the other hand, understanding does not necessarily yield predictions.

'When Homans said "liking increases with the frequency of interaction,"
he explained a phenomenon that occurs on the job, during courtship, in
the army unit.

He identified the broad relationship between two single

variables in understandable terms.
his predictions prove untrue.

But as we add complicating variables,

The partners in a marriage gone bad

interact more than they did in the early days of courtship; hostile
. racial groups often confirm their prejudices and increase hatred when
. they encounter each other during riots, street incidents, and even on
such neutral settings as the job.

Clearly we need other variables--

like friendliness or equal-status contact--to predict an actual situation.

Even though Homans' basic statement alone provides some under-

standing of the interaction.
Sociologists are still trying to combine prediction with under-
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standing.

Axiomatic theorists, among others, often combine prediction

and process statements.

Consider two of Zetterberg's statements about

authority {discussed in Dubin's Theory Building, 1969:23-25).

First,

people in central positions, that is, people who interact more, get
better knowledge.

Second, people with better knowledge can more easily

issue directives and, therefore, obtain authority.

Dubin points out a

critical distinction between Zetterberg's two statements.

The first

simply predicts a relationship between centrality and knowledge; the
second predicts a relationship between knowledge and authority mediated
by a knowledgeable person's ability to issue orders.

This explanatory

comment would be much more difficult to test than the predictive ones.
In other words, Zetterberg's axiomatic theory lists easily testable
predictive statements and empirically elusive explanatory ones.

Start-

ing with data instead of theory, other theory builders are trying to
find predictive variables {like the social-policy indicators used in my
population example) that can be the operational definitions of explanatory constructs {Fox, 1974:1-5).
In spite of these efforts, however, we must often choose between
research that illuminates the mechanisms of social life and research
that calculates the results.

Since, at present, we must combine the

.two approaches via separate projects, we must continue to perform
research doing one or the other very well.
The four abstract methodological polarities considered here mark
strategy extremes.

Few sociologists would plead for one position at

the complete cost of the other.

However, some would argue that certain

approaches better suit different stages in scientific development,
perhaps that deductive theory suits a mature science after it has
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exhausted the possibilities of inductive reasoning.

In my own opinion,

such speculations re-echo the quantitative/qualitative debates of a few
decades ago.

Modern quantitative descriptions, statistical testing, and

mathematical models do require more technical sophistication than the
8 tmplest

of qualitative descriptions used by many early sociologists.

However, qualitative researchers have also become more sophisticated-only now, instead of investigating all of social life, they prefer to
concentrate on problems most suited to qualitative techniques.
Furthermore, whatever their preferences on the abstract subject
matter and methodology issues, all sociologists study "social impact
•

o

•

the ways in which the behavior and perceptions of persons are

developed, changed, confirmed, or controlled by the demonstrable influence of other persons" (Bosko££, 1972:251-52}.

Often we use different

words--we may study the "functions" of the political machine--but the
basic conceptualization is causal.

If the machine functions to provide

upward mobility for disreputable, disadvantaged ethnic groups, then, in
some sense, the machine causes mobility to occur.

We may also phrase

our theories with the non-causal language of logic or mathematics.

But,

the chief axioms assume causal relations and the probability statements
estimate the likelihood that a cause will operate in a given situation
(Wallace, 1971:91-101}.
Defining this term, however, is a difficult matter.

Gibbs (1972:

20-27} briefly reviewed just the sociological literature on causality
and decided we would better spend our energy trying to study the relationship than define it.

Indeed, even Blalock (1961} in Causal Infer-

ences in Nonexperimental Research did not define the term.

Working

inductively, he observed correlations between forms of objective
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behavior and assumed the existence of a "cause" or "causal" sequence
linking the actions.

In other words, whatever the ontological reality of

cause, we look for correlations between two (or more) variables with the
measuring techniques of science.

Then after discovering such correla-

tions, we apply the rules of logic to determine i f our idea of "cause"
seems to be operating in the situation (Hirshi and Selvin, 1967:114-41).
For example, if certain ethnic groups dominate the upper reaches of the
political machine, we may call "proper" group membership a necessary
cause of success.
Thus, our search for the causes and effects of "social impact" is
circumscribed by the techniques and reasoning of science.

In a later

section, I will review a few methodological specifics of data gathering
and observation.

But first, a brief section on the places where causal

impact may be observed and the particular causal problems that most
interest sociologists.
Dimension Three: Groups Used
as Sites of Analysis
Reviewing some concrete aspects of subject matter--if sociology
examines the "social impact" of persons over each other, where does the
impact occur and what form does it take?

Social life must be empiri-

cally grounded, that is, it must occur within a group or aggregate of
'interacting, interdependent people ranging from the dyad to the society.
Once these groups have been identified, crucial theoretical elements
may be abstracted for analysis.
values people seek.

Group structure delimits the types of

Participation in a group creates the basis and the

potential for achieving goals, and each social group carries unique consequences for its members in their pursuit of values.
Thinking of the total society as a system with sustaining activities,
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ve can identify generic groups.

Parsons (1959:17-21) located such groups

when he analyzed society to find the organizational levels that sustained
social life by filling system needs (as he had defined these needs in his
AGIL scheme).

The primary-technical level performs all functions but

stresses adaptive ones.

The managerial level coordinates primary units,

thus serving pattern-maintenance and integrative functions.
level takes major responsibility for goal-attainment.

The societal

Between society and

the two lower levels lies the integrative institutional structure which
legitimizes and coordinates the managerial level.

Shifting from organiza-

tional levels to groups, we can easily identify the primary group, formal
organizations, and society itself.
the institutional structure?

But what is the group-equivalent of

I would suggest the community.

times society was coterminous with community.

In primitive

Even today, the major insti-

tutional forms grow and operate within a community.

It is here, in his

community that the average man "integrates" with society.
We can find empirical support for this theoretical speculation in
actual research projects and in analysis of research work.

For example,

in his pioneering work on social disorganization. W. I. Thomas identified

the familial primary group, the ethnic-immigrant community, and ethnic
organizations as the institutionalized groups supporting--or failing to
support--societal culture (1927:57-86).

When Janowitz (1965:73-74) dis-

cussed social mobility, he identified it as one aspect of societal change
which "at a minimum" also

affects "primary groups, community structures,

and large-scale or bureaucratic organization."
concluded, must include all four groups.

Thorough analysis, he

Recently Boskoff (1972:254-55)

reviewed the major trends in sociology and listed the same four groups as
those that recur throughout social research.

He also indicated that
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theorists concentrating on the various group levels tend to emphasize
different problems and to observe them with different variables.
We can conclude, therefore, that whatever the social activity
under consideration, we search these groups for variables either using
the group as a source of independent variables (a unit of analysis) or as
a source of dependent variables (an object of analysis): (1) the primary
group; (2) the complex or large-scale organization; (3) the community;
(4) the total society.
In other words, I am suggesting, sociological ideas vary with the
group under consideration.

Furthermore, the theorist who uses the same

group as both the unit and the object of analysis will produce quite
different theories from those of a thinker who examines the relationships
between different groups.
Dimension Four: Group ProcessProblems Analyzed
Regardless of the particular groups under consideration, most
theorists recognize a core of key group processes, or from another point
of view, key theoretical problems to be explained (Bosko££, 1972:252-61):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Group formation--the establishment of boundaries with norms
and goals;
Differentiation--of specialized skills and values distributed
in the group;
Socialization--for the transmission of different patterns;
Deviation--either applauded or deplored, in part of the result
of inadequate socialization;
Coordination--to repress some deviation, to sustain some
patterns;
Stratification--systems of rewards and opportunities segregating
different segments of the population;
Innovation--technical, valuational, associational;
Social change--the collective result of innovation.

Each of these problems works through social processes within a social
structure: socialization requires the process of internalization often
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enacted within peer groups; coordination requires power exercised in
some authority system like bureaucracy.
together.

Further, the problems link

Inadequate socialization helps foster deviation which requires

coordination expressed in a stratification system that, in turn, invites
innovation •
Dimension Five: Principle
Data-Gathering Techniques
In his analysis, Ritzer (1975) listed four general data-gathering
techniques: comparative/historical studies; interviews; questionnaires;
observations; and experiments.

Modifying this schema slight, I would

begin with direct studies of institutional structures--accounts of economic
practices, for example, but not attitudes toward laissez faire; or analyses
of crime rates in relation to other institutional features but not accounts
of how the criminal perceives moral reality.

Thus, we use four basic data-

gathering approaches: we examine information about institutional structures; we assess the thoughts and characteristics of people (as these are
recorded in interviews, questionnaires, and other individual documeats);
we observe the behavior that occurs during normal interaction; and we
manipulate group situations (often in artificial groups) to determine the
impact of various preconditions on activity within the group.

Each of

these techniques works more efficiently toward different research. goals.
When Weber traced the economic consequences of the Protestant Ethic, he
did not conduct a national survey asking people how they applied Sunday
sermon principles to the market place.

He observed the patterns and

results of capitalistic practices, looked for the causal principles,
counted whether Protestants also tended to be capitalists.

But, Ritzer

notes, many sociologists interested in similar problems about structure
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collect data about individuals and many researchers interested in individual perceptions collect data about behavior.

In other words, socio-

logists with certain overall perspectives tend to prefer certain datagathering approaches--but not necessarily the most appropriate ones
(Ritzer, 1975:67-80).

The approaches: (1) direct studies of institu-

tional structures; (2) interviews/questionnaires; (3) observations;
(4) experiments.
Dimension Six: Observational
Categories
Given the subject matter and general strategies of our discipline,
how do we find data and decide what data properties to observe?

I am not

asking about the specialized tools--path analysis, latent structure analysis, and the like.
the profession.

These will vary with growing technical proficiency in

Instead, I am concerned about the type of methods; the

problem is not whether an astronomer uses the most powerful telescopic
equipment to measure light waves from distant stars but whether he tries
to observe the age and distance of the stars .at all.
To study the social processes occurring within the between groups,
we must select a set of observable criteria, conditions that indicate the
events and states of social relationships.

These conditions may be

specified in terms of the following observational categories:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Material environment (available materials, limiting climatic
conditions);
Spatial location (ecological patterns, social distance);
Population base (demographic variables as preconditions);
Structural characteristics (technology level, age distribution,
social mobility, power distribution, and other features of the
group that directly affect routine patterns of interaction);
Social characteristics (class, ethnicity, religious identification, other background traits of individuals or groups);
Cultural products (symbols, inventions, laws, beliefs).

In sum, the typology will build on six variable dimensions: 1) the
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abstract subject focus of sociology; 2) abstract methodological

stra~egies;

l) groups used as units and objects of analysis; 4) the group processes
analyzed; 5) principle data-gathering techniques; and 6) observational
categories.

Using these six sets of variables, I will classify and con-

trast a number of major theoretical works in sociology comparing them
across the entire sample of variables and making selected comparisons
between different dimensions.

With these comparisons, I hope to answer a

series of questions such as: Do the people who share the subject-matter
frameworks also share a research strategy?

Are either related to the choice

of group processes explained or variables observed?

Do types of techniques

correlate with the problems studied?
Traits of Sociological Theory: Research HyPotheses
To begin, the issues I have discussed include a few basic assumptio•s
and lead to some elementary hypotheses about the nature and distribution of
sociological paradigms:
Assumption.--Science is selective; each theorist chooses from aspects
of the available subject matter and methodology for a particular research
project.
Hypothesis !a.--Theory-research works can be classified according to
their subject matter and methodology.
HyPOthesis !b.--Natural classes or paradigms will remain fairly constant even when separate dimensions of the typology are considered independently.
Alternative.--Since the variables have not been weighed, the most
important dimensions (items that involve a theorist's overall perspective)
have no more impact on the classification than the minor variables.

If the

different dimensions yield different classifications, this problem must be
explored.

so
In a limited sense, I am asking: Do paradigms exist in sociology?

Kuhn himself doubted this.

When Masterman (1970:74) analyzed Kuhn's

ideas, she remarked about "trivial," "narrow" frameworks that characterized sociology.

However, some theory analysts already mentioned have

divided the discipline into important cognitive categories.

To review:

wagner (1963) contrasted the "interpretive" and "positivistic" sociologists (along with the "non-scientific" or "evaluative" theories).
Expanding this idea, Ritzer (1975) identified three paradigm groups--the
positivistic social factists, interpretive social definitionists, and the
positivistic social behavioralists.
chosen similar type perspectives.

Other sociologists have independently
Abel's social realists, humanists and

nominalists correspond roughly to Ritzer's factists, definitionists, and
behavioralists (Abel, 1970:29-41; Ritzer, 1975:197-200).

So do the

theorists who prefer one of Boskoff's (1975:254) three "explanatory variables:" structured opportunities, motivations and perceptions, and social
reinforcements.

In other words, although Boskoff and Abel simply used

one dimension for classification, their three groups would be almost coterminous with Ritzer's paradigms.

Perhaps they have located real

divisions within the field.
Assumption.--Sociology is characterized by certain general perspec~ives,

particularly the preference for explaining social life in terms of

structural, definitional or behavioral variables.
HyPothesis Ic.-- The classification will conform to the three-fold
typology suggested by Ritzer, Boskoff and Abel.
Alternative.--!£ these hypotheses, particularly lb and Ic, cannot be
supported by the classification system, I must examine the possibility that
sociology does not contain paradigms (Reynolds, 1971:21-43).
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These hypotheses imply important additional considerations.

If

theorists who discuss certain problems tend to use a few basic strategies and a few key variables, could they improve their theories by incorporating additional ones?

Kuhn's basic argument denies this possibility:

in his opinion, a scientist is usually locked into a paradigm, unable to

even glimpse the world beyond.

In contrast, Phillips (1975) suggests

that paradigms are not "incommensural."

A scientist can escape into a

broader framework and still retain his memory of the first along with his
ability to use its better facets.

Indeed, a later paradigm may incorpor-

ate the earlier one as Einstein's physics included the special case of
Newtonian physics.

Ritzer (1975:212-19) actually named four "paradigm

bridgers"--Marx, Durkheim, Weber and Parsons--theorists who worked beyond
any single type combining the factist-behavioralist-definitional perspectives.

The classification system may locate other bridgers or highlight

the specific component missing from a particular type of analysis.
sider the bridger Marx.
variables.

Con-

In much of his analysis, he neglects ecological

If he had incorporated these into his hypotheses about how

groups form collective awareness, he probably would have analyzed interaction within a community as a possible source of group consciousness.
Community consciousness, in turn, could have rivaled class consciousness
as a possible source of political action.

Following this line of analysis,

Marx might have anticipated nationalism along with class rebellion.
Nationalists of the world arise •
Assumption.-- Theorists who combine dimensions in "unconventional"
ways may be paradigm bridgers.
Assumption.--Theoretical-methodological dimensions are normally
combined in a few "conventional" ways.
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Assumption.--Theorists who combine contrasting abstract subject
focuses or constrasting strategy approaches may be paradigm bridgers.
Hypothesis !I.--The classification system can identify theorists
who bridge two or more categories by combining traits from each in a
single theoretical work.
In sum, the classification should demonstrate the existence of
cognitive groups--possible paradigm groups--and provide clues about the
•issing items in certain perspectives.

In later discussions of the classi-

fication system, I will use these clues to suggest some possibilities for
theoretical reformulations combining different aspects of the various perspectives.
Influences on Sociological Theory: Implications
from the Sociology of Sociology
The sociology of sociology is but one variant on the sociology of
knowledge, or as some prefer to call it, the sociology of culture (Crane,
1972:129-42).

This discipline builds from one key postulate: truth is a

dependent variable (Bosko££, 1972:172-97).

The independent variable,

however, ranges from abstract ideational configurations to pure self
interest.

Sorokin (1947) identified dominant cultural themes and traced

their effects in art, science, religion and other forms of thought.

For

Marx (1844:106-19) and Mannheim

(1936:270-7~~

the key independent variables.

Marx explained that political ideology

social organizations were

represents the interests of the dominant class.

Therefore, we might

expect, American ideology stresses rugged individualism, self-sufficiency,
and other virtues convenient for capitalists who do not want their taxes
spent on shiftless unfortunates.

Mannheim explained how our position in

society, even something as subtle as the historical experience we lived

S3
through at an impressionable moment of our lives, shapes our outlook.
Bence, American depression children value "materialism" more than children
of the affluent 1960s.

Against this background, we can easily understand

Weber's interest in value-free sociology and the Hinkle's discussion of
the development of sociology as a response to World War, the Depression,
and other historical events.
However, science provides a special kind of truth, a truth based on
rational procedures designed to measure reality objectively.

Even if

values affect what we study and how we use the information later, must they
also redirect the process of our search for this objective, rational truth?
Within contemporary sociology, one group--the radical-critical

theorists--

has been especially concerned about the ties between our extra-scientific
allegiances and our scientific perspectives.
The radical-criticals launch their methodological critique from the
basic assumption that the social order can (and probably should) be changed.
Sociology should study "the root relationships of the historically conditioned--and therefore changeable--social order" (Horowitz, 1971:12); it
should criticize society beginning "with the adumbration our historical
secularities" (Birnbaum, 1971).

This pervading interest in "life as it

could be" instead of simply "life as it is" has led the radicals to
certain methodological stances; they criticize interpretive sociologists
for stressing individual reactions without revealing the structural conditions that provoke such reaction.

They castigate the systems analysts

for providing ahistorical descriptions of current functions, functions that
appear to be universal necessities.

They condemn the methodological

Pioneers for specializing in irrelevance, for contributing more to our
knowledge of formal thought than to our knowledge of the social problems we
should think about.
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They have not, however, provided a methodological tradition of
their own.

T. R. Young (1971) suggests that a "conflict theory" requires

a "conflict methodology," that is, a politically informed sociology must
discover more than respondents are willing to tell.

People often reveal

their true position only when threatened or tricked by an aggressive
interview, a devious maneuver, torture, legal action, or some other device
that strips away usual excuses.

He is quite correct: being nice to re-

spondents does not always elicit the full truth.

Oo the other hand, there

is no reason why any efficient methodology (including this one) cannot be
used for both radical and non-radical purposes.

So.e of the "conflict"

techniques suggested by Young have long served to gather information for
various established governments.

A good marketing survey on the effects

of advertising can tell the marketing expert how to sell his product and
the consumer-affairs advocate how to promote sales resistance (Becker and
Horowitz, 1972).

For radicals, then, the real problem is not how we get

information but how we use it.

Nonetheless, they do demonstrate that our

values may incline us toward certain methodological positions.
Science:

~

Social Product

Assuming for the moment that the scientific process does respond to
social pressures, we may speculate about the structural mechanisms involved •
.To begin, Znaniecki has described the "man of knowledge;" a social person
acting within a circle of other people--fellow scientists, publishers, lay
audiences, government agencies--who evaluate him in terms of his performances as a scientist (1965:220-39). Roger Bacon may have labored in an
isolated tower, monastic not ivory, preparing manuscripts that would not
be appreciated for centuries.

But most scientists prefer more intimate

interaction with their social circle and seek guidaace from other members
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about both the style and procedure of their science.

The lone innovator

who roams freely in search of the unexpected often becomes a tragicomic
figure.

His ideas do not "fit," however brilliant they may be; he does

not solve the problems that are troubling other circle members (1940:55-

69, 164-99).
Although he began with Weber's ideas rather than Znaniecki's,
Merton provides several examples of research illustrating the power of
the social circle.
~etween

(1938).

Reviewing historical data, he documented the ties

Puritanism and the growth of seventeenth-century English science
The Puritan value stress on rational approaches, empirical

studies, and utilitarianism could naturally foster a flowering of the
"hard" sciences.

If so, Merton reasoned further, then a disproportionate

number of Puritan sectarians should have pursued physical-science studies
and entered scientific groups like the Royal Society.

did.

And indeed they

More recently, Merton has documented other ties between social

values and scientific institutions.

There is, even within the scientific

community, a firm tendency to accept traditional authority: hence the
Matthew effect--those who have, get--famous men get more credit for the
same work than their lesser known fellows (1968).

Finally, examining

another value held within scientific circles, Merton (and Harriet Zuckerman) have observed how age and the traditions of authority associated with
age affect a scientist's reputation among his peers.

In areas with a

well-developed theory, the scientific community will quickly recognize and
acknowledge the contributions of a newcomer.

In contrast, recognition in

less codified fields (like sociology) is accorded to the mature judgment
of older scientists (1972).
Merton's work suggests another problem: the existence of more than
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one relevant social circle--at a minimum three possibilities including
the scientist's particular subfield; the discipline as a whole; and the
overall cultural community.

How can these circles variously shape the

process and procedures of science?

Certainly a social circle of like-

minded astronomers describing the heavens with Newtonian principles will
share formulas, techniques, discoveries.

But what if half of them sub-

scribe to Einstein's principles instead?

In Kuhn's terms, the discipline

is undergoing a revolution with two competing paradigms struggling for
control.

If these two groups of scientists use different assumptions to

find different truths, we may wonder if they also belong to different
social circles.
social networks?

In sum, do paradigm affiliations depend on independent
The next question, of course, is whether a discipline's

internal networks affect its response to the wider community.

Simmel

hypothesized that people in routine, business-as-usual occupations reflect
their position in society whereas those in turbulent, problematic occupations tend to concentrate on professional problems instead (1908b:l85-88).
If this is true, we could expect the history of a scientific discipline to
reveal a continuous cycle

alternating between times of internal quarrels

and periods when everyone seems to be asking: "What does astronomy do for
mankind?"

Others--Marx, Veblen, Mannhetm, to name a few--have suggested

that occupational groups tend to form a peculiar ideology regardless of
their internal condition.

Finally, assuming that the outer circle does,

somehow, affect a scientist's values and ideology, we come to another
important question--Do these ideologies also shape the methods we use for
finding scientific "truth?"
Social Circles in Sociology
In trying to develop a typology of sociological theory, I have
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assumed the existence of identifiable cognitive types within the field.
Whether these groups present opposing truths or variations on a universal
theme is another issue.

But, if theory types do exist, then we may ex-

amine them as dependent variables subject to pressures from the social
circle.
Researchers have already identified several possible social divisions
which could be termed circles.

Crane found "invisible colleges"

among

rural sociologists (and mathematicians)--not interest groups who formed
ideologies but rather social circles united in a common network transmitting the shared ideas generated by a few productive individuals (1972:
43).

Members of a "college" cite each other's papers, recruit new students,

form a cognitive circle (1972:129-42).

Crane (1967) also located a "gate-

keeper" mechanism: even with anonymous reviewing, a disproportionate
number of authors in a magazine issue share a university affiliation and
background in common with the editors.

Whatever the reason for this

phenomenon, it indicates some sense of cognitive purity.
Therefore, we can assume at least a limited commonality among
different groups in sociology, with scientists trying to perform for an
admiring circle of like-minded colleagues.
paradigm?

But de circle members share a

Mullins alone addresses this question.

Unfortunately he

answers it by fiat, giving only his word, for example, that his own group,
the structuralists, differ significantly from the "standard American
sociology; faith of our fathers, living still

." (Truzzi, 1975).

However, as Mullins (1973:12, 14ft.3) himself explains, sociologists who
can barely distinguish the major points separating distant camps perceive
subtle nuances within their own--just as the college teacher can recognize
a full professor and an instructor but often cannot explain the difference
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between a mechanic and a machinist's helper.

Indeed, theoretical groups

_.1 be composed of people who only think that they have a special way to

think alike (Mullins, 1968).

In short, we do not know whether Mullins'

structural groups also share cognitive paradigms or whether they just
share a rather limited core of more minor ideas.

(See Reynolds, et al. ,

1970 for a concrete example of a circle with a limited core of subparadigm ideas.)

As one way of investigating this kind of possibility, I

suggest looking for correspondence between various circles and cognitive
types identified in the theory taxonomy.
Assumption.--Paradigms, if they exist in sociology, delimit subject
focus, explanatory principles and methodological strategy.
Assumption.--Inner social circles exist in substantive areas like
"rural sociology."
Assumption.--Inner social circles form around core ideas like
"structuralism."
Hypothesis IIIa.--The members of particular substantive circles in
sociology will produce works that are similar to the works of fellow
circle members.
Hypothesis IIIb.--The members of a social circle formed around core
ideas will produce works that are similar to the works of fellow circle
aembers.
Assumption.--Inner social circles are composed of people sharing a
communication network.
Assumption.--Personal-communication networks create a more cohesive
circle than networks bound simply by more formal communication in journals
and other official platforms.
Hypothesis IIIc.--People trained both in the same tradition and at
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tbe same school will be more likely to produce similar works than
theorists who simply share the same substantive interests.
Alternative.--Even if different paradigms exist, they may not be
limited to circle membership.

Furthermore, the ideas I have chosen to

define categories may be so general that they will be adopted by all cognitive circles.
The people who share similar ideas are not the only members of the
scientific community engaging in communication.

When discussing the func-

tions and dysfunctions of paradigms, Ritzer (1975:202-03) referred to some
famous quarrels--Mead's attack on behavioralism, Romans' critique of
social factism, and so on.

In his view, such controversies (which he

details elsewhere in the book) demonstrate our unreasonable tendency to
view the limits of our own paradigm as the limits of scientific truth.
However, Ritzer first defined his paradigms in terms of explanatory variables, methodology, and the like; then he reviewed controversies about
these particular issues.

Naturally, opponents fired the verbal shots

from different battlements.

Merton (1959b), in

contras~

reviewed a

series of "conflicts" in sociology that centered on a shifting variety of
topical issues and involved a changing army of participants.

In this

situation quarrels would not identify members of opposing paradigm groups.
·A classification of famous fighting pairs could evaluate these two views
of . conflict by showing i f the combattants tend to come from similar or
different groups.
Assumption.--Quarrels grow from paradigm perspectives, not just
from specific issues.
Hypothesis IIId.--Qpponents in famous substantive or methodological
controversies will tend to belong to different classification categories.

,
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I!Plication.-- If Hypothesis IIId proves true we should explore the
paradigm implications of controversal issues.

These may reveal the points

from which we should reformulate theory in the direction of one paradigm.
Throughout the discussion so far, I have assumed static paradigms-one mind set in the cognitive circle.

However, those who prefer to think

that change marks the history of the discipline may wonder whether this
change affects the cognitive orientation of circle groups.

Deutsch

(1971) identified seven "major advances" in sociology between 1900 and
1965, each of which bas inspired innumerable elaborations.

As community

studies, ecosystem theory, bureaucracy analysis, and other advances become
common in the discipline expanding groups of researchers--similar to
Crane's rural sociologists--would form to pursue each interest.

A similar

process must occur when new tools enter the cultural-cognitive network-first an inventor, then a small group of pioneers, finally a large coterie
of

scientist~

examining the small details and perhaps a new inventor look-

ing at the insolvable problems (Wallace, 1971:104-05).

As these groups

form and grow, what happens to their cognitive composition?

For small

groups, Sbmmel predicted a doctrinal unity followed by a diffuse spread of
ideas as the group compromised doctrine point by point in order to convert
new disciples (1908a:94-95).

With his structural sequence (of normal,

.network, cluster, and speciality-discipline stages), Mullins (1973) describes the same process--first a small group of innovators and pioneers,
then numerous disciples exploring the outer ramifications of "breakthrough"
ideas.

So, we may predict that the researchers who explored "community"

or "symbolic interaction" during the 1920s and 1930s shared more common
ideas than their counterparts today.

Furthermore, the research strategy

of a pioneering substantive group would stress exploratory approaches over
theory-testing ones.
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Assumption.--The inner circle changes over time.
Assumption.--Circle changes are related to the cognitive composition of the group ideas.
Hypothesis IVa.--In the early stages of a specialty, theoreticalresearch works tend to be more similar to each other than they are in
later stages.
HyPOthesis IVb.--When a new tool is introduced to a discipline,
its initial users will tend to be very similar to each other.
lmplication.--The data may reveal that certain cognitive constellations tend to mark early and late stages of a specialty.

If this is

true,/then perhaps we should plan to vary our theory-building procedure
with the stage instead of seeking a comprehensive procedure to handle a
substantive area or the entire discipline as a unit (Merton, 1959).
Following Sorokin's (1947) thesis, we can expect the cultural community--the outer circle--will also exert its influence on science.

Cer-

tainly that was the thrust of Merton's (1938) argument when he studied
the

Puritan cultural community with its stress on utility and then

examined utilitarian values in the writings of Puritan scientists.
Sociology is not immune to such influences.

The twin horrors of lower-

class misery beginning with the Industrial Revolution and lower-class
rebellion beginning with the French Revolution combined with the hope that
science could extinguish the fires (or at least teach us to bank them)
formed the cultural constellation behind sociology.
Durkheim, 1890; Nisbet, 1966:21-44.)

(See Bramson, 1961;

The tools developed in other sci-

ences also shaped the direction sociology would take--a flirtation with
biological analogies, a serious pursuit of statistical analysis, a continuing interest in causality.

(See, for example, Douglas, 1971).
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Drawing from Marxian ideas, the radical-critical sociologists identify
dominant-group ideology as one of the more pervasive cultural influences
over sociology, the substance if not the methodology as well (Becker and
Horowitz, 1972).

Although the classification system does not offer any

way to test the relationship between culture itself and the corner of it
called sociology, the system can evaluate works written by people with
different political perspectives (using.Friedrich's "prophets" and "priests")
to see if these perspectives also affect cognitive perspectives.
Assumption.~-Political

ideology shapes other cognitive perspectives.

Assumption.--Sociologists tend to assume "conservative" or "radical"
stances toward society.
Assumption.-- The "prophetic" stance is basically "radical" and the
"priestly" stance basically "conservative."
Hypothesis V.--"Priestly" and "prophetic" sociologists will form
two cognitive groups producing two different types of sociological works.
Sociology of Sociology: In Conclusion
In sum, we know that cognitive social circles exist within scientific disciplines.

These circles form around networks of communication;

they do not necessarily presuppose physical interaction or common selfinterest but, instead represent a tradition of shared perspectives spread
_through scholarly communication.

The fundamental question here is whether

these perspectives are broad enough, deep enough, pervasive enough, and
inclusive enough to be called paradigms.
Once we have identified such circle paradigms--or satisfied ourselves that they do not exist--we may explore the implications of social
cognitive circles for the whole discipline.

If circle networks spread

ideas within paradigms, then these networks also raise communication

63
barriers between paradigms.

This implies that separate camps within the

discipline systematically eliminate a set of key ideas from their theorybuilding repetoire.

Other-paradigm perspectives become heresies to argue

against (Ritzer, 1975:201-08).

On the other hand, if circles form around

substantive interests (Crane, 1972) or single-theoretical ideas (Mullins,
1973) that do not happen to belong in single paradigms, then we can assume
each circle contains the entire repetoire of theory-building tools.
Policy implications--for example, the staffing of graduate schools--would
also change depending on the relationships between circles and paradigms
and how we assess the functional value of this relationship.

CHAPTER III
NUMERICAL TAXONOMY APPLIED TO THEORY CLASSIFICATION
Typology construction in sociology ranges from the clustering of
innumerable variables on the basis of some common factor or latent
structure to the listing of important theoretical considerations that
should mark a type if it conforms to a particular possibility.
typologies define concepts as groups of items.

These

Ideally, we try to

build types so that groups of clearly related items cluster within each
type and the types themselves relate to some outside feature.

This pro-

cess streamlines theory building by enabling us to conceptualize items
in groups rather than one by one by one (Stinchcombe, 1968:38-47).

In

empirical practice, typologies must handle two kinds of items: characteristics or traits and individuals who exhibit these characteristics.
We have already reviewed how variable traits become part of a typology.
Either they are chosen from a large pool of empirical variables or they
are selected for relevance in some theoretical framework.

Beginning

with the list of empirical variables, for example, we can profile cities
according to their relationship to various factors or we can identify
"egoistic" suicide occurring in a social situation.

Using the directly

·theoretical approach, we can contrast a real bureaucracy with an ideal
one or examine the effect of certain pattern-variable combinations on
middle-class child rearing.
These examples all exhibit a common strategy.

They build from

variables collected in a concept system to a discussion of how individuals possessing a particular constellation of traits would behave
(McKinney, 1966:35-67).

Theory classifications reverse this approach
64

65
by beginning with a collection of similar theorists and proceeding to a
discussion of what traits create this similarity.

Thus variants of Q-

methodology have inherent attractiveness for theory classifiers (Sneath
and Sokal, 1973:114-16, 256-59; Kerlinger, 1973:582-600).

We normally

assume that individual theoretical works possess an internal coherence,
that they form an articulated system not just a random collection of
conceptual parts.

In analyzing such coherent systems, we cannot

simply note, among other things, whether theorists who stress values
often neglect ecological variables.

We want to identify a theorist like

Marx, whose work could be enriched in certain aspects by the incorporation of ecological variables.

Thus, for analyzing types of theory we

must begin by identifying clusters of theoretical works instead of
clusters of theoretical traits.
Other social scientists have begun experimenting with various
modern biological techniques to identify human groups.

Wilkins and

Smith (1964) borrowed a simple method for grouping delinquent boys
through a series of dichotomous splits, first in the original group and
then in some of the successive groups.

Driver (1967) reviewed various

more sophisticated classification approaches in bioanthropology, linguistics, archeology and ethnology.
~ologists

In each of these fields, anthro-

face the classical biological clustering problem: grouping very

similar individuals on the basis of numerous related traits.

In political

science, Alker (1969) complained that many promising approaches, including the ones I will try here, have not been adapted to the study of
similar political behavior exhibited by people who share similar background characteristics.

Finally, in his recent review of sociological

clustering methods, Bailey (1975) referred to the possible, but largely
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untested, utility of biological clustering techniques in sociology.
For this reason, in my attempt to develop a numerical classification for theory, I have chosen to use an approach developed in biology
tnstead of the clustering techniques traditional in sociology.

Biolo-

gists have long been concerned with the problems of grouping similar
individuals both for identification and comparison of organic groups and
for study of their evolutionary development (Sokal, 1966).

Ignoring the

problems of evolution in theory, I will simply use phenetic (or "resemblance") classification to group "camps" of theorists much as biologists
group mutated forms of bacteria.

But even with these simple resemblance

groups, I can also look for the evolutionary effects of outside influences (like ideological preferences) much as a biologist observes whether
sunlight or fertilizer change the traits within plant groups.
Both social science and biology have long used skilled, intuitive
scholars to define groups like species or civilizations and assign
individual animals or societies to the various types.

Numerical taxono-

my provides a· routinized mechanical method for achieving the same
results with greater speed and more accuracy.

It groups units (like

bacteria) into taxa (or species) on the basis of numerous variablecharacter states.

In other words, numerical taxonomy provides a system

. for listing a large number of variables, coding individuals according
to each character trait, identifying groups of similar individuals, and,
an important addition, providing the mechanical routine for identifying
additional individuals as members of some established group (Sneath and
Sokal, 1973:3-4).

This procedure has important advantages over the old

"creative" way: it integrates information about many characteristics,
more than we could handle in conventional classification; it provides a
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coding procedure for unskilled, routine workers; and it forces us to
really define variable traits in explicit coding terms (Sneath and
Sokal, 1973:11).

So if the classification system does no more, it can

at least inspire more rigorous thinking about theoretical characteristics and a more comprehensive appreciation of the patterns these
characteristics tend to exhibit in various research works.
To adapt the numerical taxonomy approach for this classification,
I propose a five-point strategy:

1) definition of key variables;
2) definition of taxonomic groups;

3) evaluation of the resulting classifications;

4) investigation of how theory groups relate to outside influences ;
5) evaluation of all classification results in terms of theory
reformulation.
The first four points actually could apply to any numerical taxonomy
although they need some modification for application in sociology.
last step, however, requires an addition to usual procedure.

The

Normally

biologists want to identify flora and fauna, not restructure them-although it is possible, at least theoretically, to combine these traits
in new ways and create new animals (Sokal, 1966)--or new modes of theory.
_For us, such rearrangements have great practical importance because
theory transmutations can be effected in "real" life.

So I will explore

such possibilities; only instead of using the computer to rearrange
traits in all possible combinations, I have chosen to examine the data
matrix personally and discuss some of the rearrangements and combinations that appear fruitful for sociology.
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Taxonomy Construction
In numerical taxonomy, workers assign individuals to types according to their position in a resemblance matrix comparing each individual
with every other on the basis of similarity (or dissimilarity) in
character traits.

Thus, the resulting types describe groups of indi-

viduals who share a certain range of similarity.

High similarity does

not mean, however, that all group members share any one particular
trait much less a single defining characteristic (Sneath and Sokal,
1973:21).

Instead of grouping "ethnomethodologists" or "Kantian for-

malists" and then discussing other traits within each group, numerical
taxonomists consider a collection of characteristics simultaneously as
if all had equal weight or influence in defining the type.

If we dis-

cover a few important traits that actually do identify works as members
of a particular class, then we can use those traits alone in later classifications.

Alternatively, we may discover that numerical taxonomy

defines groups we already recognize, groups defined on the basis of Kantian epistemology, organic analogies, or other variables not used here.
In this event, the numerical types may prove useful for describing the
additional theoretical components associated with major approaches.
"formal" sociologists work inductively or deductively?

Do

Do they concen-

trate on interpersonal relations or social structure?
Numerical taxonomy contains no magic formulas for answering such
questions.

Good classification rests on the selection of appropriate

variables, the construction of an appropriate similarity matrix, and
the development of a classification from the matrix.

This section will

outline the techniques essential for all three and the following
sections will review strategies for the evaluation of taxonomic results,
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particularly as this evaluation also helps us to assess the various
hypotheses suggested earlier.
Variables
Numerical taxonomy uses two kinds of variables--in technical
terms, operational taxonomic units (OTU's) and character traits; in our
terms, theoretical works and variables describing theory.

Both sets of

variables should be selected to "represent" the population we are trying
to describe.

However, numerical taxonomy does not assume random sampling

or selection of either.
In selecting individuals to classify, taxonomists try to find a
range of possibilities, not a selection weighted according to their
actual frequency in the population (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:68-71).

A

random sample of birds in Illinois would contain hundreds of starlings
but might miss red-winged blackbirds altogether.
should

~valuate

one example of each.

A good classification

Obviously, then, selection of

OTU's begins with some foreknowledge of the results.

Although taxono-

mists have not agreed on theoretical rules for maintaining prescience
without prejudgment, the rules worked out in practice seem to include:
selecting individuals varied enough to provide a range of possibilities
while at the same time using a group large enough for any planned statistical evaluation but small enough for ease in computation.

Once a

classification is established more individuals can be added one by one.
Indeed, a classification's ability to incorporate new individuals is
one sign of its value or validity.
For the initial classification I have chosen twenty-five theoretical works ranging from one by Comte (a "positive organicist") to
one by Blalock (a "new causal theorist").

These works (listed in
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Appendix A) represent many strands of theoretical thinking often
identified by other theory classifiers.

Some strands ("new causal

modeling," for example) obviously are very much alive today; others
appear dead or dormant with mere remnants extant in current thinking.

or perhaps the work of men like Comte is more alive than we think.
Certainly an evaluation of the similarity between his approach and
recent theoretical fashion would be one way of assessing whether Comte
and similar early theorists pioneered the paths we still travel or
explored unfruitful fields.

So, I have included works representing a

wide range of theoretical perspectives without deciding in advance which
historical ideas are most important today.
The traits or characters form the other set of variables for the
original data matrix (Sneath and Sakal, 1973:71-75).

Each trait must be

a sensible, tangible object, something we can measure directly from
observation of the OTU's (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:17-18).

Beyond that we

must consider the criteria for choosing traits, the proper number for an
adequate measure of types, and the coding best suited for both the traits
and their placement in a similarity matrix (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:10313).

First traits, like OTU's, represent a spread of possibilities, a

selection from areas we have already defined as important.

Traits should

also vary from individual to individual--for classification purposes it
is senseless to measure either mammals or fish by whether or not they
breathe with lungs.
all animals.

But we might use lungs as a trait for evaluating

Traits may be related--given the nature of classification

systems, they often are--but one trait should not be the necessary or
logical consequent of another.
measure both?

If two traits must occur together, why

Deciding how many traits to use is another important con-
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sideration.

Early taxonomists, looking for a number large enough for use

in possible statistical testing, preferred sixty or more.

More recent

workers set a much lower limit based on practical criteria: we should
use enough traits that the addition of one more would not affect the
resulting classifications.
1973:162-65).

Thirty seems large enough (Sneath and Sokal,

Numerical taxonomy also solves the coding selection

problem in a practical manner.

Without parametric estimates of the

character variables, there is no inherent advantage in ordinal and
interval measures.

In fact, even when such measures represent the data

accurately (which is not true in this instance), nominal-level codings
are generally very close to the results of more sophisticated, more
costly, more time-consuming approaches (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:147).
I have already discussed the trait,or character variables--subjectmatter perspectives, observational categories, and the like--at length.
(See list in Appendix B.)

They form a nominal set of independent and

partially related traits, naturally coded as present (I) or absent (0).
With the abstract variables, I have coded each end of the polarity as
two separate items.

For example, a theorist might or might not define

social subject matter in subjective terms; he might or might not define
it in objective terms.

A theorist could be both interpretive and posi-

tivistic but no theorist can be neither.
Appendix D.)

(For coding details see

Thus, although the traits are not necessary or logical con-

sequents of each other, many are related and the coding procedure must
measure this relationship.
out of eight polarities.

This coding also creates sixteen variables
Added to the other traits, they bring the

traits to forty-two, an acceptable number.
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After coding the traits, we can assemble a data matrix of the
theoretical works by character traits (t x n).

The next step is

measuring the similarity (or dissimilarity) between OTU's and translating these results into a similarity matrix (t x t) which, in turn, can
be analyzed to define the types.

The basic rule that applies to coding

also operates here: keep it simple.

Complex procedures generally yield

results quite similar to those of simple techniques unless there is
some problem in the data requiring special handling (Sneath and Sokal,
1973:147).

So, with this rule in mind, I have chosen the simple match-

ing coefficient, modified elementary cluster analysis, and factor
analysis for constructing the classification system.
If positive and negative matches are equally important--if it is
just as important that two theorists both have or both do not have a
particular trait--then the simple matching coefficient (S

sm

) measures

dichotomy similarity very well (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:132-33)
m

sam -----m+ u
when m represents a positive or negative agreement between two individuals (both coded 1 or both 0) and u represents a difference between
them on any given trait.
~ompared

(S

to itself (S

sm

After computing the similarity for each work
• 1.00) and compared to every other work

~

- 1.00), we can present the results in a similarity matrix (t x t)
am
showing the relationship of each work compared to every other work.
In addition to being a straight-forward measure, S also approxism
mates a binomial distribution if more than twenty traits have been used.
Actually the binomial distribution overestimates the variance of S

sm

by

ten to twenty per cent, thus forming a conservative estimate of confi-
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dence limits for any given coefficient and providing a conservative
way to estimate the significance of difference between any two coefficients.

This relationship between S
and the binomial distribution
sm

allows limited statistical testing of classifications based on S
sm
(Sneath and Sokal, 1973:132-33).
Before testing, however, we must first define the class groups by
clustering the coefficients into high similarity groups.

For this

classification, I have modified elementary cluster analysis because it
too is a simple, straight-forward approach for this particular data.
ECA consists of two basic steps: choosing a series of similarity levels
and identifying successive clusters of OTU's that share various levels
of similarity (Sokal and Sneath, 1963:179-80).

Beginning with the

highest similarity coefficients, we could isolate several small clusters
of' closely related theory works from assorted, less related works.

By

lowering the required similarity level, we incorporate the unattached
units into some group but, with this particular procedure, we may very
well incorporate some of them into two or more groups at the same time.
This duel-membership phenomenon violates the basic rule of typology
construction requiring exclusive categories.
tions, real data also violate

However, in many situa-

this rule (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:207-08).

·Some classification techniques would definitively incorporate the lowsimilarity items into some group, perhaps by defining a large, loosely
related class that includes both of the smaller groups along with the
units lying between them (Bailey, 1975).

But, for our purposes, it

would be better to think of two types and a possible paradigm bridger
belonging to both.

Thus, elementary cluster analysis provides one way to

evaluate an hypothesis about the theory-classification system:
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Hyp 11--Paradigm bridgers can be identified by the classification
system.
The only real disadvantage of using this technique here, if we
can call it a disadvantage, is the necessity of defining cut-off points
and rules for dealing with low-similarity OTU's before actual analysis
in order to reduce bias and routinize the procedure for reliability.

Taxonomy Evaluation
How do we recognize a "good" classification system?

This

question troubles all numerical taxonomists because there are no clear
answers (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:63-67).
always define some types.

Numerical procedures will

The question asks whether the types describe

data and whether the classifications system (and its procedures) are
simple enough to be practical.

The simplicity problem is one reason,

among several, I chose the simple matching
cluster analysis for this classification.

coefficient and elementary
Sociologists need a system

for examining new works (and possibly new character traits) quickly and
easily, not a complex procedure that defines classes of fossils "for all
time."

The other problem--whether the types exist in data as well as in

the system--cannot be handled so readily.

Nonetheless, we can estimate

the validity of a taxonomy in two ways: by examining the classification
·statistically and by assessing the classification's usefulness in further
analysis (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:275-77).

In the statistical examination,

we can define confidence intervals for similarity coefficients, and de-

scribe the "fit" between the classification and the data.

For the other

assessment, we must replace mathematical procedure with insight to
judge whether theorists seem to belong in their types and whether the
types themselves, along with the original data matrix, suggest new ways
to evaluate or reformulate theory.
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Significance Testing
Strictly speaking we cannot test the significance of all relation-

ships in a classification.

Nor would we want to do this.

The focal

point of evaluation must be the classification as a whole rather than
any particular relationship within it.

Indeed, in this taxonomy the

outer members of one group may be quite similar to the outer members of
a neighboring group or actually belong to both.

Furthermore, the whole

system marks small divisions between the works of thinkers who are, we
assume, basically orientated toward explaining similar problems with
similar techniques.

Sampling procedures also vitiate many forms of

statistical analysis.

In R techniques, we draw a random sample of inde-

pendent individuals from a common population and measure their possession
of certain traits.

In Q techniques, we do not have a corresponding pop-

ulation of character traits from which to draw this sample.

In other

words, sampling is not random and character variables are, by definition,
a diverse lot, even worse, correlated with each other in ways that
violate any assumption of independence (Sokal and Sneath, 1963:153-54).
Nevertheless, we can perform some limited statistical tests to use
as a rough estimate of the overall importance of relationships in the
matrix (Sokal and Sneath, 1963:313-15; Sneath and Sokal, 1973:163-68) •
.Since the distribution of the simple matching coefficient (S

sm

) approxi-

mates a binomial distribution, we can compute the standard error of Ssm
and estimate confidence limits for any particular coefficient.

SEs
ables.

·J's<;-s)

when S • Ssm and n • the number of character vari-

Given this property of S we can look for differences between
sm

strategic coefficients.

Most differences will not be significant.

But,

since a matrix with no significant differences would not be worth examin-
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iog, we should at least consider whether the most characteristic work
iP one group differs significantly from the most characteristic work
iP another (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:284-87).

One strategy for such a

test would be establishing confidence intervals for high similarity
within the first group and then demonstrating that the similarity
between two key works falls outside of these limits.

Another would be

computing the mean coefficient of similarity within groups and comparing
these means to the mean similarity of the group as a whole.

Either pro-

cedure gives us some purchase on the first hypothesis:
Hyp !a--Theoretical-research works fall into natural categories
defined according to their subject matter and methodology--by demonstrating whether or not the system yields some significant relationships
between classes.
For assessing the hypothesis predicting specific type categories:
Hyp le--The classification will conform to the three-fold typology
suggested by Ritzer, Boskoff and Able, we could begin by looking for a
three-class division and then comparing the members of these classes
with the distribution that Ritzer et al. would predict.

However, in

order to use Chi-square with such a small number of variables, we must
also collapse the Chi-square table into two cells, "works that fall
.into the predicted category" and "works that do not fall into the predicted category."
In other words, by examining significant relationships, we can
test two basic hypotheses about any classification systems (Sneath and
Sokal, 1973:284-87):
Hyp--The procedure will yield a classification of natural groups;
Hyp--A given subset of individual OTU's will fall into a given type
or class.
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However, significance testing must be used with caution.
as we already know, is a chancy,
numerical taxonomy.

Sampling,

somewhat arbitrary procedure in

Improper sampling of either character variables or

oTU's increases the variance of the similarity coefficients by some
unknown amount, thus increasing our chance of making a Type I error and
finding statistically significant relationships that do not exist
(Sneath and Sokal, 1973:162-68).

At best, significance tests serve as

one way to evaluate a classification.

Furthermore, even the most "sig-

nificant" set of classes is only valuable because it provides a useful
guide to real data.
Best Fit
The other mathematical strategy for evaluating numerical taxonomy-looking for ''best fit"--investigates another basic hypothesis:
~-This

classification adequately describes the original data.

Of course, we must also ask: What "original" data--the data summarized
in the similarity matrix (containing all the sampling errors introduced by non-random procedures) or the "real" data someplace "out there?"
If we trust the similarity matrix to reflect reality and if we use
variance minimizing techniques to find exclusive clusters, we might compute a cophenetic correlation coefficient (r

cs

) between the unsorted

·Coefficients in the similarity matrix and the similarity coefficient
levels indicated by the classification system (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:
278-79; Sokal and Sneath, 1963:312-23).
exactly how high r

cs

Taxonomists do not know

should be although the usual range for workable

classification systems seems to be from .60 to .95.

This coefficient

can also be used to decide which of several exclusive cluster techniques
provides the best description of a given similarity matrix.

We can also

78
evaluate the hypothesis about relationships among trait variables:
Hyp lb--The classification results (or "natural categories")
will remain constant when separate dimensions of the typology are considered separately.
For example, we could classify the works using only abstract
traits and then compare these results with those of the original typology.
Another possible measure of best fit is the ability of a classification to incorporate new OTU's (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:289-90).

Faced

with a small handful of new units, a skillful taxonomist could simply
assign them to a class where they fit or decide that the system is not
complete enough to include the strangers.

But, to introduce any large

number of new theoretical works, we should either recompute the system
or develop a standard key for coding and assigning--that is, identifying--newcomers (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:394-400}.
In addition, the identification process provides a second way to
explore the ''bridger" hypothesis.

If certain trait variables prove

"most characteristic" of a class, bridgers may be defined as theoretical
works that belong to the class but score in uncharacteristic ways, at
least on the key variables.

Furthermore, if Ritzer's thesis is correct,

the abstract character variables are the ones most apt to define the
bridgers.

Although most class members may score positive on some of

these traits and negative on others, the bridgers would be more likely
to score positive on both, to use contrasting abstract perspectives
simultaneously in their works.
Evaluating Additional Hypotheses
Once they have constructed a classification system, taxonomists
can easily use it to assess the relationship between classes and "out-
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side" (environmental) variables (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:373-76).

The

basic three-step procedure includes:
1)· choosing a group of OTU's that have some "outside" quality;
2) if these units have not already been classified, recomputing
the system or identifying these units as members of some
existing type;
3) using a statistical test (like Chi-square) to confirm or deny
a significant relationship between membership in a class and
possession of the "outside" variable.
For our purposes, the most problematic step would be the first,
choosing the proper theoretical works to test each of the remaining
hypotheses:
Hyp Ilia--The members of particular substantive circles in sociology
will produce works that are similar to the works of fellow circle members.
Hyp IIIb--The members of a social circle formed around core ideas
will produce works that are similar to the works of fellow circle members.
Hyp IIIc--People trained both in the same tradition and at the same
school will be more likely to produce similar works than theorists who
ctmply share the same substantive interests.
Hyp !lid--Opponents in famous controversies will tend to belong to
different classification categories.
Hyp IVa--In the early stages of a specialty, theoretical-research
works will tend to be more similar to each other than they are in later
stages.
Hyp IVb--When a new tool is introduced to a disciplines, its initial
users will tend to be very similar to each other.
Hyp V--"Priestly" and "prophetic" sociologists will form two cogni-
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tive groups producing two different types of sociological work.
In some instances, for example, when comparing "priests" with
"prophets," we could work from an available list.

For other hypotheses,

we must develop a rationale for deciding what constitutes a 11 famous controversy11 or "substantive circle."

In other words, there is no common

pool of possibilities from which to draw a random sample, so researchers
must follow the usual numerical-taxonomy procedure of judicious selection.
Once past this difficulty we could identify the theoretical works as
members of some class, setting up a two-cell table with predicted frequencies of similarities based on our hypothetical ideas.

Then, with Chi-

square, we could simply compare observed frequencies of similarity with
predicted ones.

In some instances the differences will exist, but not at

a "significant 11 level.

However, since the binomial distribution for large

numbers of cases approximates the normal distribution, we could supplement the other evaluations, perhaps with t tests to contrast within-class
mean similarities with mean similarities to "outside" works or with the
mean similarity of the entire sample.
This research--with twenty-five works--cannot use all of the mathematical techniques described above.

However, the analysis can describe

how these works exhibit (or fail to exhibit) hypothesized relationships.
·Do Sumner, Durkheim, and Weber develop similar ideas when discussing

"religious asceticism?"
Marx the Prophet?

Does Parsons the Priest differ radically from

In the final

analysi~,

whether we use twenty-five works

or a thousand, these are the kinds of questions we want to answer.
Classification Utility: The Ultimate Evaluation
Thus, we may argue, a classification system can only be termed 11 good"
because it is useful.

If the taxonomy makes theory easier to understand,
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easier to explain, easier to reconstruct, then it is useful.

If the

taxonomy tells us something about the relationship between a theorist's
ideas and the social-ideological parameters of his life, then it is useful.

So, as I proceed through the various sections of the classification

construction and evaluation, I will suggest how we can use this particular
system for more than just describing the shape and significance of similarity between Parsons and Park and Pareto.

CHAPTER IV
THEORY CLUSTERS DEFINED: LOOKING FOR PARADIGMS
Theorists differ, in perspective, techniques, and major conclusions.

Given such differences, any well-constructed clustering pro-

cedure will produce "types" of theoretical works.

In other words, we can

simply apply numerical taxonomy and "interpret" the results whatever they
might be.

For a more informed interpretation, however, we need some

standards of evaluation or some rationale for anticipating possible
cluster forms.
The literature on Kuhn paradigms can provide this theoretical
justification if we conceptualize clusters as groups of works sharing a
paradigm and define theoretical paradigms as common cores of similar
thought.

We can also understand the similarity core within a cluster as

a network of binary similarity relationships, that is, a network of
numerous relations connecting members of a cluster while few relations
spread between the cluster members and outside works.

Thus all works in

a field are connected to each other with some degree of similarity.
"Clusters" indicate the strongly connectedworks (Sokal, 1974:1121).
Before examining the actual theory-clusters, I will explicate this
line of reasoning in brief detail: first the conception of a paradigm
and its implication for the kind of data used here; then the conception
of types as clusters of binary relationships between objects.
Kuhn Paradigms Redefined
Kuhn, himself, defined paradigm several different ways ranging
from a total scientific vision to an exemplar for research (Kuhn, 1970:
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175; Masterman, 1970}.

He also noted that the existence of some para-

digm within a discipline is signaled by close communication, often in
journal articles, between specialists whose technical conceptions are
incomprehensible to the average layman.

Like beginning students, lay

people must depend on textbooks written especially for their understanding if they want to comprehend basics in a paradigm field (Kuhn, 1970:
10-22).

According to some critics, sociology reached this level of

incomprehensibility some time ago, first through jargon and then through
technical methodological sophistication.

I am not certain, however, that

this is the style of "incomprehensibility" Kuhn had in mind.

Although the

average reader may not understand the mathematical underpinnings of path
analysis, he can grasp substantive arguments about stratification, attitude change, or some other phenomenon based on the statistical manipulations.

Perhaps, judging by this standard, we may argue that sociology has

not yet developed enough sophistication for distinctive world views or
even exemplar research.

Sociology obviously has not produced simple

frameworks outlining social interaction in a few elegant laws.

However

we define paradigms, they will not contain the distinctive hypotheses and
arguments characteristic of Newton's physical paradigm and Einstein's
replacement.
If paradigms are more limited visions and if these exist in sociology,
how can we distinguish one from another?

Can we truly identify Homans as

a "social behavioralist" distinct from "social factists" or should we place
both groups together in a paradigm of "positivism?"

In other words, how

can we decide if sociology has paradigms and what they might be?

First

we must abandon the Newton-Einstein model of an ideal paradigm and think
instead of minimum requirements.

Masterman (1970:79-89) argues that
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limited paradigms could be defined as thought typology systems with
"inexact matching;" in mathematical terms, clusters or "clumps" of
thought sharing a core of similarity.

Such paradigms contain the

incipient elements of "crisis" because clusters with inexact matching
must contain unmatched--perhaps contradictory--ideas outside their
common similarity core.

Revolutions can occur with a shift of the core

as certain fringe ideas become "absurd 11 and others begin to explain the
absurdity.
Viewed in these terms the paradigm becomes a limited construct and
the typical revolution far less unsettling than the conversion from Newton's physics to Einstein's.

Indeed, normal scientists may travel the

distance between paradigms during a career or even during a research
project.

These limited paradigms need not define "incommensurable"

world views (Phillips, 1975).
Individual scientists may be blind to certain positions, even positions held by people with whom they share many points of similarity.
Thus, incommensurability or paradigm-blindness may involve only certain
tenets within a framework, not the entire scientific view.

(As a side

issue, we may note that if paradigms were completely incommensurable,
then Kuhn, standing in his particular paradigm of the history of science
would not be able to describe previous kinds of historical insights.)
Applied to sociology, these ideas suggest lines of interpretation.
Sociology is a few hundred years younger than physics and focused on a
far less predictable subject matter.

This science has not had the time

to experience discipline-shattering revolutions and, given the natural
unpredictability of social life, it would be difficult to document the
clear superiority of a new paradigm even if a revolutionary contender did
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appear.

Kuhn (1970:144-59) has argued that political support insures the

success of a new paradigm.

Mullins (1973) among others, has suggested

how this political support may build through networks of disciples
colleagues.

and

However, neither questioned the inherent scientific attrac-

tiveness of competing paradigms (Urry, 1973).

If creative working scien-

tists believed intellectual change to be no more than a trip between
political groups, then many would probably abandon the pursuit for some
less demanding form of futility.

But, if science does depend--to some

extent--on our ability to perceive truth about data, then scientists
themselves probably react to the data-paradigm relationship in their discipline.

Those working in fields where.data seems more closely tied to

paradigms, will probably form more distinct separate paradigm groups-each pointing to the data that verified its versions of truth.

Scientists

working in a field like sociology usually cannot demonstrate their
"truths" so clearly.

So, we may suspect, sociological paradigms cover

limited areas, in Masterman's terms, clusters of theoretical works containing small cores of total similarity and much wider areas of partial
agreement.

Elements from these partial

agreements may, in turn, form

the total-similarity core of an adjacent group.
Clusters: The Paradigm Des_cribed Mathematically
To translate the paradigm idea into mathematical clusters, we must
look for "natural" groups within sociology.

These natural groups, if

they exist, reflect modal densities of underlying variables (cattell,
1968:99-100).

This conception contrasts with the principles of dichotomy,

continuum, or "school" identity that form the basis of most typologies in
sociological theory.

Not only does the cluster summarize the impact of a
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far greater number of variables, but it also defines areas of density;
that is, it places the theoretical works in a geometric space, looks
for densely occupied areas, and defines types in terms of that density.
These dense areas are natural groups.

Ideally, we would find two or more

dense clusters separated by great empty spaces (Needham, 1965)--perhaps
Ritzer's three paradigm groups with each social behavioralist being
totally different from each factist and each definitionist, as if
Homans completely opposed Talcott Parsons, as if Parsons were unable to
even comprehend Goffman or Cooley.

In the real world, and particularly

in the real world of sociological theory, natural groups interbreed pro-

ducing semi-similar hybrids.

So, instead of neat monothetic clusters in

which all works share the same traits in common, we may expect polythetic clusters in which works share many traits but few, if any, traits
are shared by all (Bailey, 1973b).

Furthermore, two works from different

groups might, nonetheless, share many common characteristics.

In factor

analysis, these polythetic groups would form around impure factors;
although one underlying factor would appear most prominent in one group,
it could be important for all (Fruchter, 1954:1-17).
The natural groups--pure or impure--form through binary relationships between works.

Each group is a network of similarity relationships

.uniting two works at a time (Bisher and Drews, 1970:48-75).

In a fully

connected-network, each work would be related to every other just as, in
a close circle of friends, each friend has a friendship relationship with
every other group member (Beauchamp, 1970:17-55;

Marshall, 1971).

The

total similarity matrix describes such a fully connected network; each
theorist related to every other although the degree of relationship
varies widely.

If the various groups within this matrix represent strong
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paradigms, almost incommensurable with each other, then the natural
groups should be fully connected on a high degree of similarity.

Lower-

level similarity relationships should connect theorists from different
groups.

On

the other hand, if sociological theories are hybrid state-

ments, theoretical works will form loosely connected groups with many
high similarity levels running between groups.

Some theoretical works

may be central (connected to many other works) in several groups; some
may be peripheral to all groups.
Normal clustering procedures can obscure these complex relationships.

Average linkage and total linkage alogarithms force each object

into a single group even if the object properly belongs to more.

If

clusters are loosely related with many high-similarity connections
between groups, single linkage methods will quickly group all works
into one large, string-shaped cluster.

In other words, the usual vari-

ance minimizing procedures force each work into a single group.

If

pure, sharply delineated groups actually exist, this poses no problem;
any standard technique will serve to identify dense clusters with large
spaces between.

For theory groups, however, we must anticipate over-

lapping clusters and use approaches that reveal this spread.

Factor

analysis, comparing the relative association between works and some com.mon properties, provides clues for interpreting theory groups in terms of
these properties, whatever they might be.
a potentially good combination

Smallest space analysis seems

technique for measuring distance between

theorists: it clusters similar items into a small geometric area representing their common property (McFarland and Brown, 1973).

However,

since we cannot anticipate either the dimensions of the clustering or the
nature of the underlying common elements, the techniques that assess
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these phenomenon directly are more

appropri~te

for now.

Thus, the problem of delineating theory groups requires a combined strategy: one clustering technique to identify the groups indicating
possible overla? between them; a second technique totrace the path of connections between works while also measuring the density within groups, and
factor analysis to provide a parsimonious summary of commonality within
groups as well as a rough measure of the common dimensions of the total
sample.
But what criteria can we use to judge the validity of this strategy?
Since any data can be clustered and since we do not have a well-articulated
underlying mathematical model for clustering, we must rely on other
standards.

Factor analysis presents additional difficulties by assuming a

linear relationship between factor variables, a problematic assumption
when the variables are idiosyncratic theorists rather than continuous
attitudinal scores (Fleiss and Zubin, 1969).

Therefore, without external

standards describing a proper tree, we must judge its fruits; at the
least, we expect the theory typology to display parsimony and a "good
fit" to data (Baggaley, 1964:91-96), two standards we will consider later.
The Theory-Work Clusters
Identified
To begin, both clustering and factor analysis depend on the basic
similarity between theory works as defined in Chapter III.

Looking at

the original data matrix (Table 1), we can see that virtually all trait
variables affect the classification: no traits appear always present (I)
or always absent (0).

Table 3, summarizing the similarity distribution

among theoretical works, indicates that the trait variables do, indeed,
distinguish between them.

However, this table obviously does not describe

a closely related band of beetles.

Similarities between pairs range from
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TABLE 1

TilE ORIGINAL-DATA MATRIX COMPARING WORKS BY TRAIT VAR.'IARLES

Worka*

Blak
Comt
Cool
Dkl2
Dk97
Goff
Ho74
Ho50
Lund
Marx
Mr48
Mr36
Pare
Pk36
Pk28
Pr71
Pr53
Pr37
Schu
SimC
SimP
Sumn
Tard
We22
We/6

Trait Variables
1

2

3

4

5

6

0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
0

0
0
0
0

0
1
1
1
0

1 1
0 0
0 0
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1•0
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1.
1 1
0 0
0 1
0 1
0 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 0

0
0

1
0
1
0

1
0
0
0
1
0
1

1

1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1

1

0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0

1
1
1

0

0
1
1

0

0
1
0 0
0 .. 1
0 0
0

0

1
0

1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1

0

0
0
0

0
0
0

1
1
0

0

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

0
1
1
0
0

1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1

0
0
0
1

0
1
0
1

0
0
1
0
1

0
0
0

0
0
0

1
1
1

1
1·
1

0

0

1

1

0

0

0
0
0
0
0

0

0

1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0

0

1
0
0
0
1

0
0
0
0

0

1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0

1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0

1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0

0
0

0
0

1
0
0
0
0
0

1
0
0
1
0
0

1
1

0

1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0

1
1

0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1

1

0
0
0
0
0

0

0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
0

0

0
0
0

0
0

0
0
1
0
0

0

1
.1

0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1

0

1
0
1

0
1
1
1

1

1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0

0
0

0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0

1
1
0
0

0
0
0

0

1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0

1

1

0

0

0

1
1
0
1

0

0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
1
0
0

1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1

0

0
0
0
0
0

1
0
0
0
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1
0
0

0
0

1
1
1
1
0

1
1
1
0
0

0

1
0
0

0

1

1
1

0

0

1
1

1
1

1
0

0

1

0
1
1

0
0
0

1

Coser's "two-method" ideal types--regression-stratification and ethnomethodology
re-st

0

1

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

ethno

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.
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TABLE 1-(cont)
worksv

Blak
Comt
Cool
Dkl2
Dk97
Goff
Ho74
Ho50
Lund
Marx

Mr48
Hr36
Pare
Pk36
Pk28
Pr71
Pr53
Pr37
Schu
SimC
SimP
Sumn
Tard
We22
We4-5

Trait Variables
25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0

0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1

0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0

1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1

1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1

0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1

1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1

0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1

Coser's "two-method" ideal-types--regression-stratification and ethnomethodo1ogy
re-st

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

ethno

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.
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.40

(t

.15 at the .05 level) to .88

of .637.

(±

.10 at the .05 level) with a mean

Table 2, describing the similarity of each work with every

other work, hints at further complication of this data.
larity for specific works ranges from .502 to .686.

The mean simi-

Some works, like

simmel's "Poor" and Durkheim's Elementary Forms, appear closely related
to most others; at the opposite extreme, Romans's work seems marginal to
the rest.
TABLE 3
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF WORKS BY SIMILARITY LEVELS

Level

Frequency

Total Similarity Score

.88
.86
.83
.81
.79
.76
.74
.71
.69
.67
.64
.62
.60
.57
.55
.52
.48
.45
.43
.40

1
1
4
5
9
15
20
19
29
28
33
24
22
28
17
14
10
9
7
1
4

.88
.86
3 .32
4.05
7.11
11.40
14.80
13.49
20.01
18.76
21.12
14.88
13.20
15.96
9.35
7.28
5.00
4.32
3.15
.43
1.60

Total

300

190.97

.so

Mean • .637

Figure 1 identifies the pairs with the highest similarity relationships (.71 to .88, a range which includes 63 pairs on 21 per cent of all
possible pairs).

As we would expect from the mean similarities, the
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1.00
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(300 Cases· Total}
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Dlt97
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Mr36
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SimP
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Figure 1.--Higb Similarities Among the Works Based on the Total
Set of Trait Variables
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.
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the number of high stmilarities varies sharply between works.

Like a

sociometric star, Simmel's "Poor" links highly with thirteen other
works, but Romans in The Human Group (a social isolate?) links highly
onlY with Romans in Social Behavior.
But do these linkages define theory groups?

Elementary matrix

analysis (Sokal and Sneath, 1963:178-80) provides a preliminary answer to
this question by identifying some clusters.

It is the existence of these

clusters, not their size, that we must consider.

Since the theoretical

works were chosen to represent a spread of possibilities rather than a
"random sample" of likely events, an isolated work or two may represent
an unknown quantity of similar items existing in the literature.
this in mind, consider Figure 2.

With

I arranged this matrix by placing the

most related pairs (.81 and above) close to the diagonal and surrounding
them with the next related pairs.

Assuming the classification contains

several groups of works highly related to each other and loosely related
to other groups, assuming this ideal situation, the final matrix should
have highly related pairs lined in several clusters along the diagonal
and minimally related pairs in the left-angle corner.

Although the data

does not conform to this ideal, Figure 2 does reveal some patterns:
1) Marx, Comte, Cooley, Parsons 1971, and Weber 1922; 2) Pareto, Stmmel
.''Poor," and Durkheim 1912 (all strongly related to Cluster 1) along
with Sumner, Parsons 1937, Merton 1936, Merton 1948, and Simmel "Conflict:"
3) Durkheim 1897, Blalock, and Lundberg (who link strongly with Pareto,
Sumner, and Merton 1936 of Cluster 2); 4) Tarde, Park 1928, and Park 1936
(each of whom has idiosyncratic links with Clusters 2 and 3); 5) Schutz
(related to Parsons 1937 and Durkheim 1912 from Cluster 2) and Goffman
(tiEd to Simmel "Poor" from Cluster 3 and Park 1928 from Cluster 4);
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Works*
Marx

Comt
Cool·~+-~

Pr71
We22

-

1.00

I* I

.81 - .88

£II

.11 - .79 (63 Cases)
(300 Cases Total)

(11 Cases)

Welr.5
Pr53
Pare
Pr37
Sumn

Dkl2·~~~~~~+-~~~~~
SimP

Mr36
Kr48
S:lmC
Tard
Pk28 •

~~~--+--r~r-~-+--~~-+~~~~--+--r~

Pk36

Dk97
Blak
Lund
Schu

Goff
Ro74 ~4-~-+~~+-4-~-~~~+-4--r~--~~4-~-4--~+-~~-

BoSO

Figure 2.--High Similarities Among the Works Based on the Total Set of Trait
Variables and Arranged with High-Similarity Pairs Close Together
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.
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6) Homans, who related highly only to himself; and, finally, 7) two outliers, Weber 1904-05 (related only to Merton 1936 from Cluster 2) and
parsons 1953 (related to Comte from Cluster 1 and Merton 1948 from
Cluster 2).
Using Ritzer's (1975) terms we could identify social definitionists,
social behavioralists, and several varieties of social factists.

But

such labels would be premature since we still must account for withingroup differences and other anomolies.
05 and Parsons 1953 appear

so marginal?

Why, for example, do Weber 1904Neither is highly related or

highly unrelated to any cluster even though most critics would consider
both part of the sociological establishment rather than the artifacts of
some esoteric cult. Conversely, why are Durkheim 1912, Simmel "Poor,"
and Pareto tied to so many other theorists?

None of these works is

normally cited as one of the exemplars of sociological analysis.

Clearly

a complete analysis of the material requires two approaches: a more
rigorous exploration of clusters in the similarity matrix supplemented
by an investigation of the original-data matrix for clues about how or
why some works do not fit a pattern.
This more rigorous exploration may include comparisons between
the original similarity matrix and matrices for selected trait variables.

Figures 3 and 4 (showing the top 22 per cent of relationships

for the abstract dimensions) place Durkheim 1912, Parsons 1953, and
Weber 1904-05 in approximately the same atypical positions they occupied
before.

Pareto, on contrast, relates minimally to some of the same

theorists he resembled closely in the total trait matrix.
Homans works relate highly to several others.

And both

However, the dimension

matrix can only provide clues about specific relationships.

With six-
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Figure 3--lligh Similarities Among the 1-l'orks Based on· the First Sixteen
Trait Variables
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.
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Figure 4.--High Similarities Among the Works Based on the First Sixteen
Trait Variables (Arranged to Correspond with the Final TotalTrait Arrangement in Figure 2)
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.
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teen

trait~

computed for Table 4, each similarity coefficient has a

verY wide confidence interval (between

!

.13 and

!

.24) indicating we

.. , can only interpret extremes with any confidence of a real difference.
But we can draw some conclusions about relationships between abstract
traits as a whole and the total set of similarities.

The cophenetic

correlationship coefficient (a Pearson's r comparing the relative similarity level of work-pairs in Table 2 with those in Table 4) is only .388,
hardly a sign that abstract orientations preclude or require some total
package of sociological thought.

If paradigms must be total perspectives,

we will not find them with the traits used here.
For a second clustering technique, I have modified the single linkage approach.

Normally with this approach, a single link can unit two

otherwise different clusters: once a single linkage occurs, all members
of each group are "related."

But we already know three theorists,

Durkhetm 1912 and Pareto and Sinmel "Poor," who between them are related
to everyone else except Romans.

Therefore, to reveal paths of relation-

ships rather than just links between clusters, I defined permissible
linkages in terms of a group nucleus of works and linkages with less
highly related works joining the group.

In other words, I began by

identifying seven .exclusive groups of highly related works.

For each, I

added works related to it on the next highest level of similarity.

With

this new nucleus I then proceeded down another similarity level until
reaching .71 (the cut-off used in the elementary analysis procedure).
Tables 5 through 11 name these highly related works and show the degree
of relationship for each cluster.

The first Cluster (Table 5) start-

ing with Durkheim 1912 and Simmel "Poor" contains twenty-three works.
Romans, in contrast, does not begin to relate to other works until
level .69 (Table 11).

For each work, I recorded its total and mean

TABLE 4

SIMILARITY MATRIX. COMPARING WORKS* FOR THE FIRST SIXTEEN TRAIT VARIABLES
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*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.
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TABLE 5
CLUSTER ONE BASED ON HIGH-SIMILARITY CONNECTIONS
BETWEEN WORKS

Entrance
Similarity
.88
.81
•79

.74

Works*
SimP
Dkl2
Mr36
Pare
We22
Pk28
SimC
Mr48
Sumn
Pr71
Pr37
Dk97
Marx
Comt
Tard
Blak
Goff
Lund

.71
Total

Total
Connections

Total
Similarity

Average
Similarity

13

9.92

.76

13
12

9.85
9.05

9

6.64
3.74
3.00
2.95
5.82
5.16
3.66
3.00
2.92
2.21
2.90
2.19
1.48
1.45
1.45

.76
.75
.74
.75
.75
.74
.73
.74
.73
• 75
.73
.74
.73
.73
.74
.73
.73

1.45

•73

.74
.74
.71
.71
81.74

.74
.74

5

4
4
8
7
5

4
4
3
4
3
2
2

Schu

2
2

Pk36
We4t5

1
1

Cool
Pk53
23

1
1
110

*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.
**See page 107 for explanation.

.71
•71
.743

Connections
Kat;io**
.217

r
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TABLE 6
CLUSTER TWO BASED ON HIGH-SIMILARITY CONNECTIONS
BETWEEN WORKS

Entrance
Similarity
.83

.79

Works*

Total
Connections

Pr71
Marx
Comt
We22
Cool
Dk12
Mr48
Pr37

.76

SimP

.74

Tard
Pk28
Pare

10
8
7
6
4
9
8
3
6

SimC
Goff
Mr36
Schu
Sumn
.71

Total

Pr53
Pk36
Dk97
20

Total
Similarity
7.64
6.18
5.27
6.18
3.11
6.66
5.85
2.27
4.34

.76
• 72
.75
.72
.78
.74
.73
.76
.73
.73

5

3.66

3
4

2.21
2.90

3
2
2
2
2

2.16
1.45
1.45

.72
.72
.72
• 72

1.45
1.45

.72
.72

2

1.42
.71
.71
65.56

1
•1
88

*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.
**See page 107 for explanation.

-

Average
Similarity

.74

.71
.71
.71
.743

Connections
Ratio**
, .232
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TABLE 7
CLUSTER THREE BASED ON HIGH-SIMILARITY CONNECTIONS
BETWEEN WORKS
Entrance
Similarity
.81
.79
.76
.74

Total
Connections

Total
Similarity

Average
Similarity

Sumn
Pr37
Pr71
Mr36
SimP
B1ak
Tard

8
6

5.97
4.60

5
8
7
2
2

3.69
5.93
5.10
1.48
1.48

.75
.76
.74
.74
.73
.74
.74

Pare
Dkl2
Lund

2

1.45
.74
.74
.74.

Works*

Pk36
Schu
We22
We46
.71

Total

Mr48
Dk97
Comt
Goff
SimC
19

1
1
1
1
1
3
2

.74
.74
.74
2.13
1.42

1
1

.71
.71

1
54

.71
39.82

1

*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.
**See page 107 for explanation.

.73
.74
.74
.74
.74
•74
• 74
.71
.71
.71
.71
.71
.737

Connections
Ratio**
.158
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TABLE 8
CLUSTER FOUR BASED ON HIGH-SIMILARITY CONNECTIONS
BETWEEN WORKS

Total
Connections

Total
Similarity

Average
Similarity

Pk28

6

4.59

.76

Pk36

3

2.28

.76

.79

SimP

6

4.37

.73

.76

Dk12

7

5.11

.73

Marx

3

2.21

.74

Comt

3

2.19

.73

Goff

2

1.45

.73

Mr48

2

1.45

.73

Pr71

1

.74

.74

Pr37

1

.74

.74

Sumn

1

.74

.74

Tard

2

1.42

.71

Cool

1

.71

.71

Dk97

1

.71

.71

Pare

1

.71

.71

Schu

1

.71

.71

SimC

.. 1

.71

.71

17

42

30.84

Entrance
Similarity
.83

.74

Total

Works*

*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.
**See page 107 for explanations.

.734

Connections
Ratio**
.154
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TABLE 9
CLUSTER FIVE BASED ON HIGH-SIMILARITY CONNECTIONS
BETWEEN WORKS

Total
Connections

Total
Similarity

Average
Similarity

Blak

5

3.93

.17

Lund

4

3.10

.78

.83

Dk97

6

4.54

.76

.76

Pare

8

5.85

.73

Mr36

7

5.17

.74

Mr48

2

1.45

.73

Sumn

2

1.45

.73

Tard

1

.74

.74

We22

1

.74

.74

We45

1

.74

.74

Marx

1

.71

.71

Pr71

1

.71

.71

SimP

1

.71

.71

13

40

29.84

Entrance
Similarity

,;86

.74

.71

Total

Works *

*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.
**See page 107 for explanation.

.746

Connections
Ratio**
.256
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TABLE 10
CLUSTER SIX BASED ON HIGH-SIMILARITY CONNECTIONS
BETWEEN WORKS

Entrance
Similarity
.79

.74

.71

Total
Connections

Total
Similarity

Goff

3

2.24

.75

Schu

3

2.24

.75

Pk28

1

.74

.74

Pr37

1

.74

.74

Dkl2

1

.71

.71

SimP

1

.71

.71

6

10

7.38

Works*

Average
Similarity

Connections
Ratios**
.333

.738

•see Appendix C for list of abbreviations.
••see ·page 107 for explanation.
TABLE 11
CLUSTER SEVEN BASED ON HIGH-SIMILARITY CONNECTIONS
BETWEEN WORKS
Entrance
Similarity
.76
.69***
.67
Total**

Average
Similarity

Total
Connections

Total
Similarity

Ho74

3

2.12

.70

Ho50

1

.76

.76

Lund

1

.69

.69

Dk97

1

.67

.67

Works*

Connections
Ratio**

*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.
**Not computed for this cluster because the two Homans works have
high similarity only with each other.
***Highest similarity level for any new connection with either
Romans work.
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similarity within the cluster along with the number of connections or
links it holds with other members of the group.

Finally, I computed a

"connections ratio" between the actual number of pair connections and
the possible total.
n(n-1)

This possible total is
where n • number of works in the cluster.

2

Table 12 reveals that this procedure both identifies clusters and
measures their underlying density.

The mean similarity for each group

(except the Romans cluster which was not big enough to be tested) differs
significantly (t test, .01 level) from the total similarity mean.

How-

ever, the number of connections within each group (except the Romans
cluster) is significantly lower (Chi-square, .01 level) than we would
expect in a dense, highly interrelated group.

Sociology, we may argue

tentatively, contains perspectives instead of paradigms.

Most works

link highly with many others although the paths of linkage shift depend-

.

ing on which works we use for a starting nucleus.
behavioralist in the matrix--stands alone.

so~al

'

'

Only Romans--the
But Goffman and

Schutz, two social definitists, also relate atypically.

-

Their cluster

-

'
(Table 10)
contains only four other members: Durkhetm 1912 and Stmmel
'

"Poor~"

who relate highly to almost everybody, and the more definitional

work of Park in "Marginal man" and Parsons in The Structure of Social
·Action.
Factor analysis shifts our perspective from the location of groups
in space to the identification of underlying common properties.

Tables

13 and 14 list the theoretical works in order according to factors they
relate to most strongly and their rank of relationship within that
factor.

Both equtmax and oblique rotations expose three common prop-

erties and tend to assign works to similar positions within each factor
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TABLE 12

MEANS AND CONNECTIONS IN SEVEN CLUSTERS OF WORKS WITH HIGHSIMILARITY AND FOR THE TOTAL SET OF SIMILARITIES
Cluster

Mean*

1

.743

.217

253

55

2

.743

.232

190

44

3

.737

.158

171

27

4

.734

.154

136

21

5

.746

.256

78

20

6

.738

.333

15

5

7***

• •

• •

• •

• •

.637

1.000

Total

Connections
Ratio

Connections**
Possible Present

*All cluster means are significantly different from the total
population mean beyond the .01 level with the t test.
**All present connections are significantly different from the
possible total beyond the .01 level with the Chi-Square test.
***Mean and ratio are not included for Cluster Seven because the
Homans works cluster only with each other at a high level of similarity.
grouping.

However, both rotations also delimit a very "impure" struc-

ture with many theory works highly correlated to each factor.

The geo-

metric representation of the equimax rotation (Figures 5 through 7)
illustrates this visually; instead of lining along the factor axes, the
works cluster mid-way between.

Since the factors are highly inter-

related, an oblique rotation yields a better description.

Even with

oblique rotation, however, we cannot sharply discriminate between
groups.

For example, Homans--the marginal Romans--loads .52461 on

Factor 1, .73000 on Factor 2, and .68271 on Factor 3.

But this rota-

tion offers one further advantage by separating the structure matrix of
correlation coefficients associating works with factors from the pattern
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TABLE 13
FACTOR MATRIX COMPARING WORKS TO FACTORS
(EQUIMAX ROTATION)

Works*

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Marx

0.83472

0.25534

0.30864

Pr71

0.76027
0.69611
0.69315
0.66314
0.63797
0.62241
0.61022
0.59758

0.30518
0.26710

0.35733
0.44366
0.26853
0.30345
0.54621
0.36766
0.51114
0.28052
0.42388

We22
Comt
Cool
Dkl2
Tard
Pk28
We/15
Mr48
SimP
Pk36
Blak
Lund
Dk97
Sumn
Ho74
Pare
Mr36
Pr53
v'co££
Schu
Ho50
Pr37
SimC

0.55671
0.55605
0.51588
0.37137
0.15999

0.42334
0.37627
0.33292
0.36099
0.27875
0.38551
0.46960
0.46765
0.40041
0.81987
0.80599

0.34184
0.41477
0.08721

0.76314
0.60922
0.60022

0.53530
0.47504
0.45766

0.59997
0.57379

0.29135
0.34949
0.14249
0.47169
0.38860

0.53776
0.23448
0.22235
0.37162
0.44881
0.48021

*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.

0.53549
0.43691
0.20596
0.41151
0.29791
0.42775
0.55022
0.33311
0.41240
0.30675
0.80822
0.73681
0.64771
0.53858
0.52461
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TABLE 14
OBLIQUE ROTATION STRUCTURE MATRIX(CORRELATION
COEFFICIENTS) RELATING WORKS TO FACTORS

Works*

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Marx
Pr71
Dk12
We22

0.91578

0.47886
0.52506
0.57864
0.49999
0.68799
0.60080
0.51292

0.48083
0.52824
0.69797
0.59264

SimP
Comt
Pk28
Cool
Mr48
Pare
Tard
Mr36
Pr37
Pk36
We/6
SimC
Pr53
Lund
Blak
Dk97
·sumn
Ho74
Goff
Schu
Ho50

0.89267
0.87739
0.85923
0.85708
0.84701
0.81937
0.81787
0.81370
0.80994
0.80383
o. 78149
0.78094
0.75826
0.75778
0.71843
0.71084
0.60904
o. 70776
0.69812
0.75124
0.52461
0.65623
0.67126
0.52126

0.55994
0.66036
0.75562
0.55493
0.74067
0.65527
0.59076
0.55039
0.66580
0.67533
0.90143
0.89940
0.86462
0.76703
0.73000
0.49044
0.47085
0.54988

*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.

0.70719
0.46078
0.64740
0.47877
0.60055
0.54087
0.53078
0.60189
0.69315
0.59070
0.44916
0.67475
0.48936
0.60877
0.44611
0.51666
0.61600
0.68271
0.87480
0.81202
0.73076

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 1

VEB.T;:tCAL FACTOR 2
*
*1-Blak
*
2-Comt
*
3-Coo1
*l
9
4-Dk12
*
s
5-Dk97
*
6-Goff
*
.22
J
7-Ho74
*
i213
8-Ho50
*
i7
..20
.21
O-Lund
*
1814
*
8
.2523 §
*
-4
-1.6
.1524
*
10
-619
*
*
*
****************************************************************************

Figure

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
5.--Graphic Presentation

10-Marx
ll-Mr48
12-Mr36
13-Pare
14-Pk36
15-Pk28
16-Pr71
17-Pr53
18-Pr37

of Factors One and Two after Equimax Rotation

*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.

19-Schu
20-SimC
21-SimP
22-Sumn
23-Tard
24-We22
25-We4a5

.........
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Figure 6.--Graphic Presentation of Factors One and Three After Equfmax Rotation
•see Appendix C for list of abbreviations.
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Figure 7.--Graphic Presentation of Factors Two aDd Three after !quimax Rotation
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.
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25-Wet,S
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matrix of regression weights predicting work position from factors (Kim,
1975).

Table 15, based on oblique regression weights, presents the

most discriminating picture of difference between factors.

In rank

order: Factor 1 contains Marx, Parsons 1971, Weber 1922, Comte, Cooley,
Tarde, Durkheim, 1912, Park 1928, Weber 1904-05, Merton 1948, Simmel
"poor," Park 1936, Pareto, Parsons 1937, Parsons 1953, Merton 1936, and
Simmel "Conflict;"

Factor 2, Lundberg, Blalock, Durkheim 1897, Homans

1974, and Sumner; Factor 3, Goffman, Schutz, and Homans 1950.

Only one

work, Simmel "Conflict," continues to share all three common properties
almost equally.
This factor analysis adds a dimension to the Ritzer typology.

He

named key independent variables: social-group reality, social perspectives, and stimulus reaction.

Factor 1 points to a structural property

that presupposes some degree of group "reality"--at least Ritzer would
identify most of the works as "factist" writings.

Factor 3--with the

phenomenologist Schutz and the symbolic actionist Goffman--must identify
a perspective or definitional property.

However, Factor 2 contains Lund-

berg and Homans 1974 (who also associate with the definitional property)
as well as three works with factist leanings.

With the possible exception

of Sumner (the most ambiguously placed of the five works here) all of
·these works grew from a conscious effort to explicate some methodology.
The methodologies themselves differ, but the stress on working out a
sociological approach inspired the research for each work.

Even Sumner

wanted to develop a special methodology although he lacked the sophistication of the other four authors.
this analysis.

No behavioralist factor appears in

But we must remember that Homans's cluster marks him as

an atypical theorist; perhaps with different traits or more bahavioralist

r'
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TABLE 15
OBLIQUE ROTATION

PATTE&~ }~TRIX

(REGRESSION WEIGHTS)

FOR PREDICTING WORKS FROM FACTORS

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Marx

1.04965

-0.13942

-0.07767

Pr71
We22

0.92735

-0.05639

0.00107

0.83340

-0.09289

0.14021

Comt

0.82146

-0.10067

Cool

0.78595

0.13708
0.08585

Tard
Dk12

o. 72189

0.07130

-0.03499
0.06221

0.72147

-0.01009

0.27077

Pk28
We46
Mr48

0.70097

0.25523

0.69572

-0.05511
0.13194

-0.03436

0.59707

0.21978

0.13177

SimP
Pk36

0.57887

0.19247

0.55421

0.15164

0.26311
0.18202

Pare

0.55207
0.46574

0.40772
0.20723

0.46284

0.37364

Mr36

0.46190

0.13041

SimC

0.34561

0.38545
0.28606

Lund
B1ak

-0.02769

0.80942

0.21647

0.29483

o. 77684

-0.12299

0.25223

0.70081

0.01150

Ho74
Sumn
Goff

-0.10364

0.46084

0.36783
0.22183

0.56211
0.45217

0.16718

-0.03128

0.75768

Sc:hu

0.31654

-0.05616

0.65073

Ho50

0.00969

0.23844

0.60450

works*

Pr37
Pr53

D~7

*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.

0.00411
0.30940
0.02328
0.32316

,
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works, we would have identified one more factor.
Coser's (1975) ASA presidential address provides a partial test
of the methodology-factor interpretation.

He outlined two methodo-

logical extremes, technical positivism as it occurs in some regression
analysis and subjective interpretation as it appears in some ethnomethodology.
extreme.)

(See bottom of Table 1 for trait coding of typical works in each
Coser's ideal-type regression analyst relates highly to most

works in the method factor: Lundberg .90, Blalock .95, Durkheim 1897 .83,
Bomans 1974 .60 and Sumner .74.

However, Coser's ideal-type ethnometho-

dologist relates about equally to the subjective subject-matter theorists
and the methodologists: Goffman .67, Schutz .69, Homans 1950 .57, Lundberg
.69, Blalock .69, Durkheim 1897 .68, Homans 1974 .71, and Sumner .76.
Perhaps, for theorists working out a new methodology, method becomes at
least as important as subject matter in determining their work traits.
In sum, the factors represent two dimensions: a stress on methodology
per se and a stress on subject matter.

Among those who stress subject

matter, most emphasize structure and a few prefer exploring culturalsocial perceptions.

These factors seem sensible.

They represent tradi-

tiona known in the field and add some nuance to the Able-Boscoff-Ritzer
perspective discussed earlier.

Furthermore, cluster analysis identifies

the same key works that stand most prominently in each factor.

The

structuralists Marx, Parsons 1971, Weber 1922, Comte, and Cooley formed
the nucleus group in Cluster 2 (Table 6); the methodologists Lundberg,
Blalock, and Durkheim 1897 group in Cluster 5 (Table 9); and the definitionist Goffman links with Schutz in Cluster 6 (Table 10).
Other clusters, however, identified similar groups of works related
to more than one factor.

For example, Durkheim 1912 and Simmel "Poor" of
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cluster 1 (Table 5) both belong in the structural factor but share definitional leanings.

Sumner and Parsons 1937 of Cluster 5 (Table 9) display

mixed factor properties; Sumner is a methodologist with factist leanings
and Parsons 1937 is a structuralist with definitional persuasions.

The

disparity between factor analysis and clustering results occurs for two
reasons.

First, factor analysis measures the complete set of relationships

between all paired works, but the clustering procedure used here only
examines the top fifth of the relationships.

Second, as we suspected from

the beginning, the relationships are multidimensional based on shifting
similarity cores, possibly with a unique core for each set of pairs.
Although the clustering techniques used here confirm this suspicion, they
cannot describe such multidimensional relationships in a two-dimensional
framework.
In terms of Baggaley's criteria, the disparity between clustering
results and factor analysis raises a dilemma.

If we build a typology

with clusters, we can describe the results of complex trait distributions in confusing detail.

If we begin with factor analysis, we achieve

comprehensible parsimony without some important nuances.

For the

moment, I will choose parsimony at the expense of "good fit."

Figure 8

portrays my view of theory types locating the ten unambiguously identi.fied works (and suggesting a location for six others) in a two-dimensional space.

Later I can use these typical works to define the standards

for measuring others (Bailey, 1973a).
This later measure will have to assess the relationship between
common properties and the trait variables upon which they have been
built.

Tables 16 to 18 list the work by trait codings for each factor;

Table 19 gives the number and percentage for each trait occurring in the

SUBJECT-MATTER DIMENSION
Cultural Meanings or SocialPersonal Perceptions as The
Key Independent Variable

Structural Patterns of
Group Reality as The
Key Independent Variable
Marx
Parsons 1971
Weber 1922
Comte
Cooley

Schutz
Goffman

Durkheim 1912
Simmel Conflict

Weber

Homana 1950

1904-05

S\lllner

Bomana 1974
Blalock Durkheim 1897

Lundberg

METHODOLOGY DIMENSION
Fig.8--Initial Typology of Ten Unambiguously Classified Works* (underlined)
and Suggested Placements for Six Others.
*The Underlined works fell into the same groups regardless of the method used
for grouping. The other works fell into ambiguous positions and are placed here
primarily according to their factor loadings. However, the true placement of
ambiguously located works would depend on many dimensions and could not be visually
portrayed on a two-dimensional space.

"
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TABLE 16
THE ORIGINAL-DATA MATRIX COMPARING WORKS BY TRAIT VARIABLES FOR FACTOR ONE

Trait Variables

Works*

Marx
Pr71
We22
Comt
Cool
Tard

Dk12
Pk28
WellS
Mr48
SimP
Pk36
Pare
Pr37
Pr53
Mr36
SimC

1

2

3

4

s

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
1

1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0

1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1

0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0

0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0

1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1

0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0

1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0

0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0

1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1

0

0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

()

0
1
1
1
0
0

0

0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.

1
0
0
0
1
1
0

0

0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0

~
~

\0

4
TABLE 16-(Cont)

Trait Variables

Works*

Marx

Pr71
We22
Comt
Cool
Tard
Dk12
Pk28
We45
Mr48
SimP
Pk36
Pare
Pr37
Pr53
Mr36
SimC

39

40

41

42

1

0

0

0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

1
0
1

1
1
1

0

1

1
1
1
1
1

0
0

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

. 37

38

0
0

0

0
1
0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0
0

1
1

0
0

1

1
1
1

0

0
0
0

0

0
0
0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

0
0

1

0

0

1
0
1
0

1
0

0
0
1

0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0

1
0

0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1

0

1

1
1
1
1
1
1

0

0
1

1
1
1
1
1

0

1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1

0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

1
0
0
0

0

0

1

0

1
0

1
0
0
0
0
0

0

0
0
0

0

0

1

0
0
0

1
0
1

0
0
1
0
0

0

0
0

1
0
0

1
1
0

0

1
1
1
0

1

1
1
0

0

0

1
0

0

0
0

0

*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.

0

0
0
0

1
1
1
0

0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0

0
0
0

1
0

0
0
0
0

0

1
0
0
0
0

0

1
0
0
0

1
0
0
0
0
0

0
0

1
0
0

0
1

0

1

0
1

0
0

0
1

1
0

0

0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0

~

N
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TABLE 17
THE ORIGINAL-DATA MATRIX COMPARING WORKS BY TRAIT VARIABLES FOR FACTOR TWO

Trait Variables

Works*

Lund
Blak
Dk97
Ho74
Sumn

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

0
0
1
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
0
0

0
0
0
1
1

0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
1

1
1
1
1
0

1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
0
0

0
1
1
1
1

0
0
1
1
0

1
0
0
1
0

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
0
1

0
1
1
0
1

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

0
0
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
1
0

0
0
0
1
0

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
1
1
0

1
1
1
0
0

0
0
0
0
1

25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Lund
Blak
Dk97
Ho74
Sumn

0
0
0
1
0

1
0
0
1
0

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
1
0
0

0
0
0
1
0

0
1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
1

0
1
0
0
0

See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.

......
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TABLE 18
THE ORIGINAL-DATA MATRIX COMPARING WORKS BY TRAIT VARIABLES FOR FACTOR THREE

Trait Variables

Works*

Goff
Schu
Ho50

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1
1
0

0
0
1

1
1
0

0
0
1

0
1
1

1
0
1

1
1
1

0
0
0

9

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1
1
1

0
0
0

0
0
1

1
1
1

0
1
0

1
1
1

0
0
0

1
1
1

0
1
1

1
1
1

1
0
1

0
0
1

0
0
1

0
0
1

1
0
0

0
0
0

25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

Goff
Schu
Ho50

1
0
1

*See Appendix

1
1
1

0
0
0

1
0
0

0
0
1

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

0
0
0

0
0
1

1
1
1

0
0
0

0
0
0

1
1
0

0
0
0

1
0
1

0
0
0

1
1
0

C for list of abbreviations.
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N
N
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TABLE 19

FREQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE OF EACH TRAIT

VARIABLE

AS IT OCCURS AMONG THE "rO'rAL SET

OF WORKS AND AMONG WORKS IN EACH FACTOR
Trait Variables
Work Groups

l

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

ll

12

13

14

15

16

Total
Frequency
Percentage

12
23
22
5 12 19
20
7
(48)( 92)( 88) (20) (48) (76)( 80) (28)

19
( 76)

13
16
9
(36) ( 52) ( 64)

22
9
(36) ( 88)

8
22
(32) ( 88)

Factor 1
Frequency
Percentage

2 10 12 12
17
9 17
7
(53)(100)(100) (12) (59) (71)( 71) (41)

15
( 88)

5
13
7
(29) ( 41) ( 76)

14
8
(47) ( 82)

15
5
(29) ( 88)

....
N

w

'!

Factor 2
Frequency
Percentage

0
1
1
5
3
2
0
l
(20) (100) ( 60) (40) (00) (20) ( 20) (00)

l
( 20)

4
0
5
(80) (100) ( 00)

0
5
(00) (100)

Factor 3
Frequency
Percentage

0
2
2
l
2
2
3
l
(67) ( 33)( 67) (33) (67) (67) (100) (00)

0
3
l
3
(100). (00) ( 33) (100)

(33) (100)

17
Total
Frequency
Percentage
Factor 1
Frequency
Percentage
Factor 2
Frequency
Percentage
Factor 3
Frequency
Percentage

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

8
2
5
5
4
5 20 17
(20)( 32) (76) (20) (16) (20)( 92) (68)
0
l
3
4
4 15 14
3
(06)( 18) (00) (24) (18) ·(24)( 88) (82)
2
0
2
0
4
0
0
3
(40) ( 40) (00) (00) (00) (00) ( 80) (60)

1
0
1
2
1
1
2
3
(67) (100) (67) (33) (33) (33)( 33) (00)

l

3

4
3
(60) ( 80)
0
3
(00) (100)

........
TABLE 19 (cout)
Trait Variables
Work Groups

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

Total
Frequency
Percentage

s 13 1 3 12 s 7 12
(20)( 52)( 04) (12) (48) ( 20) ( 28) (48)

10 10
4
1
( 40)( 40)( 16)( 04)

Factor l
Frequency
Percentage

2
4
6 11
8
1
1 10
(12) ( 47) ( 06) (06) (59)( 24)( 35) (65)

0
16
0
4
( 64)( 24)( 00)( 00)

Factor 2
Frequency
Percentage

1
2
1
1
0
1
1
1
(20) ( 40) ( 00) (20) (20)( 20)( 20) (20)

3
s 1 1
( 60)(100)(-20)( 20)

Factor 3
Frequency
Percentage

......,
~

2
0
0
0
1
1
3
0
(67) (100) ( 00) (33) (33)( 00)( 00) (00)
37

38

39

40

41

42

Total
Frequency
Fercentage

s 7 2 17 9 17
( 20)( 28) (08) (68)( 36)( 68)

Factor 1
Frequency
Percentage

s s 2 13 6 14
( 29) ( 29) (12) (76) ( 35)( 82)

Factor 2
Frequency
Percentage

0
2
0
0
3
1
( 00)( 00) (00) (40)( 60)( 20)

Factor 3
Frequency
Fercentage

2
0
2
0
2
0
( 00) ( 67) (00) (67) ( 00) ( 67)

0
1
3
0
( 00)( 33)(100)( 00)
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total set and within each factor.

Statistical comparisons of the trait

distribution between factors will not help us here because the factor
membership is too small for rigorous comparisons and, as we anticipated,
the common core of similar traits shifts within each factor group.
Nonetheless, we will return to the trait variables later for clues about
reformulating theory.

In this indirect way we can assess the importance

of a few traits for theorists working in the structural, definitional, or
methodological .traditions.
Paradigm Hypotheses Evaluated
Whatever its usefulness for classifying works, numerical taxonomy
procedure can answer some of our questions about paradigms.

In my

initial discussion of sociological theory I hypothesized the following:
paradigms exist, hold constant across trait dimensions, and conform to
Ritzer's typology.
digms.

I also hypothesized that "bridgers" span the para-

Later, I defined paradigms as tightly connected clusters.

By

this definition sociology may have three paradigm frameworks with a few
sociologists exploring one paradigm thoroughly and numerous eclectics
borrowing random pieces from each.

Or perhaps sociology has different

perspectives--not firmly drawn paradigms but tendencies toward key modes
of analysis.

By searching the literature for appropriate examples, we

could find sociological works to cluster in tightly connected groups
within the structural, definitional, and methodological "paradigms."
However, most works used here are well-known, highly regarded research
monographs.

Most belong to the "living body" of sociological thought.

If these works do not cluster into tight-knit paradigm groups, then, we
may conclude, sociology itself contains paradigm tendencies rather than
incommensurable frameworks.

Or as an alternative hypothesis, we might
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speculate that sociology contains one master paradigm and that we are
all imprisoned within, unable to envision any real competing framework.
If this is true, we have lived in our prison since Comte began building
it in the 1820's.

Comte's work of 1820 remains a central plank of the

factist framework along with some works by Marx, Weber, Parsons, and
Cooley•

I
I

Thus even if we are locked in a master paradigm, it appears to

have tendencies that could develop separately.
The clustering of the paradigm tendencies or types suggests a
shifting similarity core of trait variables.

The similarity matrix based

on all traits does not conform to the similarity matrix based on abstract
traits alone.

Many works load highly on two or three factors.

Sfmmel's

"Poor" shares high similarity with thirteen works; Weber's Protestant
Ethic with only one--even though the Protestant Ethic is far better

known, far more frequently cited.

The types themselves begin with three

non-exclusive dimensions of structure--definition--method and expand into
an uncharted area of overlapping cluster memberships.

To conclude, the

typology modified Ritzer's types into a more complex framework representing partially related underlying dimensions.
When travelling such marshy, unmapped terrain we may erect bridges
where we choose.

Bridgers could be the fifteen ambiguously placed works.

Or the works with the largest number of high-similarity scores.

But

neither definition encompasses Ritzer's useful concept of works spanning
the distances between so-called "incommensurable" positions.
typology simply does not define irreconcilable extremes.

This

Perhaps bridgers

could be identified in terms of individual traits used in their analysis.
Those theorists who consciously reconcile opposing theoretical components
(measured by the trait variables) are "bridgers."

In other words, although
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the typology itself does not name bridger theorists, we may discover
8 ome

later while analyzing specific works.
A Cautionary Note: Limits of Numerical
Taxonomy in Theory Classification
Regardless of whatever refinements we may make on this classifica-

tion, two features limit its usefulness.

First, as in any clustering of

empirical variables, each group is a time-bound sample, not a set of
universal, abstract categories applicable to all other items in a defined
universe (Dunnell, 1971).

Second, since the groups reflect over-all

similarity rather than similarity on particular items, we cannot define
the properties of an individual work simply by identifying it as a member
of some cluster (Bailey, 1972).
Both of these problems present a greater challenge to sociologists
than to the biologists who pioneered numerical taxonomy in systematics.
Biological clustering usually starts with higher over-all similarity
values--after all, biologists generally cluster highly related organisms
not the whole range of life.

Many important biological groups can also

be defined by reproduction: either members are capable of reproducing
identical organisms or are evolving toward that capacity.

Theorists, in

contrast, combine intellectual species much more freely producing all
.manner of hybrids.

According to recent discussions about scientific

paradigms, these hybrid ideas could form the basis for unified explanations of physical motion or evolutionary development or human interaction
(Kuhn, 1970; Ritzer, 1975).

In other words, biologists identify minor,

highly related, relatively stable groups within the whole range of life.
For them, a semi-permanent catalogue of fossils can prove very useful.
With this catalogue, they can explore both the nature of a species and
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the evolutionary sequences of species change (Mayr, 1942).

Theory classi-

fiers, who must map shifting, ill-defined divisions within a smaller ·
range of rapidly changing phenomena, cannot hope for a useful semi-permanent catalogue.

I

I
I

What, then, can we ask of numerical taxonomy?

As I have suggested

earlier, classification may highlight clues for theory reformulation and
identify the cognitive similarities in various groups who are related by
political ideology, friendship, or some other non-scientific criteria.
Eventually it may also yield some ahistorical types that can catalogue
the theorists of the future.

If each similarity group shares a small

core of common traits, these shared variables might be used to redefine
types of theory, ultimately, we may hope, exclusive-exhaustive ideal
types.

If • • •

Then we will have travelled full circle--back to

theory classification based on a small handful of variables.

But with an

important difference: the new classification will have its origins tested
against a more varied empirical reality.

r
I

CHAPTER

V

THEORETICAL REFORMULATION: USING THE TYPOLOGY

Locating natural groups of sociological theorists can be an intriguing exercise in computer ingenuity, but to cross-breed these groups, we
must examine some animals at closer hand.

I will do this by dissecting a

few work pairs to inspect their similarity core of trait variables.
1 am assuming that sociological theory should address some empirical
research problems of social life.

In other words, the most important com-

ponent of a theory is not its form, but its substance: form is the tool,
exploration of substance the finished product.

If this is so, we should

search for ways to explain a topic rather than arguments for defending a
paradigm-framework (Singleman, 1972a; 1972b).

In "Notes on problem-

finding in sociology 11 Merton recommended theory questions

11

so formulated

that the answers to them will confirm, amplify, or variously revise some
part of what is currently taken as knowledge in the field" (1959a:x).
Such questions inform all the works in this theory typology.

In this

chapter, 1 will examine works that explore a similar substantive topic
from a different type or paradigm perspective.
questions?

Do they ask similar

Do they argue for similar explanations?

For this examination, I havechosentwo substantive issues: the
group process of stratification and a cultural product, namely religious
asceticism.

Both issues form the subject matter of three or more works

in this typology.

Further--although this outcome exceeded my expecta-

tions--the works fall in strategic type positions.

Marx, Blalock, and

Goffman, each the top theorist in a different factor group, probe for
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the causes and consequences of that pervasive, ubiquitous human condition called inequality.

Durkheim 1912, Weber 1904-05, and Sumner

detail the nature of religious asceticism.

The first two works belong

to the same structural factor; however, Durkheim relates highly (.71 or
more) to 13 other works, Weber to only 1.

None relate highly to each

other, yet all address the same limited subject topic.

We may wonder if

they share a critical core of common trait variables or if they used
very different traits to produce strikingly different explanations.
There are also less substantive kinds of subject matter in sociology.

Schutz, Simmel

11

Poor, 11 and Park 11Marginal man 11 use the ana-

lytic construct of social role.

Stratification is a group process in

the typology (trait 30); religious asceticism is a cultural product
(trait 42).
sociologist.

The role, in contrast, exists only in the mind of the
This abstract term describes a concept of social behavior.

that is, a category to be used by theorists and researchers viewing
social

activ~ty.

Tarde, Romans, and Pareto raise a different subject

matter issue when they reduce group problems and products to the effects
of individual psychological desires (trait 4); doing this, they define
sociological subjects as the results of personal motivations.

After

examining the stratification and religion works in some detail, I will
briefly suggest how subject material like the role or psychological motivations or even the choice of subject groups can also be reworked using
ideas from the theory typology.
The Traits: Components of Reformulation
Reformulation depends on the trait variables (listed in Appendix
B).

Fortunately, we can hold some faith in this list of forty-two.

Chapter II, I developed a rationale for my choices, defending them in

In
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exhaustive,or at least exhausting, detail.
theory typology based on these traits.

In Chapter IV, I built a

Each had some impact; none

were always present (I) or always absent (0) among the total set of
works.
On the other hand, codingerrorscould bias any description based on

these variables.

As Sokal (1974) documents, the beauty of a trait--

indeed its existence within a taxonomy--varies with the eye of the beholder.

Although we can easily decide if Goffman did or did not use

participant observation in research, we have no standards telling us if
a theorist has used a positive approach or a cultural-science one or both.
Clearly Lundberg falls in the first category and Schutz in the second.
But how do we categorize Marx or Park in "Marginal man" or Simmel' s discussion of "The poor"?

I have tried to answer this question in Appendix

D by listing all traits along with a basic coding rationale, a few
examples of coding decisions, and some citations to literature that discusses the operational definition of particular traits more thoroughly.
Someone else would judge a few works differently.

Nonetheless, with 42

trait variables, the typology can remain stable against the minor
assaults of human-coding error.
In this chapter I will use the traits--errors and all--to explore
reformulation possibilities suggested by the core of similar traits and
the dispersal of dissimilar ones in works on a single topic.
The search for commonality between different theorists has an old
tradition.

Talcott Parsons launched a career with this search; many

people still consider The Structure of Social Action (1937) his most
durable contribution.

Parsons examined the works of Weber, Durkheim,

and others to trace the growth of a unified "social action framework"
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based on shared agreements about social norms and individual choice.
However, this hypothesis about commonality in Weber and Durkheim is
still being disputed; for example, Pope et al. (1975) challenged Parsons's doctrines by citing different passages from the same scriptures.
One suspects, if we performed detailed exegesis on the work of any
sophisticated theorist, we would find wide ranging ideas.

The minor

points casually mentioned by

D~rkheim

could very well include ideas

central to Weber's thought.

Of course, both Parsons (1976) and Pope

claim to interpret the most crucial message of Weber and Durkheim.

We

need not arbitrate that dispute here; I have avoided the problem by concentrating on one single work at a time, one particular subject at a
time.
Besides areas of agreement, we should discover weak portions of a
theory, missing components-of thought (Siebler, 1973).
ables give one check list of components.

The trait vari-

Using this standard, I will

outline how a theory could change if a writer incorporated new traits.
However, the 42 trait variables do not form an exhaustive catalogue of
possibilities.

Exercises in theory reformulation may eventually yield

an additional set of important traits.
Theory Reformulation: Two Examples
To reframe theoretical views about some topic, one must consider
the feature of a particular theory along with the additions or deletions
that would make the construct more attractive.

Although, I will use the

42 trait variables as sources of ideas for such rearrangements, these
traits are not a checklist of "things to see."

They form a group of

interrelated variables, some critical to a particular theory, some quite
unimportant.

Therefore, I willchoose among them selectively as they seem

,
r
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tmportant for a type of theoretical perspective, for a general topic,
and for a specific work.
Stratification (trait 30) is a major societal process effecting a
distribution of goods and services through a population (Eisenstadt,
1971:233-35).

The stratification process determines who gets what by

doing what to whom.

Power, inequality, or their correlates seem to be

key concerns of any stratification theory.

In other words, to study

this topic we can look at the relationships that effect an unequal distribution of social goods or we can examine the pattern of this unequal
distribution (Coser, 1975).

We may wonder if different types of theorists

tend to favor one or the other of these conceptions in stratification.
Marx, Blalock, and Goffman each consider stratification from a different
type perspective; Marx as a structuralist (Factor 1), Blalock as a
methodologist (Factor 2), and Goffman as a definitionist (Factor 3).

As

we shall see, the typology category does inspire different views of
stratification.
Marx, like many factists, defined society in terms of "reciprocal
action" (1846b:670).

He believed that physical-environmental resources

(trait 37) combined with a society's technological level (42) and population density (39) to produce certain levels of interaction and, most
important, divisions of labor.

New divisions of labor lead, in turn,

to new economic practices and new ideas (42) (1846a:6-16).

In this

developmental process (8), Marx included coordination (29) and social
change (32) among the background features for the stratification structure.
His research reflects this thinking: he examined institutional arrangementa (33) exploring how change of production spurred new political forms,
how religious thought reflected economic ideology, how the coordination
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.achinery of the state tended to serve some economic groups better than
others.
In "The eighteenth Brumarie of Louis Bonaparte," Marx detailed
revolutionary changes in the French government between 1848 and the
triumph of Napoleon II by 1851.

Doing this he asked why people support a

government against their own class interests.

To answer his question he

examined the role of various groups supporting Bonaparte's new populist
dictatorship.

That bulwark of reactionary rule, the peasantry, is a

social category, not an interacting group.

With the French Revolution

peasants had become landowners, a status later confirmed by Napoleon I
in his effort to secure peasant support.

The peasants had not really

become country plutocrats, however, their small plots could not support
a family, let alone an elegant lifestyle.

They had simply exchanged

their old feudal obligation to a noble landlord for new capitalistic
debts to mortgage holders and tax collectors.

Living in the isolation

of their famrs, separated by bad roads, poor communication, and illiteracy,
they could not form associations to learn of their common plight or to
work for their common interests.

Therefore a populist dictatorship like

Bonaparte's--pandering to their love of land and false sense of ownership--could win their support.
Blalock shifts focus from a concern for explaining the inequality
between social groups to the need for designing research that tests
specific hypotheses (10) about social inequality.

He commends causal

models: carefully explicated statements about the causal links between
variables, measures for each variable (2) and predictions (15) of how
the presence of one measured variable will affect the presence of
another (1969:1-10).

Blalock usually defines these variables as indi-
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vidual characteristics (41) to be measured through a questionnaire or
interview (34}.

Basically he hypothesizes that certain kinds of people

tend to act out certain kinds of behavior: people with incomes over
$100,000 tend to vote Republican; people who are downwardly mobile tend
to support the political right.

In theory Blalock could also measure

groups; he could weigh the percentage of individuals with "middle"
incomes against the degree of democracy in different countries (40).

In

practice, however, such measures of group properties like "democracy"
often elude the researcher bent on interval-level precision (1974}.
Since Blalock prefers explicating a methodology to probing a subject
matter, he concentrates on the problems of measurement error rather than
the inequality perpetrated by an "unmeasurable" social system.
For example, in his article on "Status inconsistency, social
mobility, status integration and structural effects," Blalock presented
current theories describing the effects of social status and mobility on
prejudice.

Here he explicitly considered the difficulties of work with

certain types of complex theories, ones in which the dependent variables

are casued by interaction between two or more variables.

Avail-

able research suggests that prejudice varies with occupational status,
often with blue-collar workers and their children exhibiting more prejudice than higher-status workers and their families.

Further, the

occupationally mobile children may appear more prejudiced as they join·
blue-collar ranks or less prejudiced as they enter white-collar work.
Finally, the difference between old and new status multiplied by some
magnitude of change effect may produce a level of prejudice in addition
to the level produced by present status plus childhood status.

In

research terms Blalock wonders how we can empirically separate the
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effects of

ch~ldhood

socialization in a previous status, life style in

the present one, and changes between them, particularly if the change
sometimes produces more prejudice and sometimes less depending on its
direction.

We can measure old status, present status, and the pre-

judice level associated with each.

We can also verify whether down-

wardly mobile workers display more prejudice than stable ones and upwardly mobile workers display less.

However, isolating the degree of

"change effect" is another matter, especially if we suspect there is
also a change in attitude associated with maturation.

Often in research

situations there is no way to measure such a factor independently of
other variables.

In these instances we are left with the choice of

reconceptualizing the theory into one we can test or, at least, recognizing the untestable provisions in very complex theories.
Goffman, the third stratification theorist, also concentrates on
a methodology, but one designed to tap a specific subject matter.

His

"dramaturgical framework" reviews individual performances on the stage
of life (1959:1-10).

The performances occur on a small, confined set

(38) where individuals perform defined roles (40) and act to create the
image they deem appropriate for their part (42).

During a long-run per-

formance, individuals may create groups (18,25), develop new roles (26),
.deviate from assigned parts (28).

We can understand this action by

watching the individuals (35) go through a routine of impression management that signals their part to other players including the sociologists
in the audience.

In "The nature of deference and demeanor," Goffman

observed the ritual exchanges between superiors and subordinates in a
mental hospital.

He watched how patients and staff members signal to

each other in the effort to create the proper impressions, to maintain

,

U7
appropriate social distance.

The doctor might suddenly stop a patient

in the hall for conversation; patients should not presume to be so
familiar and could be repulsed with a frown, a hasty answer, or some
other sign that they had violated proper distance by failing to recognize the doctor's superior front.

Patients, on the other hand, had

license to "act crazy," to violate convention.

A patient could avoid

intrusions on his privacy by spitting at someone who spoke to him; an
orderly would be fired for such behavior.

Thus the cultural norms (42)

--the accepted dramaturgical fronts--of the people in a situation support
its superior-subordinate structure (40).
The three type frameworks presented here encompass very different
views of stratification--one portrays the sweep of history, another
confines action to a single building; one asks why stratification conditions arise, a second details some effects of stratification in a
given population, a third illustrates how people act in different
status positions.

It is not surprising, then, to find these works

share only 15 traits (three-way similarity level .36) in common.

If we

add Parsons' 1953 article on "A revised analytic approach to the theory
of social stratification," the overall similarity level drops to .19
(based on 8 common traits).

Adding Homans' articles about status levels

and conformity to norms would reduce the common core still further.
Marx, Blalock, and Goffman each share more common traits with the key
members of their factor type than they do with outside stratification
theorists (Tables 16 to 18).
Reviewing these works, we may argue there is no one way to study
stratification, no master framework.

However, although we may choose

from among several vantage points, the choice of framework and its

r
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related traits does affect the

study.

First, the basic difference between a structural orientation
(Factor 1) and a definitional one (Factor 3) encompasses a far deeper
division than the simple trait distinction between theorists with
positive (trait 2) or
subject matter.
tural theorists.

cultural~eaning

a

(trait 1) approach to sociological

Marx used both approaches yet heads the list of strucBlalock, who used a strictly positivistic approach

relates weakly to the structural factor and heads the methodological
one (Factor 2).

Among the endemic quarrels in sociology is the dispute

about whether we can build theories for stratification and other powerlinked societal processes without incorporating both positive and cultural meaning variables.

Those who argue for both usually attach struc-

tural approaches like functionalism for their failure to analyse how
cultural meanings, especially the ideologies of powerful interest groups,
shape social life (for example, see Rex, 1961:60-77; 115-55).

However,

Parsons 1953 (among others) presents a functional theory explicating
commonly held cultural ideas and tracing their impact on stratification:
our common societal values define valuable activity, and we reward those
who perform such valuable service with money, prestige, and the good
life.

Thus, using a combined positive-cultural meaning approach, as

Marx did, Parsons draws opposite conclusions about the causes and functions of class structures.

Goffman, in contrast, uses a strictly cul-

tural approach and heads the definitional factor.

Yet somehow one senses

that his patients have created their own world, placed themselves in a
subordinate status, and secured this lowly position. by presenting a subordinate front to the other performers on the stage.

Blalock, the

positivistic methodologist, sees people reacting to a status position:
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upwardly mobiles feel more kindly toward unfortunates than do downwardly
mobiles, at least they say so on questionnaires.

Both Coffman and Bla-

lock share a common perspective that describes individual people reacting
within their social position.

How or why people reached these positions

is the issue unraised by either theorist.

Both Coffman and Blalock

study the distribution of stratification traits rather than the relationships that effect this distribution: the impression management of
people who "act crazy" but not the forces used to define mental illness;
the attitudes of nouveau riche but not the differences in routes of
social mobility for people who rode an expanding-class escalator with
numerous companions and those who climbed a stalled economic system one
position at a time.
The problem, then, is whether a structural issue can be explained
with data about individuals.

Blalock recommends random sampling (11)

and questionnaire data (34) to measure both the extent and direction of
class based attitudes.

Using a deductive (10) framework, built on

probability as well as the substantive ideas of the moment, he predicted
(15) correlations between class membership and attitudes.

In effect,

be measured the consequences of class consciousness (or lack of class
consciousness) among Americans striving toward the Great American Deam.
Coleman (1975) suggests we can build information about these kinds of
individual judgments into theories of how "corporate actors" behave.

In

this instance, the corporate-actor downslider would repeal the first
amendment and revive the New Deal.

Coleman argues from three basic

assumptions: "corporate actors" possess the sum total of individual
thought; individuals and groups do act on their beliefs; and--the critical
assumption here--beliefs reflect self-interest.

He even hopes for "nor-
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.ative evaluations of society by the degree to which they satisfy the
preferences of their members" (1975:93).
porate actor with a split personality?
the ovens?

But what happens to a corDoes his weaker self get sent to

Does society itself condemn the weaker corporate actors?

Do

corporate actors ever acquiesce in their own condemnation?
These questions return us to the problem of reconciling Blalock's
methodological individualism with Marx's theory about the role of individuals in the stratification process.

Unlike Coleman, Marx did not

assume that our perceptions of self-interest reflect our real situation.
Instead he predicted a series of events: increasing interaction among
exploited miners, seamstresses, and chimney sweeps followed by the rise
of a true class consciousness and the consequent revolt of these victims.
Meanwhile, manufacturers, government bureaucrats, and other well-placed
fortunates controlled the various propaganda sources, convincing the poor
to "be humble, obey the law, wait for heaven later."

Thus Marx outlined

an historical sequence affecting attitudinal change.

Further, he traced

the origin of this sequence to a set of economic conditions--the breakdown of French peasant economy--which should have an increasing impact
on each generational cohort.

After the revolution, grandfather owned

enough farmland to sustain a family.

Two grandsons cannot support their

families on the same land; three grandsons have migrated to the city and
become revolution-minded proletarians.

In other words, Marx described a

functional sequence on the brink of developmental change (8).

The old

revolution had won peasant support which was later reinforced by government propaganda; however, increasing economic pressure combined with
increasing opportunities for the dispossessed farmers to congregate in
urban slums, would generate true--revolutionary--class consciousness
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among the lower-class corporate actors and this consciousness would
create the pressure for a new revolution.

With Marx's

expla~tion,

a

set of predictions really, about institutional structure (33) and
related cultural products (42), we could design a class-consciousness
questionnaire (34).

Then, with random sampling (11) and a miracle of

retroactive time, we could perform a longitudinal study of rising prorevolution attitudes.

Or, we could sample strategic groups (12,40),

test their attitudes (42), and combine this information with census
projections (39) to predict future attitude change.

(See Stinchcombe,

1968:101-30 for other examples of this approach.)
Goffman's individualistic approach would lead us to other kinds
of reformulation.

He too probes the nature of class consciousness,

specifically the conscious perceptions of subordinate and superior.
Like Marx, he directly examines the structural limits (40) of his particular stage and links these structures to universal conditions (12):
all "inferiors" will become conscious of their condition if interaction
structures are present; all subordinates will develop "humble" fronts if
superiors seem to demand these.

However, where Marx and Blalock had

studied societal (23,14) change, Goffman observes (35) the limited stage
of primary groups (18) within one complex organization (19).

Can we

combine Coffman's ideas about interaction fronts with Marx's theory of
class consciousness?

We cannot simply use Goffman the way we used

Blalock, as a test of Marx.

Blalock designed a methodology to test

theory; Goffman, in contrast, developed a framework for generating it.
He moves his framework into the field and observes the action (35).
Goffman happens to be a master observer who has detected interaction
similarities between the convent novice and the prisoner of war, between
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the socially stigmatized prostitute and the physically handicapped paraplegic.

However, a framework like his finds its meaning only in the

talent of the observer.

Less skillful researchers, eyeballing the

scenery without the guidance of a plot outline, tend to acquire the
ideology of individual actors without appreciating the entire set (Huber).
How ironic!

If we study impression management and interaction fronts,

we must assume that our subjects are also presenting a front to us.

Thus

we may be led by our own methodology into a world of perception unbounded
by structural limits.
But, thinking about this problem for a moment, we can imagine how
very useful a front must be.

Information is power; knowledge of their

fears and desires enables others to control us, through manipulation if
nothing else (Stinchcombe, 1968:163-73).

Both exploited and exploiter

would have good reason to present a false interaction front.

Perhaps

we could develop several ideal types (13): the god-like noble, the humble
peasant, the crafty entrepreneur.
typical encounter?

How would these people interact in a

We could assume each type of person acts rationally

to hide critical information from the others.

Then the pre-industrial

peasant, the older black man, the traditional housewife, should all present a front that displays servility and masks hostility.

To test our

idea we can observe the action, measuring real players against typical
ones.

Using types for comparison we can also observe action in different

structural situations.

Do rural, southern blacks present "humble" fronts

more consistently than their urban, northern cousins?
do fronts promote or retard class consciousness?

Even more critical:

In Rainwater's (1970)

study of a housing project, residents would not unite for common causes
because each refused to associate with "disreputable" fellow residents.
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Suttles' (1968) participant observation of a lower-class Chicago community caught many residents in the act of presenting their fronts to
"disreputable" members of other groups--with dress, street demeanor,
and other signals, they told each other "I'm a safe associate" or "Don't
tread on me."

Alinsky's (1971) work in community organization typically

began when residents acted as if they were powerful (perhaps in an exercise set up for this purpose by Alinsky himself).

A powerful act would

become power itself when lower-class people came to see themselves as
powerful actors with powerful fronts.

In sum, Goffmanesque players

occupy far larger stages than the ward of a mental hospital.
gating their fronts could detail some of

t~e

Investi-

mechanisms behind the growth

of class consciousness and suggest techniques for raising (or suppressing)
this consciousness in modern groups.
In conclusion, Marx remains the most general stratification theorist
of the three considered here.

Marx outlines a societal process and the

distribution of its effects.

Blalock, the methodologist, suggests ways

to test some predictions from Marx's theory.

Goffman, the inductive

definitionist, raises new questions about how class-based ideas come
into being.
Religious asceticism is a cultural product (42), a particular set
of beliefs about spiritual good and related processes shared by some
groups.

Weber 1904-05, Durkheim 1912, and Sumner, three authors who

were not writing in response to each other, still share remarkable
agreement on the nature of religious self-sacrifice for spiritual ends.
Nonetheless, these authors are not highly similar to each other in
overall trait distributions.

Even though Durkheim and Weber both belong

in the structural factor (Factor 1) and Sumner is a methodologist
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(Factor 2) with structural-factist tendencies, their overall similarity
is only .43 (based on 18 common traits).

I will examine their diverse

theoretical approaches to this common problem beginning with the group
processes they observed (trait dimension 5) and the observational variables they used (dimension 6).

Then I will review their separate

methodological traditions (dimensions 1 and 2) to discern how a combined
methodology could generate new hypotheses about religious asceticism.
In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism Weber detailed
the beliefs of radical protestant sectarians (trait 41), the Protestant
people most anxious to lead "new" lives, to oppose all popish ideas and
life styles.

These intensely practical

as the ultimate sin.

pe~ple

condemned waste-of-time

Excessive sleep, non-useful sex, profligate spend-

ing, all distracted men from the pursuit of God's calling to useful work
in the world.

Furthermore, man is only God's trustee; the fruits of a

successful calling belong to God, not to the vineyard worker.

Thus,

Protestant asceticism both denied sectarians the right to enjoy success
by wasting time or money on "useless" activity and, at the same time,
urged them to work harder than ever at their calling, which happened to
be trade.

The result: a new kind of businessman (26) on the cutting

edge of the culture (31).

Their dynamic inner-worldly asceticism per-

meated and transformed modern life (32): the severe English Poor Relief
Legislation, for example, reflected the moral order of people who called
beggardy a sin; and now adults in industrial societies live in the Iron
Cage of work even though their religion no longer defines work as God's
calling.
In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Durkheim delineated a
more restricted subject matter, the positive and negative rituals of
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primitive peoples.

Ascetic rituals or negative rites separate sacred

areas from profane ones, teaching (27) profane humans how to perform
sacred acts.

In other words, negative ascetic practices distinguish

among people (26), helping to coordinate (29) sacred-profane areas of
social life by assigning the roles and rites appropriate to each (40).
The world does not contain inherently sacred or profane objects.
ourselves define who is our God or what is our totem.

We

Since these dis-

tinctions are socially defined rather than inherent, we naturally blur
them in our own minds and need some social mechanisms to remind ourselves
that different kinds of objects exist in the world.

These social

mechanisms, various practices like fasting or flagellation are, therefore, not the fruits of more positive spiritual impulses, but the sources
of such spirituality.

Without suffering induced by ascetic rites, there

would be no proper sense of a distinct sacred duty to a god or to society.
In Folkways Sumner surveyed numerous, diverse groups looking for
ways that people endure pain in the name of religion.

He called asceticism

"an abberation," an innovative (31) response to man's ancient fear of
spiritual forces.

Even in modern life, such "abberant" responses as

voluntary poverty and perpetual virginity exist in testimony to the persistant belief that powerful gods are pleased by man's suffering.

Natu-

rally, Sumner concluded, the ascetic impulse lures men from harmonious
personal balance toward extremes.

We must not be surprised to find those

who refrain from sex judging the sexual activities of others; those who
seek pain for themselves permitting torture for others. • • •
Turning to the methodology behind these three views, we find
increasing levels of sophistication.
framework, far too simple in fact.

Sumner worked with the simplest
For Folkways he viewed "anthropo-
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logical data" by simply imposing an inductive (9) "evolutionary perspective" (1910:2244-47) in order to "trace the evolution of society
from its germ up to its present highest forms" (ca 1900:425).

One

suspects his "evolutionary perspective" encouraged a chronic case of
temperocentrism.

Durkheim, of course, looked for social facts or

"phenomena which would not exist if this society did not exist and which
are what they are only because this society is constituted the way it is"
(1900:363).

Phrased differently, he studied "all the beliefs and the

modes of conduct instituted by the collectivity" (190l:lvi).

Sumner

explained that a psychologically based (4) fear of the spiritual world
leads men to propitiate the gods through culturally defined rites; Durkheim that men acting in their society (3) name a god and then build
ascetic practices to encourage more positive forms of worship.

Both

theorists defined asceticism as an evolving cultural meaning, but only
Durkheim attempted to probe that meaning (1) in his research.

Weber

introduced a different methodological perspective; instead of searching
for the ultimate origin of religious impulse, he designed a methodology
explicitly for examination of such cultural forms once they exist.

His

sociology studies causal chains of social action by exploring bow and why
people voluntarily act in response to other people.

He assumed, of course,

.that cultural values define the reasons behind voluntary social action.
Weber investigated these cultural reasons with a technique of analytic
understanding, or Verstehen (2) (1922:4-26); he defined an ideal type (13)
describing the extreme or characteristic values of some social-action
orientation and then interpreted a specific situation in terms of its
correspondence to the ideal type (1904:62-112).

After defining a type

of social-cultural meaning, he could hypothesize the causal sequences
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of special situations (12) where his types, or some empirical forms
approximating his types, would occur in the empirical world.

In this

instance, he described a causal sequence of negative-ascetic practices
strengthening the spiritual power of certain Protestant sects thereby
igniting a powerful economic motive which he called the "spirit of
capitalism."
When combining the ideas of these three theorists, we can begin
with solid agreement on basic definitions.

All three described negative

or ascetic practices--personal denial ranging from self-torture that
prevents the very pleasure of feeling good to sexual abstinance that
precludes the pleasure of feeling very good.

All believed

ascetic

practices would inspire more positive forms--worship ranging from a
mystical escape in other-worldly ecstasy to a grimly degermined conquest
of this world.

All observed how people who practice asceticism expect

others to practice it as well.
Durkhetm on one important point.

However, Weber and Sumner differed from
Durkheim stressed the usefulness of

rites to define a line of practice separating the sacred world from the
profane one.

Sumner and Weber suggested that ascetic practices could,

depending on one's view of religion, lead one to unite the sacred and profane worlds instead of separating them.
.different types of religious impulse.

In other words, they described
Although all religious meanings

begin in man's effort to deal with some other-worldly force, some direct
that spiritual force into a redirection of mundane life.
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Chart 1
TYPES OF SPIRITUAL PRACTICE

I

Direction of
Spiritual
Impulse

Negative
(Ascetic)

Positive
(Non-ascetic)

Other-worldly

Private Fast
Initiation into
Separation of
Rituals (Durkheim)~Priestly Rites ~ Sacred and profane
(Durkheim)
(Durkheim)

Mixed

Sexual Abstinance
Medieval MonasChristian Attitude
(Sumner; Weber)~ ticism (Sumner)~ toward Sexual"Sin"
(Sumner)

Inner-worldly

Abstinance From
"Idle" Time
(Weber)

\II Calvinistic
11

Calling"
(Weber)

Social Consequences

English Poor Relief
Legislation (Weber)

Viewed in this typology, the line between the sacred and profane blurs
further.

Durkheim described "elementary forms" of religious ritual in a

mystery-laden primitive world; Sumner and Weber detailed ascetic practice
in a much more secularized society.

If Durkheim is correct in claiming

we-define god and the sacred in the image of our own group, then a small,
ethnocentric primitive tribe could define itself as a sacred people and its
own natural environment as a powerful sacred force: "we are the people and
this land is made for us by our gods."

Modern man, well innoculated by

anthropology and natural science, is more apt to deny all sacredness, to
. call the world world a profane machine.

Modern man also lives in a

world of heterogeneous belief, sometimes even heterogeneous belief under
the cover of a common religion.

Whatever his view of the sacred, he

experiences it as a minority view.

I would hypothesize that the long

term trend toward modern secularization has changed the universal social
conditions (12) underlying the sacred impulse.

If primitive asceticism

marked a distinction between sacred and profane in a predominantly
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sacred milieu, modern asceticism illuminates small corners of sacredness
in an overwhelmingly profane world.

So naturally, modern asceticism

must inspire men to act in the world rather than withdraw from it.

(For

an interpretation of the development of Roman Catholic religious orders
that assumes this hypothesis, see Gannon and Traub, 1969.
To research these sweeping ideas, I would begin by defining universal societal conditions (12) in terms of the first three observational
traits.

The societies with high technical and material resources (37),

high urbanization (38), and low mortality rates (39) would probably differ
religiously from those with little science and technology, low urbanization, and high mortality.

Then, borrowing from Weber's type-building

strategy (13), I would look for societies that approach extremes of primitive and modern development, or perhaps two extremes and a midpoint:
for example, selected primitive tribes, medieval Europe, and the modern
United States.

In these societies, I would expect religious asceticism

to find different expression, especially in its social consequences:

I
I
I
I

more mysticism in the sacred societies, more overt social-control action

in the secular ones.
also be critical.

The position of a group within the society may

We might assume the trend toward secularization is

also a trend toward increasing human control over physical and social
matters.

If this is true, we might further expect different kinds of

people (41) with different positions and feelings of power to have different religious impulses.

Among those who actually practice a religion,

lower-class slum dwellers might score higher on an "other-worldly
religion" questionnaire than middle-class suburbanites (Roof, 1976:197-97).

Or a society with a colonial power structure (40) might inspire more
sectarian religious movements than a more egalitarian society (Smelser,
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1962:338-52).

Finally, going beyond religion per se, we might look for

religious ideas in other institutions, like law: Is law more likely to
enforce the negative proscriptions of asceticism or the positive prescriptions of worship?

Given the ascetic's zeal to impose his self-denial

on others, I would expect religious-inspired law to say "do not" more
often than "do."

Gusfield's explanatory history of the temperance crusade

provides one illustration of this zealous desire to eradicate sin committed by others {Gusfield, 1963).
These research hypotheses will not astound anyone familiar with
current thought in the sociology of religion.

However, the theoretical

framework, building from the theory typology, constructs a common
structure around the hypotheses by indicating societal conditions that
accompany certain forms of religious asceticism and stating these conditions in a way that frees them from specific groups and specific time
periods.

(For more details on this approach, see Freese, 1972a, 1972b;

Willer and Willer, 1972.)

If the theory typology helps us articulate

more such common theoretical frameworks, it will have served us well.
Theory Reformulation: Approaches From the Theory Taxonomy
So far I have used two substantive problems, the group process of
strattfication and the cultural product called religious asceticism, to
serve as examples for reformulating the ideas of several theorists into a
more unified common framework.

In each example, I tried to expand the

original theories either by generating new propositions about a subject or
by suggesting new testing strategies or both.
some general ad hoc rules.

Doing this, I developed

First, I briefly defined where the subject

matter at hand fit among the trait variables and what it meant as a
sociological issue.

Second, I reviewed the methodological and subject
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matter assumptions posited by each author, relating these assumptions
(along with their associated trait variables) to the work itself.

For

less familiar theories, I would reason backwards from the works to the
assumptions: Does the author seem to be developing a deductive mathematical
model (10) or interpreting social action (1)?
causes (3) or psychological ones (4)?
even with familiar authors.

Does he stress social

Actually this procedure serves well

For example, Durkheim's positivistic rules

formulated in the 1980's do not detail the more interpretive methodology
of Elementary Forms.
chosen works.

Third, I examined the trait distributions for the

Did the common traits seem vital to analysis or peripheral?

The stress on social-level causes (3) common to all stratification
theorists seems inherent to any analysis of how social structures rank
people within societal groups.

On the other hand, we could easily study

stratification effects in the community (22) even though none of the
theorists in our sample chose to do so.

Finally, with these ideas about

subject matter, author's orientation, and some particular works firmly in
mind, I began "plflying" with the theories.

In these examples, I supple-

mented my own game rules with theory-building ideas from Stinchcombe
(1968), Freese (1972) and the Willers (1972).

In this final section, I

will present other reformulation problems for those who would like to
play on their own; first some comments on social roles, and then two
subject matters I introduced in Chapter II, namely reductionism and the
use of social groups as sites of analysis.
Role is a crucial component of group differentiation (26).

However,

roles are not real objects but analytic constructs far more abstract than
a group process like stratification or a group product like religious
asceticism.

The term "role" denotes a network of rights and duties

r
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associated with some position or functional performance in society.
Always a social level variable (3), the role explains individual behavior
by tying it to some position in the surrounding structure (40).

Whatever

their psychological motives may add to the situation, priests and prostitutes act a part as they perceive it is prescribed by society.

When we

begin to analyze these roles, we find separate components: prescribed
roles (what society expects); subjective roles (what we think society
expects); and enacted roles (what we do in conformance with expectations)
(Deutsch and Krauss, 1965:175-77).

In effect each role is really three.

So we may wonder about the course of role play in those situations, most
likely changing ones, when societal expectations and personal actions do
not coincide.

Unfortunately, we cannot investigate this question easily

because the problem of measuring role components independently or linking
changing social definitions to changing role behavior still troubles role
theorists (Komarovsky, 1973).
The three role works in our typology--Park's "Marginal man," Simmel' s
"Poor," and

Schut~'s

"Homecomer"--may provide clues for solving some parts

of this methodological puzzle.

All three describe changing situations

which disturbed some set of role expectations.

Park argued that during

times when cultural groups first intermingle, societal expectations must
create a "marginal" world for the mulatto, the inunigrant, and the various
other people who live between the two cultures.

Park names these marginal

role players as the bellwethers of our cultural future, the people whose
marginal status forces them to enact new roles.

Stmmel described indi-

viduals who could not initiate role innovations but must simply react to
expectations imposed by others.

By definition, the "poor" are those who

ask for help but cannot contribute to society in return.

For this reason
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they cannot bargain over role definitions but must accept their defined
positions--as unfortunates who can justly claim a fair share of social
goods, as objects of charity performed for the benefit of the donor, as
the source of potential menace who must be given welfare so they will not
steal, as whatever society chooses to call them.

In role analysis, both

Park and Simmel discussed how society can create a role (2); Park also
indicated that an individual may subjectively redefine his role, particularly if he hears conflicting definitions from society (1).

Schutz

directly examined the subjective roles we build for ourselves and for
others by constructing "personal types, 11 in this example ideal-type constructs of people creating false expectations for other members of their
primary group.

He described a homecomer newly returned from World War II.

The family expected a John Wayne hero who would nonetheless be content to
settle into his old life.

Instead the homecomer was a young man anxious

to make a different life or too anxious for any life except a long slide
into alcoholism.
In our efforts to reformulate role theory, we could begin as these
theorists did by defining some peculiar, changing societal condition (12)
and constructing a typical-hypothetical role expectation (13) that could
grow from these conditions.

Like Simmel and Park we could stress cultural

expectations as they can be inferred from social structure (2,40) or like
Schutz we could construct subjective expectations held by individuals
judging others (1,41).

Either way we will have outlined a role component

independently of the way some individual plays the game yet tied to changes
in the social structure.

To complete the analysis, we should continue

beyond such definitions to examine the role-in-action.

The real question

is when and why the expected-prescribed roles differ from the subjective
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and enacted ones.

When does the immigrant decide to become a "real"

citizen with a rightful claim on participation in the society?

When

does the homecomer simply tell his family "it must be & way?"

When do

the poor welfare recipients begin to demand their "just" rights?

When,

in other words, do role players achieve class consciousness and begin to

I

redefine and reenact their roles (Komarovsky, 1973:659)?
Reductionism (4), the use of psychological level variables to
explain sociological data, has raised perennial controversey since sociologists first tried to claim a real, independent, scientific field.

Few

would seriously deny the importance of psychological variables; the problem
is whether we can, or should, use them to explain group-linked behavior.
Looking at the five reductionist works in the typology (Romans 1974,
Romans 1950, Pareto, Sumner and Tarde) we can find rather different uses
of this technique.

Pareto and Tarde studied institutional structures of

society (33); later, to explain these structures, they simply named the
psychological motives behind the institutionalized behavior.

Tautology--

the people who rule like "lions" have lionine psychological motives; the
people who imitate an exciting new fad have a desire for novel activity.
Sumner used similar reasoning when he attributed religious activities
like asceticism to a motive like "fear of ghosts" which leads men to
religion.

Romans moved closer to the people with the psychological

motives through his use of secondary sources based on interview/questionnaire data (34), participant observation (35), and experiment (36).

He

could even have looked directly for information about psychological predispositions if he had inquired about these in his subjects' background
characteristics (41) or cultural values (42).

However, unlike the other

reductionists, he ignored these observational variables and concentrated
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on the structural character of groups (40).
rests on very abstract ground.

Therefore, his reductionism

All people desire goods; all pay limited

costs to get these goods; a person's position in a group restricts his
access to goods.

But Homans never defines these goods.

He does not ask

why men in different groups value skill at diplomacy over prowess on the
battlefield (42) or whether the peasant loves war as much as the noble
(41).

In sum, examining reductionism in terms of trait variables reveals
different kinds of reductionism with different substantive consequences
and different problems for theory reformulation.

If reductionism ends in

tautology, we must construct independent measures of lionine impulses,
novel desires, or what have you.

If reductionism has erased all group

qualities and if we wish to make generalizations about social life, we
must start by "bringing the group back in" to analysis.
Groups have long been a focus of sociological interest.

Studies

of community (21,22), small or primary groups (17,18) and complex organizations (19,20) fill the literature even though they are not well represented in this typology.

But I have a suspicion, mentioned in Chapter II,

that studies using one kind of group as a source of independent variables
(a unit of analysis) and another as a source of dependent variables (an
obje~t

of analysis) differ in important ways from studies focusing on only

one kind of group.
Looking at other trait variables we can see how this effect must
vary with the kinds of groups.

Studies focusing exclusively on small

groups or complex organizations often describe the internal mechanisms of
an artificial setting.

For example, when Homans linked status level with

deviance, he defined "status" in terms of the experimental (36) subject

156
group;
(40).

some members were told that others had rated them "high" or "low"
Romans later examined status and deviance in real groups with

people who brought their status with them from society itself.

Since

most of us respond to our own personal status background (41) as well as
the structural character of a small group (40), a telling study of personal status effects must eventually consider both.

Furthermore, even

the naturally formed groups respond to pressures from other groups.

We

can see this, among other places, recorded in the history of communitypower literature.

It began with traditional, in-depth studies of a single

community, almost self-contained if we believe the sociological descriptions.

More recently this field has progressed to regression analyses of

environmental variables affecting a list of communities examined only for
the specific regression variables (Clark, 1975).

Actually the variables

examined may remain the same--population distribution, ethnic composition,
material resources--but in one form of analysis, the variables may rest in
the unique holistic fabric of a single community (5,21); in the other form,
variables become separate, weighted qualities of society (6,23) that happen
to converge in a particular place, bringing particular effects.

In studies

with society as the object of analysis (24), we usually reverse the direction
of the variables and look for effects generated by internal groups.

In other

words, we can conceptualize society as a single, holistic group (5) or the
site of various analytically distinct institutional structures (6) which
can act through various communities, complex organizations, or primary
groups.

Cooley's study of class ideology illustrates the holistic approach.

He explained how capitalistic ideology permeated the minds of all members
of society; although the rich controlled the media (and, we presume, promoted their own ideas), all citizens

shared the dream of social mobility
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through hard work and even the lower-classes worked to transform their
dream into reality.

Marx, with his more analytic conception, did not

assume such happy agreement among people placed in different institutional structures of society or such a fortunate correspondence between
dreams and more substantial reality.
Perhaps, the most important distinction to make in this discussion
of groups is whether a sociologist studies the group itself as a subject
matter or whether he examines a particular problem like power or coordination or stratification.

If we simply want to study a group per se, we

may be justified in viewing it as a holistic entity, source of both independent and dependent variables.

But for studies of group process, we

need a more analytic approach, connecting separate parts of a group or
tying the group to outside influence.
In conclusion, trait variables do provide clues for theory reformulation.

These variables also reveal an intimate relationship between sub-

stance and method.

The choice of observational variables or data-gather-

ing techniques first appears to be a methodological decision.

But a pre-

ference for questionnaire data (34) may lead one to use social background
characteristics (41) like a respondent's social class.

This choice, in

turn, may lead one to study the distribution of stratified goods rather
than the relationships creating that distribution.

Finally, the vari-

ables prove there is no one pre-packaged way to approach a substantive
topic.

With at least three works for each topic, we find rather small

cores of similar traits.

The highest overall similarity for any of the

topic group considered was .55 (based on 23 shared traits) for the three
social role works, well below the pair-by-pair mean similarity of .637.
Clearly, we must conclude, theory building can follow many forms; it is
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unlikely that any one paradigm tendency delimits the analytic possibilities for any one sociological topic.

,
CHAPTER VI
INFLUENCES ON SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY: CREATING THE CLUSTERS
In Chapter VI I will examine the proposition that "truth" is a
dependent variable: even "rational" scientific truth may be affected by
such non-rational, non-scientific considerations as the group membership
(or social circle) of the scientist.

We have solid evidence arguing for

the existence of potentially effective groups; for example, Crane's (1970)
identification of "invisible colleges" and Mullins' (1973) mapping of
"theory groups."

Both Crane and Mullins exposed ties of interests uniting

clusters of social researchers and theorists.

Allegiances formed through

sponsorship or colleagueship reappeared as authors advocated similar perspectives, worked on similar problems, cited a common pool of sources.
But--this is the question I raised earlier--do these social-circle groups
share the common gestalt of a single paradigm?
With the evidence from the theory typology, we must answer "no"
because the paradigm types are so loosely clustered few theorists
belong unambiguously to any one type (see Figure 8).

I even labeled

these types "paradigm tendencies" rather than paradigms.

I also located

clusters of theorists centered around a similarity core of trait variables, but found within each cluster that two works could be highly
related to a third yet share very little similarity to each other: as if
one sociologist loved sports, one classical music, a third both field
hockey and opera.

Thus, even membership in the same cluster does not

insure high similarity between a specific pair of theorists.

With this

peculiar structure of similarity between theoretical works, we cannot
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expect a simple correspondence between social circles of theorists and
paradigm types of theoretical thought.

Nonetheless our taxonomy pro-

cedure can answer some questions about whether social allegiances influence thought, whether scientific politics affects science, whether belonging to a group means thinking in orthodox ways.

In this chapter, I will

consider the sociology-of-sociology hypotheses presented in Chapter II.
We need not sort the thinkers into paradigm groups to test these hypotheses.
Instead, assuming that works on a tether circle together, we can look for
the ties of high similarity between works written by members of the same
scientific circles.
The final hypothesis links theoretical ideas to groups of theorists
who share basic outlooks about the proper function of sociology in society.
For this problem, I will use a different strategy.

Since I did not delib-

erately choose policy researchers, radicals, or other practice-orientated
theorists, I do not have a good selection of them in the typology.

How-

ever, the typology does contain one outstanding radical, Marx, who advocated science-for-action but shares highest degrees of similarity with the
much more conservative Parsons 1971, with Cooley the ever-optimistic
democrat, with the consensus theorist Comte, and with Weber 1922 the
cautious academic.

Something besides their sense of sociological mission

must have united these theorists.

To delimit their common views, I will

perform another exercise in theoretical reformulation via the trait variables.

Although relatively few traits separate these thinkers, the odd

traits may well be the crucial ones.
Social Circles in Sociology Revisited
The various hypotheses linking paradigm views with group membership
rest on two basic assumptions, one drawn from the philosophy of science,

,
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one from the sociology of sociology.
exhaustive paradigms exist.
contradicts this.

I originally assumed that exclusive-

But the evidence of Chapters IV and V firmly

In Chapter IV only ten out of 25 works could be unam-

biguously placed 'in a type category and even these had non-zero factor
loadings for other types (see Tables 13-15).

In Chapter V, I demonstrated

how a few key traits, rather than an entire paradigm complex, account for
the necessary ties among theorists working on some common sociological
topic.

The second assumption has proved less problematic.

I claimed that

scientific sociological circles exist and in Chapter II supported my assertion with research evidence from the literature on "invisible colleges,"
"theory groups," and other colleague circles.
If the typology had defined unambiguous type categories, we could
test hypotheses relating circle groups to paradigms with a simple procedure,
straightforward even if time-consuming.

We could select theorists from

various social circles, code a selection of their works, classify these
works with the variable weights from multi-discriminant analysis (see
Table 20) and, finally, test the statistical probability that circle
membership would coincide with type memberships the way they do.

(For an

explanation of how to identify new works with discriminant analysis, see
Sneath and Sokal, 1973:400-08; for a mathematical exposition of multidiscriminant analysis, see Cooley and Cohnes, 1971 and Van de Geer, 1971;
for computer procedures, Klecka, 1975.)

Of course, we cannot pursue this

strategy here, partly because unambiguous paradigms do not exist--at
least not in this research--and partly because our initial group of 25
works does not justify this kind of statistical testing.
have other options.

Fortunately we

The typology rests on similarities defined by the

simple matching coefficient.

In Chapter III, I detailed the virtues of

-~--

----

:q

TABLE 20
DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS POR PREDICTING GROUP-TYPE MEMBERSHIP PROM SELECTED TRAIT VARIABLES
Function 1
Unstandardizedb
Standardized8
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var

1c
2
3
4
5

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Constant

0.04632
0.54873
0.20652
0.50160
0.13125
-0.53405
-0.41257
-0.51989
-0.41171
-0.33651
-0.95230
-0.35916
-0.06076
-o .04118
0.16579
0.02670
-0.03704
0.63738
-o.84220
-0.46313
0.04991
1.01394
0.93022
0.59903
0.82912

0.09085
1. 98178
0.62267
1.22866
0.25741
-1.22519
-1.01058
-1.13449
-0.94453
-0.68690
-1.86762
-0.73313
-0.12402
-0.12418
0.34822
. 0.08050
-0.09073
1.33877
-3.04168
-1.13444
0.13340
2.48364
2.27855
1.25822
2.03093
-3.90851

Function 2
Standardized
Unstandardized
a

5.08970
0.67718
-4.44383
0.03700
0.89525
-6.21680
-1.68483
-1.96213
-10.36690
-10.79249
- 1.91163
0.26018
- 0.07378
- 0.05062
5.58668
2.82919
- 4.07428
6.17277
- 3.82290
- 1. 74623
0.59982
7.63197
4.08282
2.11054
3.95757

9. 98171
2.44568
-13.39863
0.09063
1. 75573
-14.26231
- 4.12697
- 4.28172
-23.78328
-22.03008
- 3.74901
0.53109
- 0.15059
- 0.15263
11.73438
8.53030
- 9.97990
12.96540
-13.80666
- 4.27737
1.60308.
18.69444
10.00082
4.43301
9.69403
40.16757

~

0\
N

TABLE 20--(Cont)

Standard!Zed 4

Function 1
Unstandardizedb

Standardized8

Function 2
Unstandardizedb

Centriods
Type 1

0.51603

0.43073

Type 2

-0.23687

- 1.94538

Type 3

-2.52940

0.80122

Relative
Percentage of
Discriminatory
Power

98.42

1.58

Significance of
Explanatory
Function

so

d.£.
Chi-square
level

219.183
Beyond.Ol

24
88.946
Beyond.Ol

astandardized coefficients can be interpreted like beta weights in regression analysis.
bunstandardized weights multiplied by the variable scores (1 and 2 instead of the initial coding of
0 and 1) and added to the function constant provide a total score for any particular work. This score,
compared to the Type centroid, is the basis for classifying new works being added to the typology.
cSee Appendix B for list of traits. Other trait variables were dropped by the computer during
analysis because they caused singularity in the within-groups covariance matrix and, therefore, could not
be used for computations. However, with a different set of works, they may prove important.
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this tool: it falls into a conservative binomial distribution, giving us
a basis for statistical comparisons of similarity pairs; it is also a Q
technique to cluster theorists from a sample of traits, giving us an N
of 42 traits instead of 25 theorists.

Thus, for an initial exploration

of our hypotheses, we need only define an intersting group and compare
its mean similarity with overall population means (see Appendix E for
formulas).
Our original hypotheses about social effects on theoretical works
fell into three categories: four hypotheses about the composition of
scientific social circles, two about patterns of change in the circles,
one about societal influences on the circles:
Hypothesis IIIa.--The members of particular substantive circles in
sociology will produce works that are similar to the works of fellow
circle members.
Hypothesis IIIb.--The members of a social circle formed around core
ideas will produce works that are similar to the works of fellow circle
members.
Hypothesis !!!c.--People trained both in the same tradition and at
the same school will be more likely to produce similar works than
theorists who simply share the same substantive interests.
Hypothesis IIId.--Opponents in famous controversies will tend to
belong to different classification categories.
Hypothesis IVa.--In the early stages of a specialty, theoreticalresearch works will tend to be more similar to each other than they are in
later stages.
Hypothesis IVb.--When a new tool is introduced to a discipline, its
initial users will tend to be very similar to each other.
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Hypothesis V.--"Priestly" and "prophetic" sociologists will form
two cognitive groups producing two different types of sociological work.
Later we will return to the last hypothesis, but first consider the
evidence on Hypotheses Ilia through Vlb along with some implications
carried by that evidence.
Hypotheses Ilia and IIIb.--In Chapter V, I analyzed the networks of
similarity among students of stratification and religious asceticism,
advocates of role analysis and reductionism.

Now we can examine the same

theorists as those who share a "substantive circle" or a circle formed
around "core ideas."

In each instance, we would expect the mean similarity

for the group to be significantly higher than the overall mean of .637.
Instead we find very different patterns (see Tables 21 through 24).

The

stratification mean falls near the average when we consider all stratification theorists in the typology (.621) and significantly below the
average for the three analyzed earlier, Blalock-Goffman-Marx (.533).
Although we should expect a low mean for Blalock-Goffman-Marx (since we
already analyzed them as theorists who approach the same problem from
different types perspectives), we could expect the total stratification
mean to reflect the substantive similarity much more than it does.
Asceticism analysts and reductionists also share near-normal similarity
cores (means .636 and .614).

Only the role theorists fall into the pre-

dicted pattern of a significantly high mean (.70).
Even with this high-similarity group, however, the total core of
trait variables shared by all three theorists is quite low (22 or .55
three-way similarity).

In other words, the findings on these hypotheses

linking substance to similarity reinforce our earlier discovery about the
relationship between paradigms and substantive issues.

Regardless of

TABLE 21
SIMILARITIES FOR PAIRS OF STRATIFICATION THEORISTS*
Blak-Cool
Blak-Goff
Blak-Ho74
Blak-HoSO
Blak-Marx
Blak-Pare
Blak-Pr53
Blak-\~e22

Blak-He46
Cool-Goff
Cool-Ho74
Cool-HoSO
Cool-Marx
Cool-Pare
Cool-Pr53

.62

Cool-We22
Cool-lVe4o5
Goff-Ho75
Goff-HoSO
Goff-Harx
Goff-Pare
Goff-Pr53
Goff-We22
Goff-He4-5
Ho74-Ho50
Ho74-Harx
Ho74-Pare
Ho74-Pr53
Ho7l1-He22
Ho74-He45

.so
.60
.45

.so
.76
.64
.60
.51

.so
.55

.so
.81
.67
.64
Overall Similarity Mean

=

.69
.57
.57
.62
.60
.55
.48
.62
.45
• 76
.40
• 64
.52
.48
.40

HoSO-Marx
HoSO-Pare
Ho50-Pr53
Ho50-We22
Ho50-He4'5
Marx-Pare
Marx-Pr53
Marx-We22
Marx-He46
Pare-Pr53
Pare-He22
Pare-Het,O
Pr53-He22
Pr 5 3-\~e4'5
He22-\.Je4-5

.637

Stratification Mean • .621
d.f. - 41
• 1.6, n.s.
t
Mean for Blalock-Goffman-~~rx • .533
t = 10.4
Sig. at .01 level, one-tail test--apposite the predicted direction
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.

.40
.55
.48
.52
.45
.71
.60
.83
.67
.64
.74
.67
.57
.60
.69

...
0\
0\
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TABLE 22
SIMILARITIES FOR PAIRS OF RELIGIOUS-ASCETICISM THEORISTS*

DK12-Sumn

.69

DK12-We45

.67

Sumn-We45

.55

OVerall Similarity Mean • .637

Asceticism Mean • .636

d.£. - 41
t
• .1, n.s.
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.

TABLE 23
SIMILARITIES FOR PAIRS OF ROLE THEORISTS*

Pk28-Schu

.62

Pk28-SimP

• 79

Schu-SimP

.69

OVerall Similarity Mean • .637

Role Theorist Mean • .70

d.£. - 41
6.30
Significant at .01 level,
one tail test
t

*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.
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TABLE 24
SIMILARITIES FOR PAIRS OF REDUCTIONIST THEORISTS*

Ho74-Ho50
Ho74-Pare
Ho75-Sumn
Ho74-Tard
HoSO-Pare
Ho50-Sumn
Ho50-Tard
Pare-Sumn
Pare-Tard
Sumn-Tard

.76
.64
.67
.45
• 55
.57
.40
.69
.67
.74

Overall Similarity Mean •

.637

Reductionist Mean - .614
d.g • - 41
2.30, n.s.
t

-

*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.
what may hold true for physics, in sociology substantive problems are not
tied to the high-similarity core of paradigm views.

But, we have not

really addressed the initial problem of circle groups and similarity.

The

various writers considered here did not always belong to the same circle,
at least not as circles have been defined by Crane and Mullins.

Many of

these theorists worked on the same substantive issues without acknowledging
each other, sometimes without even knowing of each other.

Therefore we

must look further to investigate questions about circle membership and
similarities in cognitive structure among members.
Hypothesis IIIc.--To properly test the "training" hypothesis, we also
need more evidence than we have here; a cadre of theorists taught in the
same tradition, graduated from the same school.

Failing that, I have

settled for Robert E. Park, a student of Georg Simmel, an imitator of
Charles Horton Cooley (Braude, 1970; Coser, 1971:357-84).

The comparison

of Park with both of his forebearers and then Park with his teacher
Stmmel shows that training may have some impact; the means (.66 and .667)
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both fall slightly above the average although only the second is significant (see Table 25).
TABLE 25
SIMILARITIES FOR PARK AND HIS INTELLECTUAL FOREBEARERS*

Pk36-Cool
Pk36-SimC
Pk36-SimP
Pk28-Cool
Pk28-SimC
Pk28-SimP

.62
.57
.69
.67
.62
• 79

Overall Similarity Mean

=

.637

Park-Simmel-Cooley Mean • .66
d.f. - 41
t
• 2.30, n.s •
Mean for Park-Simmel alone = .667
t
- 3.0
Significant at .05 level, one tail test

*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations.
However, we cannot fashion a conclusion from one example particularly
when the exemplar theorist consciously imitated his high-similarity coworkers.
For establishing the ties between training and theory, we should examine
cohorts of graduates from selected schools.

Mullins (1973:294-315) has

mapped the lines of influence between sponsor and protege.

But he further

observed that the same intellectual parent may father very different offspring--as Parsons begat both Robert Bellah and Harold Garfinkel.

Lodahl

and Gordon (1973) observed teachers in more codified (paradigm-orientated)
disciplines spending more time and thought, exerting more influence, on
the direction of graduate students.

These authors compared firm para-

digm disciplines like chemistry and physics with the less structured discipline of sociology.

We may wonder if this tendency exerts its influence

within sociology: no schools organized around more unified points of view
produce more high-similarity graduates?

Or do sociology departments simply
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produce graduates who really learn on their own, and, no doubt, develop
their own heresies in the process?
These are not trivial questions.

In practical decisions we assume

great unity within graduate schools and diversity between them.

Harvard

and Chicago do not, we assume produce interchangeable scholars.

A mid-

western school may deliberately seek a transfusion of "new blood" from
the East Coast or from Berkeley.

Stinchcombe (1975) compared such

academic hiring procedures to primitive exchange rituals.

Although all

women have the same virtues (more or less), an Elk man must marry the
"special" Beaver woman, else the whole exchange system would collapse and
no Beaver men would consent to marry his Elk sisters and daughters.

The

evidence so far--on Park's moderate, deliberate similarity to his teacher
Sfmmel; on the whole network of similarities--suggests that important
·differences between groups may be small and deliberately contrived.

Per-

haps Stinchcombe is right; in six months an Elk could learn to be a
Beaver--in sociology the source of training is more important for political
reasons than substantive ones.
Hypothesis IIId.--Famous quarrels abound in sociology, as they do
everywhere else I suppose.

Ritzer (1975:201-08) argues that disputes often

arise between paradigm perspectives and illustrates his claim with suitable
example of theorists debating over methodological approaches.

His

examples include the Parsons (1963-Homans (1971) controversey over reductionism vs. functionalism (Ritzer, 1975:165-67).

Although Parsons and

Romans do not spend much time in mutual criticism, each consistently works
in his own tradition, each consistently avoids the other's perspective.
Excluding the unusual Structure of Social Action, I compared Parsons'
work with Homans' and found a mean similarity of .487, well below the
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average (see Table 26).

The typology also contains Tarde and Durkheim,
TABLE 26

SIMILARITIES FOR PAIRS OF WORKS* IN FAMOUS CONTROVERSIES (TWO
REDUCTIONISM CONTROVERSIES)

DK12-Tard
DK97-Tard
Ho74-Pr71
Ho74-Pr53
Ho50-Pr71
Ho50-Pr53

Overall Similarity Mean • .637

.67
.60
.45
.52
.50

Controversey :t-1ean • .537
d.£. - 41
t
- 10.0
Significant at the .01 level,
one tail test

.48

Durkheim-Tarde Mean = .635
t • .2, n.s.

two other theorists who consistently opposed each other on the issue of
reductionism and sociological analysis, once carrying this opposition to
public debate (Tarde, 1904).

The mean similarity between their works,

however, is almost exactly average at .635.
Once again, although we cannot draw firm conclusions from the
limited examples here, they do suggest problems for further thought.

The

mere existence of a quarrel does not signal paradigm divisions in sociology.
To assess a quarrel we must examine the trait variables involved.

Even a

series of disputes centered around the same narrow topic, in this instance
reductionism, may actually carry several sets of meanings.

In Chapter V,

I used trait variables to distinguish the tautological labeling by Tarde
from the behavioralist analysis of Romans.
examining controversies.

This seems a good approach for

Ritzer correctly documented how arguments may

arise from paradigm divisions.

Nonetheless, our task, if we are interested

in theoretical reformulation, is to determine the exact points of differ-

172
ence and the possible paths of reconciliation for theorists who oppose
each other ever some specific method or technique.
Hypotheses IVa and IVb.--The next two hypotheses link cognitive
similarity to patterns of change in the discipline.

Neither issue can be

properly solved with the material from our typology although the clusters
do leave some clues.

For example, if we consider specialists very broadly

defined, we find contradictory tendencies.

When nineteenth-century Marx

analyzed stratification, he resembled the old-fashioned Cooley (.81 + .12)
and Pareto (.71 + .14) far more than the modern Blalock (.50+ .15) whereas
Blalock does not share high similarity with fellow contemporaries Romans
1974 (.60 + .15), Romans 1950 (.45 + .15), or Goffman (.50+ .15).

It

appears that the core of similarity does, indeed, decline as a speciality
ages.

On the other hand, when three near contemporaries--Weber 1904-05,

Durkheim 1912, and Sumner--investigated religious asceticism, their mean
similarity was only .635--compared to the overall mean of .637.
on methodological tools is no more conclusive.

The evidence

Schutz based his ideal-

type methodology directly on Weber's (Wagner, 1970); ethnomethodology, in
turn, claims direct kinship with Schutz (Turner, 1974:321-31).
group means for Verstehen
(Table 27).

sociology is only .55, well

belo~T

But the

the average

In contrast, Blalock's path analysis of stratification relates

very highly (.95 + .07) to the "typical" work of its kind described by
Coser (1975).

Here the combination of tool plus substance may be the

critical variable.

When Clark (1975) described recent path analyses of the

variables affecting urban policy outputs, he described a group of researchers
whose work used the Blalock mathematical techniques on a different set of
topics (coding for Coser and Clark works available on request).

Clark's

typical work relates Only .74 (+ .13) to Coser's ideal type and .69 (+ .14)
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TABLE 27
SIMILARITIES FOR PAIRS OF WORKS* USING THE SAME
SPECIAL METHODOLOGICAL TOOL

Verstehen Methodology
(as introduced by
Weber)

Path Analysis (as
developed by
Blalock)

• 69

Coser' s "Typical" Ethnomethodologist-Schutz
Coser's "Typical" Ethnomethodologist-Weber
04-05
Schutz-Weber 04-Q5

.45
.52

Blalock-Cla rk' s "Typical" Community-Power Work
Blalock-Coser's "Typical" Stratification Work
Clark-Coser

• 95
.69

.74

Overall Similarity Mean • .637
Methodology Mean • .67
d.f. - 41
t
- 3.30
Significant at the .05 level, one tail test
Mean for Verstehen Group • .55

t: - 8.7

Significant at the .01 level, one tail test-- opposite the
predicted
direction
Mean for Path Analysis Group • .79
t - 15.6
Significant at the .01 level, one tail test
~See pages 116, 172-73 for explanation of Clark-Coser works.
Appendix C for list of abbreviations.

See

to Blalock's article, scores above average but also well below the almost
total similarity between Blalock and other regression analysis-stratifiestion pieces.
Coser himself (1975:693-95) suggests it is the combination of metho. dology with substance that freezes a work style.

In other words, when we

begin to automatically combine substance and method, we may impose premature closure on our technique.

Since--if the evidence of this study

,
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comes near the truth--we have not found the approach ideally suited to any
one topic, we need open options, multiple techniques.

However, promiscu-

ous leaping from fad to fad does not advance science either.

In paradigm

fields, a few creative pioneers lead into new territory, followed by
dozens of imitators using the same kind of axe to clear the same kind of
brush.

Blalock (1970):114-15) would refer to the brush-clearing activity

as "replication."

Therefore, even if the use of similar tools does

create a temporary high-similarity fad among social scientists, we need
not disceurage this flurry of imitation.

Perhaps, after tool and topic

have both been tested in numerous replications, it may then be time to
travel new scientific directions, axe in hand, looking for a new kind of
brush.
In conclusion, these hypotheses simply assert an overlap between
members of a scientific social circle and theorists who belong to the same
theoretical type sharing a high similarity core of trait variables.

The

results so far, ambiguous at best, indicate a possible relationship between
thought similarities and such circle criteria as common training.
not be surprised by the low support for these hypotheses.

We can-

As we have seen

in Chapter IV, even the types themselves show relatively low cores of
similarity shared by all members.

In Chapter V, I demonstrated how a few

critical variables distinguish one analytical approach from another; and
these critical variables vary with the subject.

Finally, the small number

of works examined here, selected to present diverse trends in the field,
may not provide the sample to demonstrate these points.

Indeed, I am

certain we could define "substantive circle" and other circle groups in
such narrow terms that all members would share quite similar thoughts (see
Crane, 1969:316-17 for sampling suggestions).

r
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To pursue this point, however, we should concentrate on identifying
causal direction: Do

like~inded

cipline train like-minded groups?

groups,circle together?

Or does the dis-

These questions need not concern theory-

builders who reconcile Goffman's study of self-fronts with Marx's ideas
about class consciousness.

But the issues involved do concern those

interested in "normal science" research problems.

If Kuhn (1970:23-51)

is correct, if normal science activity requires scores of scientists
researching the minor problems within a defined framework, then the discipline should consider how to acquire these normal scientists.

On

the

other hand, if Crane (1972:22-40) is correct, if the need for concentrations of specialists and generalists varies with the growth stage of the
specific sub-field, we must also assess the maturity of a speciality.

At

present, sociologists often assume concentrated training will produce
needed workers for speciality areas (Quarentelli and Weller, 1974:66).
But, given the loosely defined "immature" state of many specialities, the
discipline may be better served by generalized training for people who
will work several subfields.

In any event, more thorough investigation of

possible causal paths implied by these hypotheses might help us to assess
the merits of such issues as specialized versus generalized training.
The Political Mission of the Scientific Circle
The final hypothesis links scientific thought to outside influences;
in this instance, "priestly" or "prophetic" orientations, an ideological
stance about the purpose of science and, we presume, other areas of life
as well.

I will not attempt to test this hypothesis in the usual way but

instead, will approach the problem with trait-variable analysis.

I have

chosen this approach chiefly because the reformulation problems here prove
far more interesting than the identification ones.

First, however, we

,
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JDU&t identify the basic difference between "prophets" and "priests."
When Friedricks (1970) named these two types of sociologists, he was
examining the discipline at its "prirnordal paradigmatic level" to uncover
basic assumptions about the sociological role.

He described prophets as

iconoclasts who broke facets of the old order (1970:75) and priests as
caretakers who preached a faith in truth from the past •. A priest would
project past order on the future; a prophet would use knowledge of the past
to change the future (1970:106-09).
theorists?

Good distinctions--but who are the

Marx must be a prophet; he broke with the industrial-capital-

istic order by advocating a classless future.

Nonetheless, after devoting

many pages to Marx and the ''Marxist analogue," Friedrichs found very few
"fully prophetic" sections in Marx's. work (1970:286).

In truth this should

not surprise us because few great thinkers can be comfortable fully married
to an existing order or fully divorced from it.
After reading Friedrichs, I concluded that the prophet-priest distinction is a variant of the old conflict-consensus dichotomy.

It distinguishes

those who wonder about the source of disorder and explain it in terms of disagreement between interest groups from those who marvel at the existence of
order and explain this in terms of a societal-wide consensus on basic values
(Lenski, 1966:24-42).

The conflict theorists, seeing one interest group

suppress another, advocate insurrection; the consensus theorists, seeing a
balance of agreement in society as a whole, praise the status quo (Warshay,
1975:26-29, 60-66).

Friedrichs himself (1970:289-328) recognized the

parallel: if prophecy and priestliness do not equal conflict and consensus
orientations, surely they are similar.
However, I do not plan to code all 25 works from the typology on some
conflict/consensus scale.

As an alternative, I will examine the one truly

r
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conflict theorist in this group along with his closest associates.

Marx

beads a theory cluster (Cluster 2, Table 6) immediately joined by Comte,
Cooley, Parsons 1971, and Weber 1922--all clearly less prophetic, less
iconoclastic than Marx.

Yet all of these theorists share high similarity

with each other and together head the structural factor (Factor 1, Table 15).
If other prophetic ideas of conflict orientations required a separate paradigm, surely Marx would not be quite so highly related to Parsons 1971, to
Comte • • •

Even with five people in the group, they share 24 common

traits (.57 five-way similarity).
These common traits argue against facile contrasts between conflict
and consensus approaches.
developmental approach?

For example, is conflict an inherently radicalRadical-critical sociologists, we have been told,

study root relationships or the historically conditioned origin of changeable structures (Birnbaum, 1971; Horowitz, 1971:12).
researchers also explore "root relationships."

But consensus

All five of the writers in

this group examined coordination (trait 29) with its implications of power;
all stressed changing (32) modes of coordination, not short term change, but
historical developmental sequences (8).

In The System of Modern Societies,

to take one example, Parsons outlined the shifting relationships between
institutions when a society adapts to modern-commercial environments.
Parsons argued that only a society with increasingly independent institutions could effect the adaptive shift from medieval to modern capacity.
Ironically, as Lenski (1966) concluded in Power and Privilege, the radical
expose of exploitation structures often depict elite abuse of power during a long-term status quo, while functional-consensus works like Parsons
1971 better expose the root relationship leading a functionally useful group
to assume elite positions in the first place.
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Similar paradoxes pervade many other comparisons between these two
approaches.

Consider how functionalism and other varieties of large-systems

analysis are often interpreted in conservative terms: "a function must be
served."

All five theorists examined here began by viewing a total society

with functions (23); all but Weber 1922 continued on that level (24).

All

examined institutional structures (33) within a holistic-systems framework
(15).

Given these traits, we could fashion each work into a functional-

systems analysis.

Even the piece by Marx.

The "Eighteenth Brumaire"

could be a description of how limited land reform promotes short-term
political stability in a peasant economy.
Rex (1961:60-71, 136-55) identified another conflict-consensus paradox.

Conflict approaches, he argued, must separate personal motive from

systems function, something functional analysis does not always do.
all of the works here stress a positivistic

Indeed,

approach to viewing the action

from the "outside" (2) and all explain people's behavior in terms of
societal structure (3) rather than individual motives (4).

On the other

hand, Marx the conflict theorist and Cooley the conservative both used
interpretive analysis (1) to link people with ideas--Cooley for detailing
how society-wide open class ideology functions to obviate the need for
rebellion; Marx in predicting how group-based class consciousness forms to
ferment revolution.

These "personal motives" could also be assessed through

a positivistic questionnaireTinterview technique (34) if we asked about
attitudes and labeled the answers "personal assessment of group interests."
The crucial problem for conflict analysis, however, is determining where
ngroup interest" really lies both in relation to function and compared to
personal opinion.
In other words, although our five exemplar theorists do not form a
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representative sample of conflict-consensus theorists, they do illustrate
that theory traits cannot be exclusively assigned to one perspective.
Given our interest in theory reformulation, a more fruitful approach would
be looking for common requirements rather than distinguishing features of
conflict-consensus analysis.
To begin, let us consider only problems of coordination (29) in a
total society (23).

Conflict in a permanent stalemate seems contradictory

in such settings so we should use developmental analysis (8).

Further,

conflict occurs between two or more parties--at least it requires relational
analysis (6) of different sectors in society; these relations could be
observed with data about the structural characteristics of society (40) and
the social background characteristics of individual people (41).
trait seems vital.

This last

Conflict must occur between different kinds of people.

If some groups exercise power (40), they may be performing a vital function
for society; but if certain kinds of people (41) monopolize positions of
power, then they have probably created a "conflict" situation.

Marx in

"Eighteenth Brumaire" and Weber in The City both examined what the power of
"citizenship" might mean for distinct social groups.

Both observed how

urban masses formed a reservoir of revolutionary potential.

Weber assessed

the "bread and circus" policy of ancient Rome, economic and entertainment
pallatives for the masses; Marx critiqued governmental reforms which
appeared to relieve lower-class conditions while actually worsening them.
Both men also highlighted an important facet of consensus.

Agreement

about societal values may occur for many reasons and have different implications among various groups.

If we are to investigate the content of

this consensus, any details besides the simple agreement signaled by
absence of overt conflict we must examine it either as an interpreted
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~eaning

in the context of specific group situations (1) or as a cultural

product tied to some particular group (42).

For theoretical reformulation,

we should use these ideas to unite both conflict and consensus in one
analysis--! suggest by defining consensus in terms of group power, consensus
as a source or product of conflict, perhaps consensus "a trophy for the
winners."
Collins (1975) has detailed a resolution between conflict and consensus in precisely these terms.

He called consensus a "power resource,"

the creation of consensus a "power act" (1975:59).

In his chapter on

"State, economy, and ideology" he argued that even the most arbitrary
dictatorship rests on a set of beliefs organized by the dictator (1975:
348-413).

At a minimum, citizens share consensus that their personal self-

interest will be best served by obedience to the established order.
suppose this could include the self-interest in not being shot.

I

Certainly

when we examine a societal group looking for the specifics of consensus,
we find little practical agreement: everyone supports "justice" but differs
over the particulars of a just decision (Mennell, 1974:116-40).

Thus, the

consensus actually supporting a social order may be no more than a widespread agreement that, for whatever reason, we personally will not subvert
the present regime.
If we accept this perspective of conflict/consensus we need not wonder
why prophets and priests gather in the same theory cluster.
should examine the mechanisms promoting consensus.

Instead, we

Treat consensus like

money or material or manpower or any other power resource.

Look for the

routes through which one group acquires control over the ideas of others
and detail how this group then uses consensus to further its advantage.
This perspective eluded Comte during his search for the universal
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sequence of connnon world views (1858:258-63).

In "Brief estimate of modern

history," he related the shift in European culture from the spiritual force
of papal rule to the scientific capacity of industrial states presenting
European history as the most advanced example of this relationship between
kinds of societies and kinds of thought.

In the end, however, Comte's

explanation tells far more about the spreading effect of technology than
about the outlines of consensus within an industrial society.
Marx the conflict theorist actually analyzed the problems of consensus
in better detail.

With his stress on groups defined by common economic

situations (1846a:6-16) and on reciprocal action between members of these
specific groups (1846b:670), he suggested that the scientific capacity may
not have the same effect on each segment of society.

Nonetheless, as Marx

demonstrated in "Eighteenth Brumaire," subgroups do not necessarily formulate ideas to reflect their own self-interest in the given situation.
Cooley identified a consensus mechanism that may explain this anomaly:
social life, he said, is a social-mental process (1926:305-07), society a
network of connnunication (1918:26-29).

In his work "On the ascendency of

a capitalistic class," he reported connnunication networks spreading hope
for the lowly through open-class ideology.

As a vehicle for consensus,

his communication network of mass media reinforced by primary group values

has

proved more important than reciprocal action.

The history of Marxist

movements demonstrates how effective leadership can communicate a message
even to those far distant persons who have no opportunity for consciousnessraising interaction as Marx envisioned it.
But what is the necessary content of this leadership message?
much consensus is necessary before a group can act?
11

How

Parsons outlined an

action framework"--ends, means and conditions, norms--culminating in a
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"common value integration" of group created values directing us to choose
the appropriate norms to suit the ends, means, and conditions (1937:72735),

Parsons had elaborated his action framework from Weber's theory of

social action.

Weber, however, simply defined social act.ion as human

activity orientated toward the responses of others (1922:22-26).

Clearly

we need some agreement among ourselves to rescue social action from a
vacuum of meaningless; social action depends on others who react in
expected, "appropriate" ways.

But Weber required only a small core of

consensus, just enough to make social life tolerably predictable, not so
much that we can assume common agreement on a basic world view (Cohen,
1975).

There is, in other words, a critical difference in the two social

action approaches.

Parsons searched for the emergent property of common

value integration, even defining sociology as the study of this consensus
property (1937:768).

In his System of Modern Societies he described

industrial society guided by universalistic standards, specific role
obligations, and other adaptive values.

Weber only expected enough mutual

agreement to insure that we can depend on others to hold up their end as
long as we hold up ours.
issue.

Why these others are dependable is not the key

With this interpretation of consensus, Weber could expect a small

elite to define societal values for the rest of us.

For example, growing

rationality in Western civilization meant growing rationality in institutional arrangements: religious practices that "please" god; bureaucratic
hierarchies to execute army plans; careful reinvestment for promotion of
capital growth (Bendix, 1960:64-69).

But individual people could simply

follow their leaders without themselves working toward the rational,
deliberate manipulation of means for some end.

In The City economic prac-

tices limited the possibility of consensus; ancient Roman nobles might buy
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lower-class allegiance with social welfare, but the nobles did not expect
the urban proletariate to formulate wise political decisions based on
proper Roman values.
Thus, by seeing consensus and conflict as a single issue, we can
find combination possibilities even with the small number of works considered here.

The nature and content of consensus varies for different

groups in society.

Those with control over the communication network may

influence consensus among others._.., Those with control over important institutional structures may encourage others to "go along" regardless of what
they think
This combined view of conflict-consensus returns us to the problem
raised by Friedrichs in his comparison of prophets and priests--sociology
for revolutionary praxis and sociology .for understanding faith.

But once

we have turned consensus into a possible object or weapon of conflict, we
destroy the basis for faith.
established order.

Faith in what? if we cannot believe the

Cooley revealed how a society can spread some common

belief, we presume belief in anything.

Parsons, with radical insight,

explained how certain beliefs may mobilize society, but not, we must conclude, for the necessary benefit of all consenting individuals.

Although

this bad news about consensus may encourage us to promote changes in the
group, praxis offers no standards for the end point of that change.

Marx

once envisioned a society without unnecessary concentration of power, with
minimal bureaucratic power in the hands of a few coordinators (Mouzelis,
1967:8-15).

However, both history and sociology challenge Harx's narrow

definition of "necessary" power.

When power is mobilized and concentrated

in certain ways, society produces

more-~ore

economic materials, more

judicial decisions, more of all those goods that can increase day-to-day
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freedom for subordinate groups.

Furthermore, this power and the related

privileges have shown a persistent tendancy to concentrate in a few hands.
John Rawls (1971) would justify such inequality so long as it serves
the interests of the "worst off" groups of society: thus, a centralized
industrial society producing more surplus goods for everyone can be more
just than an egalitarian society with few goods equally distributed to all.
Reasonable enough, until we realize that social goods are often defined by
private choices, the aggregate of which are impossible to control (Boudon,
1976).

For example, the private decision of many couples to have "one more

_baby" can create a baby boom, precipitating a demand for more schools, more
jobs, numerous other goods.

Further the consensus about what is "good"

changes--often in the direction of increasing demand for a higher level of
good given to an ever larger percentage of the people.

I mentioned Rawls

and his Theory of Justice as a current, sophisticated attempt to bring
prophetic ideals into the service of some end besides iconoclasm.

Deal-

ing with the problems raised by Rawls will be, I predict, a major new
direction for sociology.

If theorists like Collins forge the links between

conflict and consensus principles, we must look for other social ends
besides those defined by consensus--not to the perpetual image breaking of
the prophets, nor the past-oriented order of the priests but to some other
standard; perhaps defined by a theory of justice, we hope tested for its
effects by sociological analysis.
This chapter on the sociology of sociology has traveled from simple
tests for simple-minded comparisons between groups to an expedition into
the nature and implications of the sociological mission.

Although I can-

not credit numerical taxonomy with all of the analysis here, it does provide a tool for comparisons between groups and--more important as we have
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seen with the prophet-priest comparison--a tool for sorting through theoretical ideas.

Using thi.s simple tool, I found a common edge with Collins

and his sophisticated analysis of the same conflict-consensus problem.

In

conclusion, numerical taxonomy can be a useful devise for further exploration into the sociology of sociology: first because the typoiogy based on
numerical taxonomy enables us to identify cognitive similarity between
theorists who may also be related on other criteria: second because the
trait variables which form the basis for classification also form a checklist of properties we may consider in critical analysis.

r
CHAPTER VII
RETROSPECT ON THEORY PARADIGMS
To be truly useful in modern theoretical work, classifications of
sociological thought should do more than simply divide theorists into
schools.

At present two additional goals seem important; 1) examining the

formal elements within a theoretical system as a step toward reformulating
theory; and 2) identifying the social-environmental influences that may
affect theoretical development.

Toward these ends, I have proposed a

numerical classification system based on many variables instead of the
traditional few usually employed for cataloguing theoretical works.

I

have detailed a rationale for choosing a particular approach, the mathematical techniques involved, a preliminary analysis of theory-classification data, and some suggestions for using this data in theoretical reformulation and explorations into the sociology of sociology.
How can we judge the results of such effort?
identifies "natural" groups of phenomena.

An

adequate taxonomy

A truly successful taxonomy

also retrieves information easily and tests hypotheses (Sokal, 1974:18586).

In this project I tried to identify natural paradigms of sociological

thought, to use the taxonomic traits for reformulating theory, and to test
a few hypotheses about the kinds of theorists who would be most likely to
cluster together in natural-paradigm groups.
paradigm into mathematical terms.

First I translated the Kuhn

A paradigm of works sharing a common

perspective for sociological reasoning is a dense monothetic cluster of
works sharing a large core of similarly coded trait variables.
186

Ideal we

,
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could expect to find two or more of these dense "natural" clusters separated
by great empty spaces of low similarity.

To identify the groups and trace

connections between them, I used three techniques: rearrangement of the
similarity matrix to group like works together; construction of clusters
based on similarity levels; and factor analysis of underlying similarity
properties.

All three tools located three major groups and consistently

'

placed ten (of the twenty-five) works in a specific group.

These unambiguous

clusters seem to represent two major dimensions: a stress on methodology
per se and a stress on subject matter.

Among those who stress subject

matter, most emphasize structure and a few prefer exploring cultural-social
perceptions.

These factors seem sensible.

They represent long-standing

traditions in the field and add some nuance to the recent typology suggested
by Ritzer.

Clustering, however, also identified four groups of theorists

who stand midway between the three factors.

This disparity between factor

analysis and clustering results illustrates the multidimensional relationships between theoretical works; even in the most "similar" groups, the core
of similar trait variables shifts from work to work leaving only a small
number of traits held in common by all group members.

Clearly no one para-

digm perspective dominates a theory cluster let alone sociology itself.
Nonetheless, these core similarity traits become very important in
reformulation exercises combining or expanding theoretical perspectives.
For example, I compared

}~rx,

Blalock, and Goffman.

Each theorist is an

outstanding exponent of a different type perspective; each wrote about
stratification problems.

By comparing their common traits and their dis-

tinguishing ones, I suggested how the three distinctly different perspectives could be worked into a common framework--Blalock's causal models of
attitudinal change as a test of growing class consciousness among

~~rxian
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cohorts, Goffman's work on the false self front as an-explanation of how
true and false class consciousness develop through interaction.

In other

reformulation exercises I compared works on religious asceticism, role
theory, and reductionism.

Each time using the trait variables for guide-

lines to the various possibilities of theoretical reformulation.
Man1 exercises in theory reformulation can prove useful quite independently of the typology classification.

To examine a handful of works

we need only their trait codings not the entire matrix of similarities.
Thus, we can choose theorists who explore some entertaining topic and compare their various views on the common concern.

Most sociologists have

been trained in a few techniques, in one or two perspectives; but we
research a topic rather than a perspective and develop subject-based
theories rather than theories about technique.

Theory reformulation with

trait variables provides a quick insight into different perspectives on the
same topic, an insight into the assumptions and orientation of a "different"
theorist as well as the substantive findings that happen to relate to our
work.

A truly intelligent combination of different theoretical views must

rest on this kind of insight (Sherman, 1974; Merton, 1975:43-52).
One of the key assumptions behind the sociology of sociology is that
colleague circles--theory groups, invisible colleges, and the like--coincide with paradigm perspectives.

So I have used the types as a limited

test of this idea selecting works from the same social circle to see if
they share the high similarity of many common traits.
hypotheses proved false.

Most of the

Not a surprising finding given the loosely

structured nature of trait similarity within paradigm groups.

However,

with a different set of trait variables, ones chosen to reflect the
v'

important issues for key groups we could probably find sharp cognitive
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differences between circle groups.

The variables used here measure

abstract, universal categories in sociological theory.

In biological

terms, these traits are like the general categories separating one mammal
from another.

If we were working in biological systematics and wanted to

distinguish between primates, we would refine the mammal traits to develop
more specialized primate variables.

For sociology systematics we could

choose variables to reflect nuances in the "interpretive" property, for
example, and provide a better base for statistical tests about specialized
circles in interpretive sociology.
With a different set of traits, we could also examine links between
sociology and other aspects of culture.

Crane (1972:129-47) argues for a

sociology of culture including science, artistic expression, and other
intellectual phenomenon.

Long ago Max Weber (1904-05:17-26) named a

common element in \vestern civilization called rationality and numbered its
effects in music, religion, architecture, business, science.

With care-

fully chosen trait variables, we could cover the same cultural fields seeing indices of rationality or other cultural characteristics in more
detail.
Even if we cannot test some hypotheses directly with the present
typology, the trait variables prove useful in other approaches.

One of my

hypotheses predicted differences between sociologists who have prophetic
or priestly political orientations.

But when Marx, who is clearly a

prophet, shares high similarity with such priestly thinkers as Comte,
Cooley, Parsons, and Weber, we cannot argue that prophetic theories of
conflict differ greatly from priestly theories of consensus.

Instead,

returning to the trait variables for clues about the nature of overall
similarity and the source of critical differences between these theorists,
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I argued toward the same conclusion that others have reached with a more
laborious literary approach: the conflict-consensus perspective unites
when we define consensus as an object of conflict.
As I have demonstrated, numerical taxonomy examines the nature of
soci~logical

thought in new ways.

It generates a numerically based

typology of cognitive paradigm tendencies based on methodology, social
perceptions, and structural constraints.

The trait variables form a check

list for theory reformulation exercises.

Similarity relationships in the

types can test hypotheses about the links between social circles and cognitive structures.

In effect, the taxonomy approach forms a kind of para-

digm, not a Kuhn paradigm of scientific gestalt but a

~ertonian

paradigm

of procedures for codifying some theory perspective (Boudon, 1970;
Merton 1967:69-72).

Although I have not fully outlined this paradigm-

for-paradigms, my theory reformulation suggests some lines of procedure:
examining one subject from several points of view, as I did in the stratification example; searching for differences in the "same" perspective like
the different kinds of reductionism; and finding common elements in such
"divergent" perspectives as the conflict-consensus controversey.

In each

instance, I looked for assumptions behind an author's approach as well as
the ideas in a specific work.

This style for reformulation efforts may

well be the most promising result of theory classification via numerical
taxonomy.

r
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THEORETICAL TRAITS FOR THE INITIAL CLASSIFICATION
Dimension One:

The Abstract Subject Focus of Sociology

Variables
1) Interpretive conceptions of social-science subject matter
2) Positivistic conceptions of social-science subject matter
3) Social levels for explanatory variables
4) Psychological levels for explanatory variables
5) Holistic-synthetic conceptualizations of social life
6) Relational-analytic conceptualizations of social life
7) The study of equilibrium in social life
8) The study of development in social life
Dimension Two: Abstract Methodological Strategies
Variables
9) Analytic-inductive strategies
10) Formal-deductive strategies
11) Typical sampling
12) Sampling from universal conditions
13) Analysis with type concepts
14) Directly propositional analysis
15) Focus on prediction
16) Focus on explanation
Dimension Three:

Groups Used as Sites of Analysis

Variables used as units of analysis
17) The primary group
19) The complex or large-scale organization
21) The community
23) The total society
Variables used as objects of analysis
18) The primary group
20) The complex or large-scale organization
22) The community
24) The total society
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Dimension Four:

Group Process-Problems Analyzed

Variables
25) Group formation
26) Differentiation
27) Socialization
28) Deviation
29) Coordination
30) Stratification
31) Innovation
32) Social change
Dimension Five:

Principal Data-Gathering Techniques

Variables
33) Direct studies of institutional structures
34) Interviews/questionnaires
35) Observations
36) Experiments
Dimension Six:

Observational Categories

Variables
37) Material environment
38) Spatial location
39) Population base
40) Structural characteristics
41) Social characteristics
42) Cultural products
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CODING GUIDE FOR TRAIT VARIABLES
Variables 1 and 2: interpretive and positivistic conceptions of subject
aatter
1 0

Basic stress on interpretations made by social actors.
Goffman' s "self" and Schutz's ideal-type "homecomer."

E.g.,

0 1

Behavior taken at face value although a psychological motive may
be posited as a given. E.,g., Simmel' s types of "poor."

1 1

Both cultural-subjective meaning and institutional structure
crucial to analysis. E.g., Weber's Protestant Ethic and Park's
"marginal man. "

Ritzer, 1975; Wagner, 1963; Wallace, 1969.
Variables 3 and 4: social and psychological levels for explanatory
variables
1 0 Activity completely explained in terms of social environment
(Goff-.n's explanation of social pressures in a mental ward) or
in terms of the social environment and a psychological given
(Simmel's "poor").
0 1

Psychological state is the principle explanatory variable.
Romans' Elementary Forms.

E.g.,

1 1

Psychological state alternates with social environment as part of
an explanatory chain. E.g., Tarde's view of crowd behavior.

Buckley, 1967; Rex, 1961; Wallace, 1971.
Variables 5 and 6: holistic-synthetic conceptualizations and relationalanalytic ones
1 0

Stress on system qua system, total and intermeshing parts.
Parsons' discussion of the development of N.W. Europe.

0 1

Stress on parts without explicit regard for the givens of the
system as a whole. Analysis could easily shift to a different
system and still apply. E.g., Romans in Human Group, Blalock.

1 1

Certain relationships are singled out for inspection. But analysis
performed in terms of how the selected relationship fit with the
system. E.g., Marx, Weber's Protestant Ethic.

Budkley, 1967; Rex, 1961; Wallace, 1971.
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E.g.,
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Variables· 7 and 8: the study of equilibrium and development
1 0

Stress on balance, changes are recurrent cycles.

E.g., Pareto.

Or emphasis on specific balanced times; even though change has
occurred from one balance to another, the mechanism is not
detailed. Simmel's "poor" or Merton's work on Puritanism and
science.
0 1 Main point is how a development originated or shifted.
Weber's Protestant Ethic, Marx.
1 1

E.g.,

Two (or more) stable systems explored with some mechanisms that
account for the shift between them. E.g., Tarde, Weber's work on the
city.

Blalock, 1969; Nadel, 1957.
Variables 9 and 10: analytic-inductive and formal-deductive strategies
1 0

A search for patterns in the data. Patterns defining a concept, e.g.,
Simlllel's "poor." Patterns of a specific relationship, e.g., Romans'
Human Group. Patterns of systems, e.g., Parsons in System of Modern
Societies.

0 1

Theory explicitly set up to "test," sets of statements to be falsified or verified (in some aspect, at least) by the "test." E.g.,
Blalock, Merton's study of Puritans and science, Pareto.

1 1

Both discovery of patterns in data and tests of relationships either
within the pattern or between the pattern and other variables. E.g.,
Weber's Protestant Ethic, Parsons on stratification.

Kaplan, 1964; Reynolds, 1971.
Variables 11 and 12: typical sampling and sampling from universal conditions
1 0 Underlying assumption that conditions "average out" in any random
sample. E.g., Blalock; Park on neighborhood succession.
· 0 1

1 1

Underlying assumption that a combination of historical, temporal
conditions affect other variables. An "extreae" sample may be
chosen to highlight these conditions. E.g., Veber in Protestant
Ethic, Simmel on the "poor."
Use of "universal" historical conditions for part of the research
but not all, e.g., Tarde, Pareto. Or use of a "typical" sample to
build to universal conditions, e.g., Romans in Human Group, Merton
on "self-fulfilling prophecy."

Rex, 1961; Willer, 1967.
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Variables 13 and 14: analysis with type concepts and direct propositional
analysis
1 0

One type (or constellation of variables) related to another type,
e.g., Weber's Protestant Ethic. Both types also explored
internally.

0 1 No "types" involved, direct comparison of two variables, e.g.,
Blalock. Or types incidental to the analysis in question, e.g.,
Pareto's analysis of elites (who have residues). Or analysis of
the inner workings of a type in terms of its variable relationships.
1 1

Exploring a developed type in terms of certain variable relationships, e.g., Tarde, Merton on Puritans and science. Using types as
part of a broader analysis, e.g., Durkheim in Elementary Forms.

Kaplan, 1964; Stinchcombe, 1968.
Variables 15 and 16: prediction and explanation
1 0

Stress on prediction. Possibilities under given conditions, e.g.,
Simmel on conflict. Necessities under certain conditions, e.g.,
Parsons on stratification.

0 1

Stress on the process of change, mechanisms that shift from one set
of conditions to another, e.g., Cooley.

1 1

Stress on both outcome and mechanisms, structure and means for
producing the structure, e.g., Weber in Protestant Ethic, Pareto.

Dubin, 1969; Gibbs, 1972; Kaplan, 1964.
Variables 17 to 24: groups used as sites of analysis--units (independent
variables) and objects (dependent variables).
Primary group: group in which relations are based on the quality of person qua person.

17

Unit: the primary group or its relations creates or shapes the
action, e.g., Cooley.

18

Object: the structure or quality of group relations is affected by
other variables, e.g., Goffman.

Broom and Selznick, 1973.
Complex or large-scale organization: group designed to accomplish
explicitly stated goals (even if the group has other goals as well).
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19

Unit: the complex organization structure affects other action,
e.g., Goffman.

20

Object: the complex organization structure is affected by other
variables, e.g., Simmel on how conflict changes organizations.

Perrow, 1972.
Community: group based, at least to some degree, on residence in a
small geographical area, integrated social relations, and a sense of
common membership beyond family ties.
21

Unit: the quality of community life is used as an independent variable, e.g., Weber in Protestant Ethic.

22

Object: the quality of community life is affected by some other
Yariables, e.g., Weber on life in ancient and medieval cities.

2122

Park on succession within the community

Bernard, 1973.
Total society: self-sufficient system with allegiance to a common "system
of action" which lasts longer than the individual and recruits largely
through birth in the system. In modern systems society tends to be coterminous with the nation state, in old systems with the community.
23

Unit: the variables originate in the structure or cultural mileu of
the society, including the societally defined background traits of
people, e.g., Weber on societal influences affecting city life.

24

Object: societal structures affected by other forces, e.g., Simmel
on conflict relations and societal cohesiveness.

2324

Blalock on how traits of people affect their position and attitudes
within the society.

Inkles, 1964.
Variables 25 to 32: group processes analyzed
25

Group formation--the establishment of boundaries with norms and
goals, e.g., Simmel on conflict.

26

Differentiation--of specialized skills and values distributed in
the group; the creation and sustaining of roles and performances,
e.g., Goffman, Park on "marginal man."

27

Socialization--for the transmission of patterns; process of learning identity and performance, internalization, e.g., Durkheim in
Elementary Forms.
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28

Deviation--both individual departures and group challenges to the
system; either applauded or deplored, e.g., Park on "marginal man,"
Goffman.

29

Coordination--to repress some deviance, to sustain some patterns, to
enforce authority, e.g., Pareto, Parsons in System of Modern Societies,
Parsons on stratification, Marx.

30

Stratification--systems of rewards and opportunities segregating
different segments of the population, e.g., Blalock, Parsons on
stratification, Marx, Goffman.

31

Innovation--technical, valuational, associational; new forms that do
not start as "challenges" (deviation), e.g., Parsons in Structure of
Social Action, Weber on the Protestant Ethic.

32

Social change--collective effects of innovation or deviance as felt in
the social system, e.g., Pareto on cyclical change (circulation of the
elites), Weber on developmental change in the Protestant Ethic.

Bosko££, 1972.
Variables 33 to 36: principle data-gathering techniques
33

Comparative or contextural study of institutional structures.
Examining the behavior of a group, the patterns of behavior most
characteristic within a group or the distribution of social traits
characteristic of a group. E.G., Marx, Pareto, Park on urban
8Uccession.

34

InterYiews/questionnaires.
Asking the person about himself, his opinions, including asking
dead persons by reviewing documents. E.g., Homans and Blalock using
the questionnaire/interview material of others. Weber in Protestant
Ethic and Parsons in Structure of Social Action.

35

Observations of behavior.
Observing behavior of individuals in interaction. E.g., Goffman,
Homans (who used observational material collected by others).

36

Experiments.
Deliberately manipulating a social structure to see the effects of
.anipulated variables. No examples in this typology. Homans used
the experimental work of others, but not in the pieces used here.

B.itzer, 1975.
Variables 37 to 42: observational categories
37

Material environment (available materials, limiting climatic conditions). Material environment used as a limit set on interaction.
E.g., Cooley and Tarde on modern technology, Marx on materialeconCIIJlic limits.

38

Spatial location (ecological patterns, social distance).

E.g.,
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Marx on organization among peasants, Park on urban succession for
geographical space; Park on "marginal man" and Goffman on social
space.
39

Population base (demographic variables as preconditions). Population defining the base of social interaction. E.g., Park on urban
succession.

40

Structural characteristics (technology level, age distribution,
social mobility, power distribution, and other features of the
group). Structural items involved in interaction, not just limits
on the whole system, for example, technology as a variable that
determines action between specific groups (as used by }~rx in
explaining social class). E.g., Durkheim on the relations between
sacred and profane areas in Elementary Forms, Simmel on structural
changes during conflict.

41

Social characteristics (class, ethnicity, religious identification,
other background traits of individuals or groups). E.g. , Blalock
on attitudes and social-class membership, l1erton on religious affiliation and scientific activity.

42

Cultural products (symbols, inventions, laws, beliefs). Thought
structures and ideas. E.g., Weber on the nature and effect of innerworldly asceticism, Goffman on the symbolic meaning of gestures,
Park on the cultural marginality of immigrants.

No specific reference.

APPENDIX E

APPENDIX E
COMPUTATIONAl, FORMULAS*
1.

Simple matching coefficient (for a pair of works)
ssm..

m is the number of matched (similarly coded) trait variables.
u is the number of unmatched trait variables.

m
m+u

Sokal and Sneath, 1963:133.
2.

/

Standard error of the simple matching coefficient (which approximates
a conservative binomial distribution)
S is the simple matching coefficient.
N is the number of trait variables.
Sokal and Sneath, 1963:313-15.

3.

The t-test for comparisons between sub-group means and the total group
mean
t

= X - _;l~

N is the number of trait variables.

Se 8 /Vif-l

4.

Total possible high-similarity connections between pairs in a given
group
connections

=n

(n-1)

n is the number of works in the group.

2

Beauchamp, 1970:33-34.
5.

Cophenetic similarity

~orrelation

coefficient

res =a normal Pearson's r between coded similarity levels rather than
just raw scores
Sokal and Sneath, 1963:312-13.

6.

Elementary matrix analysis
The similarity matrix comparing work pairs can be arranged to cluster
similar work pairs together. Place the most related pairs (in this
instance, those with similarities of .81 and above) close to the
diagonal of the matrix and surround them with the next related pairs.

*Formulas only included if they are unusual or if they deviate in some
way from standard statistical procedures.
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In the .ideal situation, this procedure should yield a final matrix
with all highly related pairs clustered along the diagonal, all
minimally related pairs in the left-hand corner.
Sokal and Sneath, 1963:178-80.
7.

Modified single-linkage clustering procedure
Begin with groups of highly related pairs (those of .81 and above, then
the next similarity level). In this instance, there are seven exclusive
groups (the seven defined by elementary matrix analysis). Enlarge
each nucleus by adding works from the next lower similarity level that
are related to those already in the group. Proceed until reaching .71,
the cut-off point used in the elementary matrix procedure. In this
example, it included about 20 per cent of all pairs. One cluster had
23 (of a possible 25) works before the clustering was completed.
Bailey. 1975:116-19.

APPENDIX F

APPENDIX F
SPECIAL COMPUTER PROCEDURES (OTHER THAN SPSS MATERIAL)
1) Calculation of the total similarity matrix from raw data scores (on cards
for each theorist). Program also punches similarity matrix on cards for
later use.

/1
MSGLEVEL=(l,l),TIME•2, CLASS•L
II EXEC PLIXCL2,PARM.LKED•

IIPLI.SYSIN DD *
EF: PROCEDURE OPTIONS(MAIN);
DCL X1(25) BIT(42);
X5(25,42) BIT(l) DEF Xl
X4 BIT(42),
X3(42) BIT(l) DEF X4,
SIMILARITY(25);
GET EDIT(X5)(COL(20},(4)((8)B(l},X(l)),(4)B(l},X(l),(6)B(l));
DO I=l ,,to 25;
DO J=l to 25;
MATCH=O
X4=BOOL(Xl(I),Xl(J),'1001'B);
DO K=l to 42;
IF X3 (K) THEN MATCH=MATCH+l;
END;
SIMILARITY(J)=MATCHI42.;
END;
PUT EDIT((SIMILARITY(K} DO K•l to 25)) (COL(1),(25)F(5,2);
PUT FILE(SYSPUNCH) EDIT(SIMILARITY)(COL(l),(8)F(l0,7));
END;
END EF;

* GO.SYSP

DD SYSOUT•B, DCB•BLKSIZE•80
GO.SYSIN DD *
(Insert data cards punched 0 for absent trait, 1 for present one.)

*

APPENDIX F--(Cont)
2) Calculation of the similarity matrix for sixteen trait variables.

EF: PROCEDURE OPTIONS(MAIN);
DCL Xl(25) BIT(42),
X4 BIT(42),
X5(42) BIT(l) DEF X4
SIMILARITY(25):
GET EDIT(XS)(COL(20),(4)((8)B(l),X(l)),(4)B(l),X(l),(6)B(l));
Xl(I)=X4; .
DO J=l to I;
MATCH=O
X4=BOOL(Xl(I),Xl(J),'l001B);
IF X5(K) THEN MATCH=MATCH+l;
END'
SIMILARITY(J)=MATCH/16.;
END~
-,
PUT EDIT((SIMILARITY(K) DO K•l to I) (COL(l),(25)F(5,2));
END;
END EF;

I*

//GO.SYSIN DD *
(Insert data cards as above.)

I*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Abel, Theodore
1970 The Foundation of Sociological Theory.

New York: Random House.

Alinsky, Saul P.
1972 Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals.
New York: Vintage Books.
Alker, Hayward R. Jr.
1969 ' "Statistics and politics: the need for causal data analysis."
Pp. 244-312 in Seymour M. Lipset (ed.), Politics and the Social
Sciences. New York: Oxford, 1969.
Baggaley, Andrew R.
1964
Intermediate Correlational Methods.
Sons.

New York: John Wiley and

Bailey, Kenneth D.
1975
"Cluster analysis." Pp. 59-128 in David R. Heise (ed.),
Sociological Methodology 1975. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
1973a

"Constructing monothetic and polythetic typologies by the
heuristic method." Sociological Quarterly 14 (SuDDDer):291-308.

1973b

·~nothetic and polythetic typologies and their relation to
conceptualization, measurement, and scaling." American
Sociological Review 38 (February):18-33.

1972

"Polythetic reduction of monothetic property space." Pp. 83111 in Herbert L. Costner (ed.), Sociological Methodology 1972.
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Barnes, Harry Elmer
"Social thought in early modern timeR." Pp. 29-78 in Barnes
1948
(ed.), An Introduction to the History of Sociology. Abridged
edition. Chicago: Phoenix Books, 1966.
Basu, A. K. and R. Kenyon
1972 "Causality and typology: alternative methodological solutions
in theory and practice." Pacific Sociological Review 15
(October):425-41.
Beauchamp, Murry A.
1970 Elements of Mathematical Sociology.
Becker, Howard P. and Harry Elmer Barnes
1961
Social Thought from Lore to Science.
Dover Publications (1st ed. 1938).

213

New York: Random House.
3rd ed.

New York:

214
Beeker, Howard S. and Irving Louis Horowitz
1972
"Radical politics and sociological research: observations on
methodology and ideology." American Journal of Sociology 78
(July) :48-65.
Bendix, Reinhard
1960 Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait.
Anchor.
Bernard, Jessie
1973 The Sociology of Community.
Foresman.

Garden City, New York:

Glenview, Illinois: Scott,

Birnbaum, Norman
1971
"Preface." Pp. vii-xii in Toward a Critical Sociology.
New York: Oxford.
Bisher, John W. and Donald W. Drews
1970 Mathematics in the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
Harcourt, Brace and World.

New York:

Blalock, Hubert M. Jr.
"Beyond ordinal measurement: weak tests of stronger theories."
1974
Pp. 424-55 in Blalock (ed.), Measurement in the Social
Sciences: Theories and Strategies. Chicago: Aldine.
1970

An Introduction to Social Research.
_Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

1969

Theory Construction: From Verbal to Mathematical Formulations.
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

1961

Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research. Chapel Hill,
North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press.

Boskoff, Alvin
1972 The Mosaic of Sociological Theory.
Crowell.
1969

New York: Thomas Y.

Theory in American Sociology: Major Sources and Applications.
New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.

Boudon, Raymond
1976
"Rawls: A Theory of Justice."
(March):l02-09.
1970

Englewood Cliffs, New

Contemporary Sociology 5

"Notes sur la notion de theorie dans les sciences sociales."
Archives Europeennes de Sociologie 11:201-51.

Bramson, Leon
~'The uses of sociology." Pp. 11-26 in The Political Context
1961
of Sociology. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press.

215
Braude, Lee
1970
"'Park and Burgess': an appreciation." American Journal of
Sociology 76(July):l-10.
Broom, Leonard and Philip Selznick
1973
Sociology: A Text with Adapted Readings.
and Row.
Brown, Robert
1963 Explanation in Social Science.

New York: Harper

Chicago: Aldine.

Buckley, Walter
1967
Sociology and Modern Systems Theory.
Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Englewood Cliffs, New

Cattell, Raymond B.
"Taxonomic principles for locating and using types (and the
1968
derived taxonome computer program)." Pp: 99-148 in Benjamin
Kleinmuntz (ed.), Formal Representation of Human Judgment.
New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Clark, Terry Nichols
1975
"Community Power." Pp. 271-95 in Alex Inkles (ed.), Annual
Review of Sociology. Vol. 1. Palo Alto, California: Annual
Reviews.
Coleman, James
"Social structure and a theory of action." Pp. 76-93 in
1975
Peter M. Blau (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Social
Structure. New York: Free Press.
Collins, Randall
1975 Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Science.
Academic Press.
1974

"Book review of A Sociology of Sociology."
of Sociology 79(March):l364-67.

New York:

American Journal

Comte, Auguste
1858 The Positive Philosophy of August Comte. Freely translated
and condensed by Harriet Martineau. New York: Calvin
Blanchard. Original, larger edition in French, written from
1830-1842.
Cooley, Charles H.
1926
"The roots of social knowledge." Pp. 289-309 in Sociological
Theory and Research. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
1918

Social Process.

New York: Charles Scribner's Sons (1922).

Cooley, William w. and Paul R. Lohnes
1971 Multivariate Data Analysis.

New York: Wiley.

216
Coser, Lewis A.
1975
"Presidential address: two methods in search of a substance."
American Sociological Review 40(December):691-700.
1971

"Robert Ezra Park, 1864-1944." Pp. 357-84 in Masters of
Sociological Thought. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.

Crane, Diana
1972
Invisible Colleges: Diffusion of Knowledge in Scientific
Communities.· Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
1969

"Social structure in a group of scientists: a test of the
'invisible college' hypothesis." American Sociological
Review 34(June):335-52. Reprinted pp. 295-323 in Larry T.
Reynolds and Janice M. Reynolds (eds.), The Sociology of
Sociology. New York: David McKay, 1970.

1967

"The gatekeepers of science: some factors affecting the
selecting of articles for scientific journals." The American
Sociologist 2(November):l95-201. Also pp. 406-22 in Larry T.
Reynolds and Janice M. Reynolds (eds.), The Sociology of
Sociology. New York: David McKay, 1970.

Curtis, James E.
"The sociology of sociology: some lines of inquiry in the
1972
study of the discipline." Sociological Quarterly 13(Spring):
197-209.
Deutsch, Karl W.
1971
"Conditions favoring major advances in social science."
Science 17l(February 5):450-55.
Deutsch, Morton and Robert M. Krauss
1965 Theories in Social Psychology.

New York: Basic Books.

Douglas, Jack 0.
"The rhetoric of science and the origins of statistical
1971
.social thought: the case of Durkheim's Suicide." Pp. 4457 in Edward A. Tiryakian (ed.), The Phenomenon of Sociology.
New York: Appleton-century-crofts, 1971.
Driver, Harold E.
"Survey of numerical classification in anthropology."
1965
Pp. 301-44 in Dell Hymes (ed.), The Use of Computers in
Anthropology. The Hague: Mouton and Company, 1965.
Dubin, Robert
1969 Theory Building.

New York: Free Press.

Dunnell, Robert c.
1971
Systematics in Prehistory.

New York: Free . Press.

217
Durkheim, Emile
1901
"Author's preface to the second edition." Pp. xli-lvii in
The Rules of the Sociological Method. New York: Free Press
(1964).
1900

"Sociology and its scientific field." Pp. 354-75 in Kurt H.
Wolff (ed.), Emile Durkheim, 1858-1917. Columbus, Ohio:
Ohio State University Press, 1960. Reprinted as Essays in
Sociology and Philosophy. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964.

1897

Suicide: A Study in Sociology.

1890

"The principles of 1789 and sociology." Pp. 37-43 in Edward
A. Tiryakian (ed.), The Phenomenon of Sociology. New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971.

New York: Free Press (1966).

Eisenstadt, s. N.
1971 Social Differentiation and Stratification.
Scott, Foresman.

Glencoe, Illinois:

Yleiss, Joseph L. and Joseph Zubin
"On the methods and theory of clustering." Multivariate
1969
Behavioral Research 4(April):235-50.
Yox, Karl A.
1974
Social Indicators and Social Theory: Elements of an Operational
System. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Yreese, Lee
1972a "Cumulative sociological knowledge."
Review 37(August):472-82.
1972b

American Sociological

"Cumultative sociological knowledge: an addendum." American
Sociological Review 37(August):486-87.

Friedrichs, Robert
1970 A Sociology of Sociology.

New York: Free Press.

Fruchter, Benjamin
Introduction to Factor Analysis.
1954

New York: D. Van Nostrand.

· Gannon, Thomas M. and George W. Traub
1969 The Desert and the City: An Interpretation of the History of
Christian Spirituality. New York: MacMillan.
Gibbs, Jack
1972
Sociological Theory Construction.
Dryden Press.
Glaser, Barney G. and Anselm L. Strauss
1967 The Discovery of Grounded Theory.

Hinsdale, Illinois: The

Chicago: Aldine.

218
Goffman, Erving
1959 The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.
New York: Doubleday-Anchor.
Gouldner, Alvin W.
1970 The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology.
Gusfield, Joseph R.
1963
Symbolic Crusade.
Press.

Garden City,

New York: Basic Books.

Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois

Bac:lden, J. K. and E. F. Borgatta
1965 American Cities: Their Social Characteristics.
Rand McNally.
Hansen, Norwood Russell
1958
Pattern of Discovery.
(1972).

Chicago:

Cambridge: At the University Press

Hauser, Robert M., John N. Koffel, Harry P. Travis, and Peter J. Dickinson
1975
"Temporal change in occupational mobility: evidence for men in
the United States." American Sociological Review 40(June):
279-93.
Hinkle, Roscos c. , Jr. , and Gisela J. Hinkle
1954
The Development of Modern Sociology.

New York: Random House.

Hirschi, Travis and Hanna C. Selvin
1967 Delinquency Research: An Appraisal of Analytic Methods.
York: Free Press.
Bomans, George

New

c.

1974

Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms.
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.

Rev. ed.

New York:

1971

"Commentary." Pp. 363-78 in Herman Turk and Richard Simpson
(eds,).Institutions and Social Exchange. Indianapolis,
Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill Company.

Horowitz , David
1971
"General introduction." Pp. 1-12 in Horowitz (ed.), Radical
Sociology: An Introduction. San Francisco: Canfield Press.
Huber, Joan
1973
"Symbolic interaction as a pragmatic perspective: the biases
of emergent theory." American Sociological Review 38(April):
274-84.
Inkles, Alex
What is Society?
1964
Ball.

Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-

219
Janowitz, Morris
"Social and political consequences of social mobility."
1965
Pp. 71-87 in Political Conflict: Essays in Political Sociology.
Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970.
Kaplan, Abraham
1964
The Conduct of Inquiry.

San Francisco: Chandler Publishing.

ICerlinger, Fred N. ·
1973
Foundations of Behavioral Research.
Rinehart and Winston.

2d ed.

New York: Holt,

Kim, Jae-On

1975

"Factor analysis." Pp. 468-514 in Norman H. Nie (et al.
eds.), Statistical Package for the Social Sciences. 2d ed.
New York: McGraw-Hill.

Klecka, William R.
1975
"Discriminant analysis." Pp. 434-67 in Norman H. Nie (et al.
eds), Statistical Package for the Social Sciences. 2d ed.
New York: McGraw-Hill.
IComarovsky, Mirra
1973
"Presidential address: some problems in role analysis. "
American Sociological Review 38(December):649-62.
ICuhn, Thomas S.
1970 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2d enlarged.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1st ed. 1962).

Lenski, Gerhard E.
1966 Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification •
. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Lipset, Seymour Martin
1975
"Social structure and social change." Pp. 172-209 in Peter
M. Blau (ed.), Approaches to the study of Social Structure.
New York: Free Press.
Lodahl, Janice Beyer and Gerald Gordon
"The structure of scientific fields and the functioning of
1972
university graduate departments." American Sociological
Review 37(February):57-72.
Lundberg, George A.
1939 Foundations of Sociology.
Madge, John
"Suicide and anomie."
1962
Scientific Sociology.
Mannheim, Karl
1936
Ideology and Utopia.

New York: Macmillan.

Pp. 12-51 in The Origins of
New York: Free Press.
New York: Harcourt, Brace.

220

Marshall, Clifford loT.
1971 Applied Graph Theory.

New York: Wiley-Interscience.

Martindale, Don
1960 The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory.
Mifflin.
Marx, Karl
1846a The German Ideology, parts I and III.
Publishers (1960).

Boston: Houghton

New York: International

1846b

"Marx to P. V. Annenkov." Pp. 669-80 in Karl Marx and Frederick
Engles: Selected Works. New York: International Publishers,
1968.

1844

Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.
International Publishers (1964).

New York:

Masterman, Margaret
1970
"The nature of a paradigm." Pp. 59-89 in I. Lakatos and A.
Musgrave (eds), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge.
Cambridge: At the University Press.
Mayr, Ernst
1942
Systematics and the Origin of Species.
University Press.

New York: Columbia

McFarland, David L., and Daniel J. Brown
1973 · "Social distance as a metric: a systematic introduction to
smallest space analysis." Pp. 213-53 in Edward 0. Laumann,
Bonds of Pluralism. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
McKinney, John C.
1966
Constructive Typology and Social Theory.
Century-Crofts.
Mennell, Stephen
1974
Sociological Theory: Uses and Unities.
. Publishers.

New York: Appleton-

New York: Praeger

Merton, Robert K.
1975
"Structural analysis in sociology." Pp. 21-52 in Peter M.
Blau (ed~), Approaches to the Study of Social Structure. New
York: Free Press.
1968

"The Matthew effect in science." Science 159 (January):56-63.
Also pp. 439-56 in The Sociology of Science. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1973.

221
Merton, Robert K.
1967
"On sociological theories of the middle range." Pp. 39-72 in
On Theoretical Sociology. New York: Free Press.
1956a

"Notes on problem finding in sociology." Pp. ix-xxiv in
Robert K. Merton, Leonard Broom, and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr.
(eds.), Sociology Today. New York: Basic Books.

1956b

"Social conflict over styles of sociological work." Pp. 17297 in Larry T. Reynolds and Janice M. Reynolds (eds.), The
Sociology of Sociology. New York: David McKay, 1970.

1938

Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England.
New York: Howard Fertig (1970).

Merton, Robert K. with Harriet Zuckerman
1972
"Age, aging, and age structure in science." Pp. 397-505 in·
Merton, The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical
Investigations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973.
MOuzelis, Nicos P.
1967
Organization and Bureaucracy: An Analysis of Modern Theories.
Chicago: Aldine.
MOvahedi, Siamak and Richard H. Ogles
"Axiomatic theory, information value of propositions, and
1973
derivation rules of ordinary language." American Sociological
Review 38 (August):416-24.
Mullins, Nicholas c.
1968 · "The distribution of social and cultural properties in informal
cODDDUnication networks among biological scientists." American
Sociological Review 33 (October):786-97. ,
Mullins, Nicholas C. with the assistance of Carolyn J. Mullins
1973 Theories and Theory Groups in Contemporary American Sociology.
New York: Harper and Row.
Nadel, S. F.

1957

The Theory of Social Structure.

Glencoe, Illinois:

Free Press.

Needham, R. M.
"Computer methods for classification and grouping." Pp. 345-56
1965
in Dell Hymes (ed.), The Use of Computers in Anthropology. The
Hague: Mouton and Company.
Nisbet, Robert A.
1966 The Sociological Tradition.

New York: Basic Books.

Parsons, Talcott
' .. : ·1976
"Reply to Cohen, Hazelrigg and Pope." American Sociological
Review 41 (April):361-65.

222
Parsons, Talcott
1964
"Levels of Organization and the mediation of social interaction."
Sociological Inquiry 34 (Spring):207-20.
1959

"The role of general theory in sociological analysis.
Kappa Deltan 29 (Winter):l3-22.

1937

The Structure of Social Action.

Alpha

New York: Free Press (1968).

Perrow, Charles
1972 Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay.
Scott, Foresman.

Glenview, Illinois:

Phillips, Derek L.
1975
"Paradigms and incommensurality." Theory and Society 2
~
(Spring): 37-61.
Pope, Whitney, Jere Cohen, and Lawrence Hazelrigg
1975
"On the divergence of Weber and Durkheim: a critique of
Parsons' convergence thesis." American Sociological Review
40 (August):417-27.
Popper, Karl
1959
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.
Torchbooks (1968).

New York: Harper

Quarentelli, E. L., and Jack M. Weller
"The structural problem of sociological speciality: collective
1974
behavior's lack of a critical mass." The American Sociologist
9 (May) : 59-68.
llainwater,· Lee
1970 Behind Ghetto Walls: Black Family Life in a Federal Slum.
Chicago: Aldine.
Rawls, John
1971 A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press.
Rex, John

1961

Key Problems of Sociological Theory.
. Kegan Paul (1970).

London: Routledge and

Reynolds, Larry T., Janice M. Reynolds, Ted R. Vaughan, and Leon H. Warshay
"The 'self' in symbolic interaction theory; an examination of
1970
the social sources of conceptual diversity." Pp. 422-38 in
Reynolds and Reynolds (eds.), The Sociology of Sociology. New
York: David McKay, 1970.
Reynold, Paul Davidson
1971 A Primer in Theory Construction.
Bobbs-Merrill.

Indianapolis, Indiana:

223
Ritzer, George
1975 Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science.

Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Roof, Wade Clark
1976
"Traditional religion in contemporary society: a theory of local
and cosmopolitan plausibility." American Sociological Review
41 (April):l95-028.
Sherman, Lawrence W.
1974
"Uses of the masters." The American Sociologist 9 (November):
179-81.
Siebler, Sam
1973 "The integration of fieldwork and survey methods.
Journal of Sociology 78 (May):l335-59.

American

I

Simael, Georg
1908a "Quantative aspects of the group." Pp. 87-179 in Kurt H. Wolff
(ed.), The Sociology of Georg Simmel. New York: Free Press,
1950.
1908b

"The web of group affiliation." Pp. 125-95 in Kurt H. Wolff and
&eiDhard Bendix (trans.), Conflict and the Web of Group
Affiliations. New York: Free Press, 1955.

Siuglemann, Peter
1972a "Exchange as symbolic interaction." American Sociological
Review 38 (August):414-24.
1972b "On the reification of paradigms: reply to Abbott, Brown, and
Crosbie." American Sociological Review 38 (October):506-09.
Smelser, Neil J.
1962 Theory of Collective Behavior.

New York: Free Press.

Sneath, Peter H. A., and Robert R. Sokal
1973 Numerical Taxonomy: The Principles and Practice of Numerical
Classification. San Francisco: w. H. Freeman and Company.
Sokal, Robert R.
1974
"Classification: purposes, principles, progress, prospects."
Science 185 (September):lll5-23.
1966

''Numerical taxonomy."

Scientific American 215:106-16.

Sokal, Robert R., and Peter H. A. Sneath
1963
Principles of Numerical Taxonomy.
and Company.
Sorokin, Pitirim A.
1947
Society, Culture, and Personality.
1928

Contemporary Sociological Theories.

San Francisco:

w.

H. Freeman

New York: Harper and Row.
New York: Harper Torchbooks.

224
Stinchcombe, Arthur L.
1975 "A structural analysis of sociology." The .American Sociologist
10 (May) :57-64.
1968

Constructing Social Theories.
World.

New York: Harcourt, Brace and

Sumner, William Graham
1910 "Unaltered sections." The Science of Society.
University Press, 1957.
1900

"The predicament of sociological study." Pp. 415-25 in Albert
Galloway Keller (ed.), The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1914.

SUttles, Gerald
1968 The Social Order of the Slum.
Press.
-

New Haven: Yale

Chicago: University of Chicago

Tarde, Gabriel
1904 "A debate with Emile Durkheim." Pp. 136-40 in Terry N. Clark
(ed.), Gabriel Tarde on Communication and Social Influence.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.
Ttmasheff, Nicholas s.
1967 Sociological Theory: Its Nature and Growth.
Random House.

3d ed.

New York:

Truzzi, Marcello
1975 "Review symposium on Mullins' theories and theory groups in
Contemporary American Sociology." Contemporary Sociology 4
(May):223-25.
Turner, Jonathan H.
1974 The Structure of Sociological Theory.
Dorsey Press.

Homewood, Illinois:

Udy, S. H., Jr.
1958
"'Bureaucratic:' elements in organizations: some research
findings." .American Sociological Review 23 (August):415-18.
Urry, John
1973 "Thomas s. Kuhn as sociologist of knowledge."
of Sociology 24 (Dec:ember):462-73.

British Journal

Van de Geer, John P.
1971 Introduction to Multivariate Analysis for the Social Sciences.
San Francisco: w. H. Freeman and Company.
·wagner, Helmut R.
1970
"Introduction." Pp. 1-50 in Wagner (ed.), Alfred Schutz on
Phenomenology and Social Relations. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1970.

225
Wagner, Helmut R.
1963
"Types of sociological theory." American Sociological Review
28 (October):735-41. Also pp. 41-52 in R. Serge Denisoff, Orel
Callahan, Mark L. Levine (eds.), Theories and Paradigms in
Contemporary Sociology. Itasca, Illinois: F. E. Peacock
Publishers, 1974.
Wallace, D. L.
1968
"Clustering." Pp. 519-24 in D. L. Sills (ed.), International
Encylopedia of the Social Sciences. Vol. 2. New York:
Free Press.
Wallace, Walter L.
1971
The Logic of Science in Sociology.
1969

Chicago: Aldine.

"Overview of contemporary sociological theories." Pp. 1-59 in
Wallace (ed.), Sociological Theory. Chicago: Aldine.

Ward, Thomas J.
1973
"Definitions of theory in sociology." Pp. 28-40 in R. Serge
Denisoff, Orel Callahan, Mark L. Levine (eds.), Theories and
Paradigms in Contemporary Sociology. Itasca, Illinois: F. E.
Peacock Publishers, 1974.
Warshay, Leon H.
1975 The Current State of Sociological Theory.

New York: David

McKay.

Weber, Max
1922
Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology.
New York: Bedminster Press (1968).
1918

"Science as a vocation." Pp. 129-56 in From Max Weber: Essays
in Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.

1917

"The meaning of 'ethical neutrality' in sociology and
economics." Pp. 1-47 in The Methodology of the Social Sciences.
Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1949.

1905

"Critical studies in the logic of the cultural sciences."
Pp. 113-88 in The Methodology of the Social Sciences. Glencoe,
Illinois: Free Press, 1949.

1904- The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.
05
Charles Scribner's Sons (1958).
1904

New York:

"Objectivity in social science and social policy." Pp. 49-112
in The Methodology of the Social Sciences. Glencoe, Illinois:
Free Press, 1949.

Webster, Murray J.
1973
"Psychological reductionism."
38 (April):258-73.

American Sociological Review

226
White, Harrison c., Scott A. Boorman, and Ronald L. Greiger
1976
"Social structure from multiple networks. I block models of
roles and positions." American Journal of Sociology 81
(January):730-80.
Wilkins, Leslie T., and P. McNaughton Smith
1964
"Predictive attribute analysis. 11 Pp. 814-27 in Norman Johnson,
Leonard Savitz, and Marvin E. Wolfgang (eds.), The
Sociology of Punishment and Correction. New York: John Wiley
and Sons (1970).
Willer, David
Scientific Sociology: Theory and Method.
1967
New Jersey: Prentice-~11 •
.

Englewood Cliffs,

.

Willer, David and Judith.Willer
1973
Systematic Empiricism: Critique of a Pseudoscience.
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
1972

Englewood

"Why sociological knowledge is not cumulative: a reply to
Professor Freese." American Sociological Review 37 (August):
483-86.

Wolfe, John H.
1970
"Pattern clustering by multivariate mixture analysis."
Multivariate Behavioral Research 5 (July):329-50.
Young, T. R.
1971
"The politics of sociology: Gouldner, Goffman, and Garfinkel."
American Sociologist 6 (November):276-81.
Zetterberg, Hans L.
1965
On Theory and Verification in Sociology. 3d enlarged.
New Jersey: Bedminster Press (1st ed. 1954).
Znaniecki, Florian
1965
Social Relations and Social Roles.
Chandler.
1940

Totowa,

San Francisco, California:

The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge.
Torchbooks (1968).

New York: Harper

APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by Elizabeth A. Freidheim
has been read and approved by the following committee:
Reverend Thomas M. Gannon, S.J.
Chairman, Department of Sociology, Loyola
Dr. William Bates
Professor, Department of Sociology, Loyola
Dr. Helena Lopata
Professor, Department of Sociology, Loyola
The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation
and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any
necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is
now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and
form.
The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Date

•

\

